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3Editorial Note
In this second issue, partly from the international conference “Future Faces of Food and Farming; Regional Challenges, World Food Policy (WFP) covers articles on topics ranging from food policy challenges in integrating food and 
nutrition security to food policy-related matters on aquaculture, dairy value chain, 
land policies and geographical indications system. 
Tremendous changes both in food policy and in food systems are here con-
sidered in three articles. Two of them provide us with case studies in the red river 
delta in Viet Nam: while Van Huong et al. analyze the present changes in food sys-
tem affected by rapidly developing freshwater aquaculture in a province of the Red 
River Delta, Nguyen et al.—based on the case study of Ba-Vi district, a “milkshed”, 
analyze the transition from state-owned concentrated production to smallholder 
farms. In the case of Thailand as a middle income, globalized, food-exporting na-
tion, Kelly et al. consider Thai enmeshment in the global food trade and impacts 
on food and nutrition security for farmers and urban consumers.
Food policy-related matters are illustrated by two articles. Regarding geo-
graphical indications, Marie-Vivien and Vagneron analyze the challenges faced 
in building an efficient yet appropriate system of controls in four Southeast Asian 
countries—Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Regarding Land policy, Pe-
tit’s ethnographic case studies in Laos illustrate how the state has become an in-
escapable mediator between people and land, transforming the social fabric and 
reshaping people’s agency.
While the majority of articles in this issue cover Asia, Lallau’s article looks 
to West Africa and discusses the notion of resilience as fashionable notion, its rel-
evance to the Sahelian context, and the way policies may “operationalize” it.
WFP will continue under a multi-disciplinary approach to welcome re-
search-based papers on food-related topics as well as those policies with notice-
able impact on the world food sector. Its scope also remains to include compara-
tive national food policies as well as issues pertaining to food policy at the global, 
regional and transnational levels. 
A subsequent issue will bring to you papers selected from the 2017 interna-
tional conference on world food policy, where the main theme is agricultural and 
food policy transformation. In the meantime, the materials on the conference has 
been made available on the WFP website.
  Véronique Ancey 
CIRAD, UMR ART-DEV, Montpellier, France, currently FAO, 00153 Roma, Italy 
Keokam Kraisoraphong 
Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok; Thailand
5Integrating Food and Nutrition Security in a 
Middle-Income, Globalized, Food-Exporting 
Nation: Thailand’s Food Policy Challenge
Mathew Kelly1, Sam-ang Seubsman2, Jane Dixon1,  
Cathy Banwell1, Adrian Sleigh1
Abstract
Thailand is deeply linked to the world food system, with food ex-
ports key to the country’s global connections. It has been a world 
leader in tackling poverty-related malnutrition and is food secure 
at a national level. New challenges are emerging with increases in 
obesity and diet-related disease as well as the relative poverty of 
farmers constraining capacity to avoid non-sustainable agricul-
tural intensification. Here, we consider Thai enmeshment in the 
global food trade and impacts on food and nutrition security for 
farmers and urban consumers. We review past and present poli-
cy approaches, and examine the prospects for Thailand to interact 
with these new challenges.
Keywords: Globalization; nutrition transition; Southeast Asia; sus-
tainability; Thailand
 
 
Resumen
Tailandia está profundamente vinculada al sistema de alimentos 
mundial, ya que las exportaciones de comida son clave para las co-
nexiones mundiales del país. Ha sido un líder mundial en enfrentar 
la desnutrición relacionada con la pobreza y tiene seguridad ali-
mentaria a nivel nacional. Nuevos desafíos están surgiendo con los 
incrementos en obesidad y las enfermedades relacionadas con la 
dieta, así como la pobreza relativa de los agricultores que limita la 
capacidad de evitar la intensificación agrícola no sustentable. Aquí 
1 Department of Global Health, Research School of Population Health, Australian National 
University (ANU)
2 Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University, Bangkok, Thailand
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consideramos el enriquecimiento tailandés en el comercio inter-
nacional de alimentos y los impactos que tiene en la seguridad ali-
menticia y de nutrientes para los agricultores y consumidores ur-
banos. Repasamos acercamientos políticos del pasado y el presente 
y examinamos los prospectos que tiene Tailandia para interactuar 
con esos nuevos desafíos.
Palabras clave: Globalización; transición de nutrientes; Sudeste 
Asiático; sustentabilidad; Tailandia
 
摘要
泰国和世界粮食系统紧密联系，其食品出口对该国与全球之
间的连接十分关键。泰国一直引领全球应对与贫困相关的营
养不良，其国内粮食处于安全状态。（泰国）正面临着新的
挑战，这些挑战源于肥胖和膳食疾病的增加，以及农民为避
免非可持续农业集约化而限制生产、进而产生相对贫困的情
况增多。本文考量了泰国涉入全球粮食贸易，并对农民和城
市消费者在粮食和营养安全上产生的影响。作者检验了以往
和当下的政策措施，然后考察了泰国在迎接这些全新挑战时
的前景。
关键词：全球化；营养变迁；东南亚；可持续性；泰国
1. Introduction
Today’s globalized food system has increased food availability overall, improving food securi-
ty. Indeed, since the early 1990s global 
per capita food energy availability has 
increased 100–200 calories per capita 
per year (Traill, Mazzocchi, Shankar, & 
Hallam, 2014). Consequently, the prev-
alence of undernutrition, particularly 
among children, has fallen, especially 
in East Asia and Latin America (Inter-
national Food Policy Research Institute, 
2013). But food security so defined does 
not reflect nutrition security of national 
populations for two reasons. First, food 
is not shared equitably due to economic 
inequality within countries, so under-
nutrition persists. Second, sufficient 
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caloric availability does not equate to 
optimal nutrition, particularly where 
the globalized food trade makes ener-
gy-dense processed foods cheaper than 
fresh healthy foods (Pinstrup-Anders-
en, 2009). UN agencies are increasingly 
making a distinction between food and 
nutrition security, with calls for access 
to sufficient calories to be complement-
ed by sufficient incomes to purchase 
health-promoting diets.
This distinction between food 
and nutrition security can be partic-
ularly apparent in major food export-
ing countries where food production 
surpluses may ensure food security 
overall, but high-quality, high-val-
ue foods are often exported. This can 
leave domestic populations food se-
cure but with less diverse, lower-quali-
ty diets, threatening nutrition security. 
As well, greater exposure to the global 
trade in food is itself a threat to pop-
ulation health. Globalized food chains 
have a comparative advantage in sup-
plying processed energy-dense foods 
high in sugar, salt, and oil (Chopra, 
Galbraith, & Darnton-Hill, 2002; 
Hawkes, 2008; Popkin, 2006). The in-
creased consumption of processed en-
ergy-dense foods is part of a nutrition 
transition, which has been connected 
with a global increase in the number 
of people overweight and obese. Those 
countries most exposed to the global 
trade in food are particularly at risk. 
Integral to globalization of the trade 
in food is the rapid expansion of bilat-
eral-, multilateral-, and regional-free 
trade agreements. Agreements opened 
up markets to food imports and for-
eign investment in food industries 
(Hawkes, 2005). As well, market lib-
eralization, particularly in developing 
countries, allowed the rapid expan-
sion of supermarkets from the 1990s, 
improved distribution networks, and 
increased consumer exposure to glo-
balized food (Kearney, 2010).
Thailand is an example of a food 
exporting, globally connected country. 
Food production has exceeded food 
needs in Thailand since 1995 (Food 
and Agriculture Organisation, 2013), 
allowing Thailand to expand its food 
export sector. In the past two decades, 
the Thai food system has transformed 
from export of a single food product—
unprocessed rice—to become a di-
verse sector which produces, process-
es, and exports a large variety of food 
products. Thailand is now intimately 
connected to the global food system, 
and the Thai government has actively 
supported an increase in both supply 
of and demand for Thai food products 
on a global scale. In part, its success as 
a food exporter has contributed to a 
prolonged period of economic growth, 
industrialization, urbanization, and 
social change, which has transformed 
the lives of the Thai people. Thailand 
has also led South-east Asia in tackling 
undernutrition and micronutrient de-
ficiencies through comprehensive pov-
erty alleviation and nutrition promo-
tion policies. In 1990, over 40% of the 
Thai population was undernourished; 
this proportion is now only 7% (Food 
and Agriculture Organisation, 2012). 
Yet, Thailand is now facing an epi-
demic of obesity and related metabolic 
diseases which follow non-traditional 
diets.
World Food Policy
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In this article, we examine Thai-
land as a useful case study of the im-
pact of globalized food on nutrition 
security in a middle-income setting. 
We have conducted an historical over-
view of Thailand’s evolving, complex, 
and globally connected food system 
through an analysis of all published 
literature and relevant policy docu-
ments over the last 20 years. Our at-
tention has focused on the effects that 
Thailand’s enmeshment in the glob-
al food system is having on domestic 
food and nutrition security for two 
population groups at opposite ends of 
the food chain: (1) agriculturalists and 
(2) urban consumers. This analysis 
reveals unresolved tensions between 
Thailand’s two major food policies: 
the domestically orientated “Sufficien-
cy Economy” and the export focused 
“Kitchen to the World”. Finally, we 
consider whether these tensions can 
be managed through the Thai Nation-
al Food Committee, or whether other 
integrated food and nutrition policies 
are required to safeguard food and nu-
trition security in Thailand.
2. Agriculture, Food Trade, 
and Rural Food Security
From the 1930s to the 1980s, the dominant economic activity in Thailand was export-oriented 
rice monoculture. From the 1940s, Thai 
governments invested in agricultural 
infrastructure in order to increase rice 
exports and introduced a rice export 
tax. By the 1960s, these export taxes 
began to fund industrialization aimed 
at self-sufficiency. Government poli-
cy kept domestic food prices low and 
then taxed exports thus expropriating 
wealth from the rice producers (Goss 
& Burch, 2001). Furthermore, until the 
1950s, land was still in relatively free 
supply and rice crop yields continued 
to increase through increasing the land 
under cultivation rather than any tech-
nological improvement (Manarungsan, 
1989). This was particularly important 
in the early 1970s when a substantial 
increase in logging concessions led to 
large amounts of land opening up to 
farming activities. Once the land fron-
tier was effectively reached in 1980, in-
vestment flowed to the industrial sector 
contributing to declines in agricultural 
viability through the 1980s (Siamwalla, 
1996). The Thai government assumed 
greater interest in rural development 
during the 1970s and 1980s, partly 
due to fears of communist influence 
in rural areas. Rural development took 
the form of investment in agri-indus-
trialization, attempting to raise rural 
incomes through greater commercial-
ization. At the same time, inequality 
between rural and urban dwellers grew, 
with subsequent mass migration to the 
cities.
Through the later 1980s and 
1990s, agri-business began to increase 
its role in Thailand, with the Charoen 
Pokphand (CP) group establishing its 
massive chicken and poultry prod-
uct enterprise. Now, one of the world’s 
biggest food conglomerates the CP 
Group adopted vertically integrated 
supply chain arrangements common 
in the United States. It led the way for 
agro-industry to grow faster than ag-
riculture itself and began the process 
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of tying Thai agriculture to food pro-
cessing opportunities (Goss, Burch, & 
Rickson, 2000). The 1990s saw a huge 
growth in the export of frozen shrimp 
and chicken meat (largely supplied by 
CP), and other processed agricultural 
goods and canned foods, and rice ex-
ports diminished in importance. It is, 
however, important to note that despite 
the growth of agri-business firms such 
as CP in Thailand, independent and 
small to medium scale firms continued 
to account for the majority of food pro-
cessing activity.
Several factors have contrib-
uted to Thailand’s rise as a major 
food-producing nation: (1) the strong 
Thai domestic market allows produc-
ers in Thailand a bigger market for 
their products than nearby develop-
ing nations; (2) strength in agro-pro-
cessing supported by extensive re-
search and development investment 
from private and public sources; (3) 
improvements in packaging; (4) very 
strict food hygiene and safety laws; 
and (5) successful promotion of the 
Thai diet as healthy and its spread 
round the world (Murray, 2007; 
Poapongsakorn, 2010).
Also important for Thailand’s 
increasing role as a processed and raw 
food exporter are free trade agree-
ments with major trading partners, 
particularly Australia and India, with 
an agreement with the European 
Union currently under negotiation. As 
well, as a member of the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASE-
AN), Thailand participates in several 
free trade zones. These ASEAN trade 
zones include Australia again as well as 
India and importantly China. In fact, 
Thailand is the most active country 
in Asia in pursuing these agreements, 
which have broadened Thailand’s ex-
port market particularly into neigh-
boring ASEAN countries and China. 
The flip-side of the free trade regime 
has been openness to increased food 
imports, particularly of temperate re-
gion produce and cheaper products 
from China (Prachason, 2009; Zam-
roni, 2006).
By the late 2000s, Thailand was 
the only net food exporter in Asia. It 
has achieved this by both growing 
food and developing its own food pro-
cessing industry. Problems remain, 
however, with the Thai agricultural 
sector. Thailand’s agriculturalists have 
amongst the lowest productivity lev-
els in the region  and have moved into 
other work sectors at a slower rate than 
in other comparable countries. This is 
exemplified by the fact that 40% of the 
Thai workforce is still engaged in agri-
culture which only contributes around 
10% of GDP (Kelly et al., 2010). As 
well, Thai farmers remain amongst the 
most financially insecure groups in 
the country (Isvilanonda & Bunyasiri, 
2009; Jitsuchon & Siamwalla, 2009). 
The Thai government has two broad 
policy approaches to the future of the 
Thai food system and Thai agricultur-
alists livelihoods: the Kitchen to the 
World and the Sufficiency Economy. 
We will now consider the potential of 
each of those approaches to improve 
income, nutrition, and food security of 
Thai food producers.
World Food Policy
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Time 
period
Major policy components Economic development factors
1850–
1930
• Expansion of rice frontier and 
development of cash cropping 
rice monoculture
• Government assistance with ir-
rigation and land clearing proj-
ects
• End of royal monopoly on rice 
trade
• Opening of economy to interna-
tional (especially European) trade. 
Including trade and extraterritori-
ality agreements with Britain and 
other nations
• Ending of corvee labor system and 
slavery encouraged free peasant 
landholder class to enter cash econ-
omy through rice trade
• Inward migration of Chinese mer-
chants who as middlemen helped 
develop the rice trade.
1930–
1960
• Emphasis on national self- 
sufficiency
• Export taxes introduced for rice 
and tariff protection for other 
agricultural crops
• These taxes fund beginning of 
industrial development, partic-
ularly processing of agricultural 
products
• Continuing expansion of rice 
frontier meant little investment 
in productivity or infrastruc-
ture
• Rice dominates agriculture oc-
cupying more than 70% of cul-
tivated areas and employing up 
to two-third of total labor force 
(1958)
• Main agricultural development 
strategy expansion of irrigated 
areas
• Nationalist military governments 
and Japanese occupation moved 
trade focus from Europe to Asia
• Consolidation of rice trade into few 
family firms with patronage from 
Thai army and bureaucrats
• Agricultural share of GDP falls 
from 50% to 40% in the 1950s
1960–
1973
• Investment in agricultural di- 
versification and moderniza-
tion
• Diversification to crops for in-
dustrial inputs, e.g. sugar cane 
and jute
• Land devoted to crops other 
than rice rose from 18% to 32% 
in 1971
• Land ownership concentration 
but remaining dominance of 
small holder agriculture
• Agricultural development sub-
ordinated to industrial devel-
opment
• Reorientation from state enterpris-
es toward private (and foreign) in-
vestment to develop the economy
• Beginning of mass influx of US Aid 
and military spending as well as 
business investment
• Establishment of NESDB and be-
ginning of 5-year development 
plans
1974–
1990
• Rural economic development 
planning prioritized—aimed at 
poverty reduction and commu-
nity health
• Aimed to raise rural incomes 
through commercial agricul-
ture
• Private agribusiness grows en-
couraged by government in-
vestment incentives
• Beginning of value added agri-
food production for export
• End of land frontier—agricul-
tural growth could no longer 
depend on clearing and plant-
ing more land
• Introduction of Green Revolu-
tion crops
• Community development period
• Rapid increase in urban economy, 
manufacturing, and industry lead 
to increasing urban/rural inequali-
ty and rural–urban migration
• Sustained decreases in overall pov-
erty but increases in inequality
• Manufacturing and trade overtake 
agriculture for contribution to 
GDP in 1980
• Farm families cash incomes in-
crease and subsistence agriculture 
decreases.
Table 1. Key Trends in the Thai Agriculture and Food Processing Sectors
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1960–
1973
• Investment in agricultural di- 
versification and moderniza-
tion
• Diversification to crops for in-
dustrial inputs, e.g. sugar cane 
and jute
• Land devoted to crops other 
than rice rose from 18% to 32% 
in 1971
• Land ownership concentration 
but remaining dominance of 
small holder agriculture
• Agricultural development sub-
ordinated to industrial devel-
opment
• Reorientation from state enterpris-
es toward private (and foreign) in-
vestment to develop the economy
• Beginning of mass influx of US Aid 
and military spending as well as 
business investment
• Establishment of NESDB and be-
ginning of 5-year development 
plans
1974–
1990
• Rural economic development 
planning prioritized—aimed at 
poverty reduction and commu-
nity health
• Aimed to raise rural incomes 
through commercial agricul-
ture
• Private agribusiness grows en-
couraged by government in-
vestment incentives
• Beginning of value added agri-
food production for export
• End of land frontier—agricul-
tural growth could no longer 
depend on clearing and plant-
ing more land
• Introduction of Green Revolu-
tion crops
• Community development period
• Rapid increase in urban economy, 
manufacturing, and industry lead 
to increasing urban/rural inequali-
ty and rural–urban migration
• Sustained decreases in overall pov-
erty but increases in inequality
• Manufacturing and trade overtake 
agriculture for contribution to 
GDP in 1980
• Farm families cash incomes in-
crease and subsistence agriculture 
decreases.
1990 • Expansion of contract farming, 
particularly for poultry and ex-
port vegetables
• Export share of processed ag-
ricultural commodities rapidly 
increased while the share of rice 
exports decreased
• Decreases in government in-
vestment in agriculture re-
placed by agri-business invest-
ment
• Dominance of capitalist free mar-
ket ideology in Thailand
• Reductions in state intervention 
in economy including agricultural 
sector
2000 • Kitchen to the World
• Free Trade Agreements
• Establishment of National Food 
Committee
• One Tambon One Product pro-
gram
• Sustainable agriculture, suffi-
ciency economy, and organic 
agriculture enter national dis-
course—farmers encouraged 
to diversify crops and balance 
subsistence and market crops
• Abundant cheap processed food
• Rice mortgage schemes to help 
farmer incomes
World Food Policy
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2.1. The Kitchen to the World 
and Contract Farming
Since the 1970s, a main Thai gov-ernment approach to rural devel-opment has been to increasingly 
commercialize agriculture and bring 
farmers into the cash economy. The 
assumption was that rising incomes 
would allow rural Thais to purchase 
the food products they did not produce 
themselves and become more food se-
cure. In the contemporary Thai food 
system described above, this approach 
is extended to including small holder 
farmer participation in agri-business 
dominated, export-oriented produc-
tion. The Kitchen to the World policy 
aims to increase production and export 
of both primary agricultural products 
and processed foods on a massive scale 
(Supaphol, 2010). One outcome of this 
policy approach has been an increase in 
the use of contract farming in Thailand. 
Producing for the international mar-
ket increasingly requires standardized, 
high-quality, hygienic produce. Con-
tract farming is seen as a way to achieve 
these standards.
Contract farming began in Thai-
land in the 1970s with the CP group, but 
rapidly expanded in the 1990s. Thailand 
is now the biggest contract farming 
country in Asia, with more than half-
a-million contract growing households 
(Singh, 2006). The Thai government has 
been actively involved in this process 
with the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives and the Bank for Agri-
culture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
helping facilitate contracts, providing 
farmers with credit to help establishing 
new production methods and also pro-
viding tax concessions to agri-business-
es to encourage their participation (Del-
forge, 2007). A key government strategy 
has become “private-led integrated ag-
ricultural development” (Singh, 2006).
Access to markets, as well as in-
creases in production, can be key to 
poverty reduction and the United Na-
tions Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion views contract farming as an effec-
tive method to link farmers to global 
1990 • Expansion of contract farming, 
particularly for poultry and ex-
port vegetables
• Export share of processed ag-
ricultural commodities rapidly 
increased while the share of rice 
exports decreased
• Decreases in government in-
vestment in agriculture re-
placed by agri-business invest-
ment
• Dominance of capitalist free mar-
ket ideology in Thailand
• Reductions in state intervention 
in economy including agricultural 
sector
2000 • Kitchen to the World
• Free Trade Agreements
• Establishment of National Food 
Committee
• One Tambon One Product pro-
gram
• Sustainable agriculture, suffi-
ciency economy, and organic 
agriculture enter national dis-
course—farmers encouraged 
to diversify crops and balance 
subsistence and market crops
• Abundant cheap processed food
• Rice mortgage schemes to help 
farmer incomes
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markets which they would be unable 
to do without assistance (da Silva & 
Rankin, 2013). International evidence, 
however, suggests that contract farm-
ing arrangements, , have in many cases 
benefitted food processors and urban 
consumers more than the food produc-
ers themselves. Pressures to produce 
the lowest possible priced foods for 
consumers have been shown to mainly 
fall on food producers who trade au-
tonomy for more secure, though lower 
incomes (Constance, 2008). The out-
comes for Thai farmers of participation 
in contract farming and by extension in 
the Kitchen to the World program have 
also been mixed. Incomes under con-
tract farming are often more reliable 
and transparent, and using contracting 
companies as middle men has reduced 
wastage and inefficiency in the val-
ue chain leading to increased incomes 
for farmers and food companies. Some 
food production contracting compa-
nies also provide crop insurance, edu-
cation funds for farmers’ children, and 
other social services not provided by 
the government, further assisting with 
poverty alleviation (Bamman, 2007). In 
addition, contract farming is providing 
food producers with access to compa-
ny-mediated extension services, techni-
cal knowledge, and ease of credit which 
farmers can utilize even if they return 
to selling on the open market (Sriboon-
chitta & Wiboonpoongse, 2008).
The outcomes of this participa-
tion in globalized production, how-
ever, are not always positive. Contract 
terms can be one-sided, especially over 
time as market conditions change, with 
farmers being responsible for most risk 
where production cannot meet con-
tracted amounts. When this occurs 
and seed, fertilizers and other inputs 
were provided on credit, indebtedness 
is often the result. Incomes are also not 
always improved by entering contract 
arrangements with prices deliberately 
set below the market rate, and contract 
farmers often earning less than the na-
tional minimum wage (Delforge, 2007). 
Some researchers have also observed 
that any benefits that are gained through 
contract farming are disproportionate-
ly enjoyed by already larger scale and 
better resourced farmers (Schipmann 
& Qaim, 2010, 2011b). Other research, 
however, has shown that small holder 
farmers can successfully participate in 
some areas of contract farming where 
they have particular advantages such 
as herb growing which requires more 
micromanagement (Boselie, Henson, & 
Weatherspoon, 2003).
 Contract farming companies 
also usually stipulate the use of par-
ticular levels of pesticides and herbi-
cides, often more than would be used 
otherwise. This has been observed by 
Thai farmers to be a negative outcome 
for their own health and that of their 
local environments (Delforge, 2007; 
Singh, 2006). Interestingly, though this 
is a phenomenon which seems to be 
changing. International markets partic-
ularly in the rich developed countries 
are increasingly demanding “safe,” re-
duced pesticide, or organic food prod-
ucts. An important component now of 
the Kitchen to the World policy is for 
Thailand to market itself as a source 
of “safe” foods. The Thai Ministries of 
Agriculture and Public Health togeth-
World Food Policy
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er with Thailand’s leading agricultural 
university (Kasetsart) are developing 
systems to monitor food safety all along 
the food chain and to train farmers in 
safe farming methods enabling them to 
gain certification under Good Agricul-
tural Practices (GAP) requirements and 
the Hazard Analysis and Critical Con-
trol Point criteria. This will allow Thai 
products access to lucrative European 
markets (Supaphol, 2010). So far, how-
ever, results of the promotion of organic 
farming in Thailand have been mixed. 
One analysis of Thai farmers growing 
organic rice under contract found their 
incomes to be significantly enhanced 
compared to conventional rice (Set-
boonsarng, Leung, & Cai, 2006). Other 
studies of vegetable growers, howev-
er, have found incomes from organic 
farming to be significantly lower than 
for conventional farming, largely due to 
lower yields (Rattanasutteerakul & Tha-
pa, 2012). “Safe” vegetable growing can 
also still produce bias towards already 
more well-resourced and well-educat-
ed farmers (Kersting & Wollni, 2012) 
and is of course still subject to the fluc-
tuations of market demand for certain 
products.
2.2. The Sufficiency Economy 
and Sustainable Communities
Following the Asian Financial Cri-sis of 1997, there were growing calls in Thailand for a reassess-
ment of the outward-looking, growth 
driven model of economic development 
which had been followed for the previ-
ous few decades. This movement was 
brought into focus by the Thai monarch 
in an influential speech in which he 
proposed a “sufficiency economy” phi-
losophy to guide development. There 
are many aspects to this philosophy, but 
in terms of rural development the aim 
is establishing self-reliant households 
and communities first before looking 
outwards to the market (Seubsman, 
Kelly, & Sleigh, 2013). This is at its ba-
sis an anti-capitalist idea and was part-
ly inspired by the Swadeshi movement 
of self-sufficient communities in early 
twentieth century India, which aimed 
to reduce dependence on imported 
British products, and by the Kibbutz 
commutarian movement in Israel (Is-
ager & Ivarsson, 2010).
In the years following the king’s 
speech, the ideas behind the sufficiency 
economy were formalized and a royal-
ly approved definition emerged. This 
definition had several levels. At the 
household level, the aim of the suffi-
ciency economy is for small landhold-
ers to move towards model self-reliant 
farms. These farms should be divided 
into four zones where farmers could de-
velop water storage, cultivate rice, plant 
fruit and vegetable crops, and practice 
animal husbandry. The emphasis is also 
on practicing low chemical, sustainable 
mixed agriculture. Moving forward ru-
ral communities could develop trading 
networks and work sharing arrange-
ments allowing any needs unsatisfied at 
the household level to still be obtained 
locally. At the regional and national lev-
el, the approach recommends modera-
tion in expenditure, reducing govern-
ment debt and reducing vulnerability to 
external shocks through conservative 
macroeconomic management (Unit-
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ed Nations Development Programme, 
2007).
The stated aim of this approach 
is to empower farming households by 
making them less reliant on fluctuat-
ing market forces and to enable more 
secure incomes for farmers through 
growing a larger variety of crops (Supa-
phol, 2010). The health and economic 
benefits of organic agriculture are also 
recognized. Importantly, the philoso-
phy distinguishes between subsistence 
production and sufficiency production, 
with sufficiency meaning that farmers 
produce enough for a comfortable ex-
istence. At the root of the sufficiency, 
economy is an appeal to the Buddhist 
‘middle path’ of moderation. Farmers 
shouldn’t live in poverty and depriva-
tion, but also should not sacrifice their 
happiness, health, and the environment 
for greater economic gain. In this as-
pect the philosophy is not a new idea, 
it continues various government pro-
grams since the 1980s which have en-
couraged Thai people to self-reliance, 
thrift, self-discipline, and commitment 
to the community and nation (Pong-
sapich, 1996).
Since 2002, the sufficiency econ-
omy philosophy has been incorporated 
into official Thai government planning 
documents, most notably the 5-year-
ly National Economic and Social De-
velopment plans, as a key goal of Thai 
development strategies. And after 2006, 
when a military government took con-
trol of the country, it became the “offi-
cial guiding philosophy” for all branch-
es of government. Ten billion baht was 
invested in creating model villages and 
training centers where farmers could 
be trained in sufficiency methods, fam-
ers were offered seed money to convert 
their farm practices, sufficiency econ-
omy principles were taught in schools 
and special television programs, and 
social marketing campaigns were con-
ducted to inform the Thai public of the 
benefits of sufficiency economy ideas 
(Isager & Ivarsson, 2010).
Despite these government ef-
forts, the results of the promotion of the 
sufficiency economy are unclear. Some 
reports suggest that participation by 
famers has been low, but there is no of-
ficial government data on the program’s 
success. There are several reasons why 
the sufficiency economy faces limita-
tions in contemporary Thailand. In 
many ways, it may already be too late 
to attempt to change farmers’ lives and 
livelihoods in such substantial ways. 
Although a large proportion of Thais 
are agriculturalists, Thai rural life is far 
from static. There are large numbers 
of rural Thais who engage in season-
al urban–rural migration for example 
and many farming families rely on off-
farm income to meet their needs (Rigg 
& Nattapoolwat, 2001). Also within 
rural communities themselves, there 
is a large degree of economic diversifi-
cation already underway with govern-
ment employment and small business 
ownership providing new livelihoods 
for rural Thais. Thai farmers are also 
already dependent on the market at a 
fundamental level for income and so-
cial status reasons. It may, therefore, be 
unrealistic to expect them to return to 
a pre-capitalist version of agricultural 
production. Many also do not desire to 
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do this. They enjoy the lifestyle changes 
and consumer power that connection to 
the market gives them. Although Thai 
farmers are facing environmental chal-
lenges and market vulnerability, they 
appear to want other ways to face these 
challenges and it appears that demand 
for change is not coming from farmers 
themselves (Walker, 2010).
3. Food and Nutrition 
Security of Thai Consumers
Beginning in the early 1960s, a se-ries of innovative nutrition inter-ventions were trialed by a group 
of Thai medical doctors and support-
ed by the World Health Organization. 
In some of Thailand’s poorest regions, 
these doctors introduced improved 
protein production, iodine supplemen-
tation, fortifying fish sauce with iron, 
and localized fish oil production, all 
using technologies which were avail-
able and appropriate for rural Thais. As 
well they developed Thai Food tables to 
assist with nutrition monitoring (Non-
dasuta, 1998). By the mid-1970s, these 
programs were considered so successful 
that the Thai Ministry of Public Health 
adopted them for countrywide replica-
tion and they were incorporated into the 
first National Food and Nutrition Plans 
in the late 1970s (see Table 1) (Winicha-
goon, Dhanamitta, & Valyasevi, 1992). 
Also importantly in the late 1970s, 
Thailand began to modify its approach 
to development from a top-down to a 
bottom-up approach (Kelly, Yuthaporn-
pinit, Seubsman, & Sleigh, 2012). Part 
of this new approach involved the de-
velopment of a comprehensive Primary 
Health Care (PHC) program which was 
rolled out nationwide. Nutrition inter-
ventions pioneered in the 1960s formed 
a key part of the PHC policies (Wini-
chagoon et al., 1992).
The identification of nutrition 
as a major element of human develop-
ment and the emphasis on community 
mobilization have been fundamental to 
Thailand’s success, achieving: changed 
consumption behaviors; nutritional 
status monitoring particularly of young 
children; supplementary foods produc-
tion; and cost effectiveness through the 
use of community-based Village Health 
Volunteers (VHVs). Volunteers were 
local people, often related to the villag-
ers, who could gain trust and pass on 
knowledge and skills gained from gov-
ernment training (Tontisirin & Win-
ichagoon, 1999). During the 1980s, 
these community mobilizations were 
based on a holistic “basic minimum 
needs” theory. Seeing nutrition as part 
of overall primary healthcare and hu-
man development was crucial (Kelly 
et al., 2012; Tontisirin & Winichagoon, 
1999) By 1986, 500,000 village health 
communicators and 50,000 health vol-
unteers had been trained and were ac-
tive in nearly every village in the coun-
try (Tontisirin, 1992).
Since the 1970s, malnutrition 
has been aggressively targeted and 
rates have fallen dramatically, interact-
ing with community development and 
primary healthcare programs which 
have improved the overall health status 
of the majority of Thais. By the 1990s, 
rapid socio-economic development had 
affected most of the Thai population 
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and undernutrition had been almost 
eliminated. The substantial investments 
in health services, particularly com-
munity and rural health, had paid div-
idends with infant mortality and low 
birth weight statistics being drastically 
reduced (Florentino & Pedro, 1992). 
Key evidence of Thailand’s success is 
the reduction in the proportion of the 
population undernourished which has 
fallen from over 40% in the 1980s to 
now be only 7% (Food and Agriculture 
Organisation, 2012). The World Bank 
considers these measures to be among 
the most successful in the developing 
world (Heaver & Kachondham, 2002).
However, rapid economic growth 
has influenced a dramatic health and 
lifestyle transition in Thailand; from 
rural and agricultural to much more ur-
ban industrial and commerce centered 
lifestyles (Kelly et al., 2010). Traditional 
Thai diets are considered healthy and 
protective against chronic diseases be-
ing rich in cereals, legumes, and fresh 
fruit and vegetables with the majori-
ty of protein coming from fish (Seub-
sman, Dixon, Pangsap, & Banwell, 
2009; Suvarnakich, 1950). However, 
economic growth, modernization, and 
industrialization are typically accom-
panied by an increasing demand for 
both more convenient foods and more 
modern foods, a diet where animal 
fats and protein replaced legumes and 
cereals, sugar consumption increased 
and fruit and vegetable consumption 
decreased (Kosulwat, 2002). Thailand’s 
regular series of nationally representa-
tive Food Consumption Surveys reveal 
that between 2003 and 2009, the con-
sumption of snack foods, instant foods 
(especially noodles), soft drinks, and 
energy drinks have all increased signifi-
cantly, particularly among Thai teenag-
ers (Aekplakorn, 2011). Although food 
security is not a problem in the vast 
majority of Thai households, the chang-
ing makeup of diets and the amount of 
pre-prepared foods being purchased 
outside the home are concerns to nutri-
tionists (Kosulwat, 2002). This achieve-
ment of adequate caloric consumption 
in a community does not preclude the 
continuation of malnutrition in terms 
of micronutrient deficiencies which is 
possible when consumption of over-
processed foods is prevalent, and fresh 
food intake is low.
Chronic undernutrition in Thai-
land has now been replaced by chronic 
obesity which affects more than 35% of 
Thai adults (Aekplakorn & Mo-Suwan, 
2009). Cardiovascular diseases, diabetes 
mellitus, and other diet-related health 
problems are all increasingly prevalent, 
replacing poverty-related diseases as 
the major causes of death and morbidi-
ty for Thai people (Porapakkham et al., 
2010; Wilbulpolprasert, 2008). How-
ever, the picture is more complex than 
diseases of poverty being replaced by 
diseases of affluence. As in many devel-
oping countries, and a growing num-
ber of developed economies, a range of 
states of nutrition (under, normal and 
over nutrition, and micronutrient defi-
ciencies) coexist (Doak, Adair, Bentley, 
Monteiro, & Popkin, 2005; Monteiro, 
Moura, Conde, & Popkin, 2004; Win-
ichagoon, 2013). These changes in the 
health status and risk profile of the Thai 
population are part of a health-risk 
transition in developing countries.
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The changes described above are reflected in a succession of 5-yearly Na-
tional Food and Nutrition Plans (Table 2). In Table 1, we present a brief overview 
of each of these plans and the prevailing nutrition situation in the country in each 
period.
Table 2. Thailand’s 5-year National Food and Nutrition Plans (1977–2006) 
National Food 
and Nutrition 
Plan (NFNP) 
and period 
covered
Plan summary  
(Tontisirin et al, 2013)
Nutrition situation
First NFNP 
(1977–1981)
• Addressed protein energy mal-
nutrition in children through 
high protein supplements and 
nutrition education
• Emphasis on agricultural ex-
tension providing extra food 
needed within communities
• First official adoption of a 
multi-sectoral approach to food 
and nutrition policy involving 
Ministry of Interior, Ministry 
of Public Health, Ministry of 
Education 
Seven major nutritional 
problems identified: protein 
energy malnutrition, vita-
min A deficiency, anemia, 
beri-beri (thiamine deficien-
cy), goiter, angular stomatitis 
(riboflavin deficiency), and 
urinary bladder stone (phos-
phorus deficiency)
Second NFNP 
(1982–1986) 
• Primary healthcare approach 
adopted, community health-
care centers established and 
community health volunteers 
trained. Nutrition programs 
were a large part of these 
healthcare center activities
• Nutrition surveillance partic-
ularly growth monitoring in 
children established through-
out country
• Poverty reduction emphasized 
as solution to nutrition prob-
lems
• Nutrition education rolled out 
especially for pregnant and 
breast feeding women and 
young children
Protein energy malnutrition 
rates in children began to fall 
in this period 
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Third NFNP 
(1987–1991) 
• Rapid economic growth and 
social change begin in Thailand
• Population growth rate slowed 
and urbanization accelerated
• Nutrition plan continued from 
last period emphasizing com-
munity development and com-
munity financing
• Wage laborers and elderly add-
ed to mothers and children as 
main target groups for nutri-
tion programs
• Protein energy malnutri-
tion had decreased from 
over 50% to less than 20% 
of children in 10 years
• By end of this plan, over-
weight or obesity was af-
fecting around 10% of Thai 
adults
Fourth NFNP 
(1992–1996) 
• Focus begins to turn from un-
dernutrition alleviation to the 
link between modern diets and 
chronic disease,
• First set of Thai Dietary Guide-
lines produced
• Nutrition surveillance extend-
ed and now incorporates over- 
and underweight
• By 1995, 23.5% of school 
children and 15.5% of 
adults overnourished with 
BMIs over 25
Fifth NFNP 
(1997–2001) 
• Household food security em-
phasized—defined as not just 
adequate calories but also se-
cure access to nutritious foods
• Nationwide campaigns to pro-
mote physically active lifestyles 
and healthy diet promotion in 
school settings
Sixth NFNP 
(2002–2006) 
• Attention turned to promoting 
the food industry and aimed to 
improve the efficiency of food 
production and distribution
• Emphasized private/govern-
ment partnerships for food 
processing, food exports, and 
food technology
• Food security approach at 
household level still import-
ant but direct action plans to 
address nutrition problems 
de-emphasized in overarching 
plan
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By the early 2000s, over nutri-
tion and its link to chronic disease had 
been identified as a growing problem by 
the Thai Ministry of Public Health and 
public health researchers. The change 
in direction, however, from addressing 
infant, child, and pregnant womens’ 
nutritional needs particularly in rural 
settings to addressing those of adults 
in a dynamic urbanizing population is 
not yet advanced. Some new programs 
which have begun to be introduced 
to address new diet risks have includ-
ed new nutrition labeling regulations, 
Thai specific guidelines for daily con-
sumption of food types, campaigns 
promoting physical activity, the high 
profile “flat belly Thais” campaign (Flat 
Belly Thais Network, 2013), the “Sweet 
Enough Network” (Thai Health Promo-
tion Foundation, 2013), which advo-
cates to reduce added sugar, and regu-
lations on food advertising to children. 
These programs have been developed by 
various bodies including the National 
Food Committee. The National Health 
Assembly has also adopted a resolution 
to tackle overweight and obesity (Chav-
asit, Kasemsup, & Tontisirin, 2013).
4. Integrating Policies for 
Food and Nutrition Security
In a growing number of developed countries, particularly in Europe, national food plans and academ-
ics are increasingly emphasizing the 
need for food policies which incorpo-
rate public health and environmental 
strategies, alongside their more tra-
ditional productivist and often trade 
objectives (Carlisle & Hanlon, 2014). 
None of these countries to our knowl-
edge have successfully established a 
Ministry of Food, instead maintaining 
separate ministries dealing with ag-
riculture, trade, health, and the envi-
ronment, although from time to time 
the UK and Australian governments 
have established high-level food policy 
interdepartmental committees (Cab-
inet Office (UK), 2008; Department 
of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry, 
2012; National Food Administration 
(Sweden), 2009; The Scottish Govern-
ment, 2009). Perhaps, the most perti-
nent example is that of the Japanese 
government’s comprehensive Shokuiku 
or “Food Education” program which 
promotes consumption of healthy, 
traditional, locally produced foods as 
a mechanism for improving food pro-
ducer livelihoods as well as consumer 
health. This approach, however, still 
has limitations, relying on changes in 
individual consumer behavior rath-
er than structural and regulatory in-
terventions by governments which 
are also needed (Chopra et al., 2002; 
World Health Organisation, 2004).
Thailand has now embarked on 
a new approach to achieve food policy 
coherence. A peak body, the National 
Food Committee (NFC), first estab-
lished in 1992, has been reinvigorated 
under the 2008 National Food Com-
mittee Act and given the responsibili-
ty of coordinating policies and actions 
across all aspects of Thai Food Policy. 
This body is chaired by the Thai Prime 
Minister and has representatives from 
the Thai Food and Drug Administra-
tion, the Ministry of Public Health, and 
the Ministry of Agriculture as co-Sec-
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retaries and has stronger legal powers 
to enforce policies than previous food 
and nutrition bodies. The centralization 
of various powers under this one new 
body also aims to provide greater effi-
ciency of resource use and to provide 
a unified strategy between various rel-
evant agencies. In 2010, the NFC pro-
duced a comprehensive Thailand Food 
Strategy document which takes the 
place of previous National Food and 
Nutrition Plans. This document out-
lines strategies in four main areas (Thai 
National Food Committee, 2012):
(1) Food security—defined as 
“each citizen having an adequate sup-
ply of food that is safe and nutritionally 
suitable for all ages”, achieved through 
land use reform and protecting land for 
agricultural use, better management of 
water and ecological resources, finding 
a better balance between land used for 
growing food and biofuels, improving 
food access for families, improving ag-
ricultural efficiency and logistics along 
the food chain, encouraging more 
young people to remain in agricultural 
sector, and investing in agricultural re-
search for improved yields
(2) Food quality and safety—es-
tablishing one unified system of food 
standards, applying strict standards for 
food quality and nutrition value in all 
agricultural products, including im-
proved systems at the community level 
to reduce food wastage, improved mon-
itoring of food safety standards
(3) Food management—improve 
and strengthen management of the sec-
tor along the whole food chain, develop 
and improve legislation around food 
system management, and improve data 
and monitoring of food system
(4) Food research and educa-
tion—support applied research in ag-
riculture and food industries, manage 
and ensure dissemination of new food 
production knowledge particularly to 
food producing communities, and dis-
seminate knowledge on nutrition and 
healthy diets in the community.
The empowerment of Thailand’s 
NFC is a genuine attempt to produce 
coherent food policies which address 
all of these aspects of the food system, 
including their public health and envi-
ronmental dimensions. One important 
consideration emphasized by the NFC 
is the multiplicity of stakeholders in 
the food space—government, private 
sectors, communities, and individuals. 
This multiplicity means that to manage 
tensions dialogue between stakehold-
ers is needed and opportunities given 
to improve mutual understanding and 
to achieve food and nutrition security, 
while maintaining fairness and effi-
ciency among stakeholders. Policy and 
strategy needs to demonstrate a clear 
plan to engage the community and 
household level. This requires integra-
tion approaches to transfer knowledge 
and experience into operations (Tonti-
sirin, 2013).
In its Thailand Food Strategy 
document, the NFC has made several 
important steps in attempting to in-
tegrate the tensions in food policy be-
tween agricultural production for the 
global market and nutrition and food 
security for Thai consumers, particu-
larly rural agricultural communities. 
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These include strategies to promote 
food access for rural communities, 
the prioritization of food crops over 
biofuels which had been increasing in 
importance, and the emphasis of im-
proving food and health literacy par-
ticularly for agricultural communities. 
The Strategy also raises the issue of the 
diversity of crops raised in Thailand, 
and the connection between this diver-
sity and nutrition in the community, an 
important link in the two dimensions 
of food policy discussed in thisarticle. 
With increasing plantations of rubber, 
sugar, and other non-food crops, the 
impact on domestic food security is im-
portant to consider.
Overall, however, in terms of 
nutrition status improvement, the 
Thailand Food Strategy still empha-
sizes nutritional deficiencies and food 
safety, with the implication that the 
main threat to food security is insuffi-
cient food being available. The problem 
of overnutrition and growing rates of 
obesity and diet-related disease, par-
ticularly diabetes, is only mentioned in 
one paragraph of the document. And 
the cause of this obesity problem is de-
scribed as a lack of food consumption 
knowledge without considering the 
broader food system influences. The re-
lated missing factor is the specific role 
of processed foods in the Thai food in-
dustry. With these foods being one of 
the major drivers of growth in obesity, 
the role of the local food processing 
industry is clearly missing in this food 
strategy. This is one area which is vital 
to integrate into modern holistic food 
policies.
5. Discussion
During the twentieth century, Thailand emerged as a world leader in formulating effec-
tive policies to combat poverty-related 
health conditions in its population and 
in rural development programs which 
helped to boost agricultural competi-
tiveness and food security. By the twen-
ty-first century, however, many aspects 
of Thailand’s hitherto successful portfo-
lio of food and nutrition policies were 
challenged by global transformations 
in production and distribution of food 
and increasing exposure to an intercon-
nected global food system.
In the agriculture and food pro-
duction sector, Thailand has emerged as 
a major food exporter and this togeth-
er with rural health and development 
plans have led to improved incomes 
and quality of life for Thai farmers. At 
the same time despite success in tack-
ling absolute rural poverty, high levels 
of economic and health inequality still 
exist between rural and urban popu-
lations in Thailand and there has been 
insufficient investment in agricultural 
productivity to allow continued im-
provements in rural quality of life. 
Walker refers to “relative poverty” in 
contemporary rural Thailand, a prob-
lem caused by a “…relatively low level of 
productivity of the rural economy” and 
a lack of investment in “productivity 
enhancing inputs” to rural economies. 
This growing urban–rural inequality 
has contributed to many of the political 
and social tensions found in Thailand 
today (Walker, 2012).
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Current policy approaches re-
veal clear contradictions at play in Thai 
agricultural sector policies which aim 
to continue agricultural contributions 
to economic growth while supporting 
farmer livelihoods. The expansion of 
large-scale export-oriented agriculture, 
promoted through the Kitchen to the 
World program, is in direct opposition 
to the encouragement of moderation 
and local food security first which are 
encapsulated in the Sufficiency Econo-
my philosophy. But, at the same time, 
the Sufficiency Economy ideals are seen 
as unrealistic even by the farmers who 
could potentially benefit. The improve-
ment of livelihoods for Thai farmers 
and their economic, food and nutrition 
security require a new approach to be 
found.
The Thai government could con-
sider investing in empowering farmers 
to better compete through training, 
agricultural credit, and infrastructure 
investment (Boselie et al., 2003). Gov-
ernment investment in agricultural 
research, which in the past has been a 
strong driver of agricultural produc-
tivity improvement, has been falling in 
recent years (Suphannachart & Warr, 
2011). A program of empowering 
Thai farmers through improving their 
human and material resources and 
through improved access to technolo-
gy, training, and credit for agricultural 
inputs would allow them to participate 
in and benefit more fully from trade lib-
eralization and improve food and eco-
nomic security for Thailand’s poorest 
group (Zamroni, 2006). An adaptation 
of the old idea of agricultural extension 
for new food systems conditions is war-
ranted. This is particularly important 
in the context of increasing importance 
of modern food retail supply chains. 
In Thailand, supermarket-led supply 
chains are still being developed but 
once established small-scale farmers, as 
well as traditional supply chain traders, 
will need new capacities to enter and 
benefit from supplying to this emerging 
high value sector (Schipmann & Qaim, 
2011a). As well, given the positive and 
negative outcomes associated with con-
tract farming described above, the gov-
ernment could consider taking a more 
prominent role in ensuring livelihoods 
are protected and contracts are fairer 
for small and large scale farmers (Singh, 
2006).
The factor, which both the Kitch-
en to the World and the Sufficiency 
Economy approaches have in common, 
is their recognition of the value of or-
ganic or low pesticide farming and food 
safety, because of the growing domes-
tic and international demand for these 
products, and also for their potential to 
improve economic and environmental 
outcomes for farmers. Investment in 
sustainable agriculture is already a fea-
ture of recent Thai National Economic 
and Social Development Plans. Fur-
ther emphasis on this sector may ad-
vance the goals of both the Sufficiency 
Economy (safe, mixed farming) and the 
Kitchen to the World (improved market 
access).
Thailand’s current approach to 
nutrition policy also needs reassess-
ment. Previous interventionist ap-
proaches, which have been highly suc-
cessful in combating rural poverty and 
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associated undernutrition, are unlikely 
to be effective in a modern urbaniz-
ing society. Social marketing and pub-
lic nutrition education campaigns, as 
well as improved nutrition labeling, are 
all being utilized to make consumers 
aware of the importance of healthy di-
ets; and although nutrition is one part 
of the remit of the Thai National Food 
Committee, it is considered as a part of 
the strategy on “Food research and ed-
ucation.” This may indicate an empha-
sis on product reformulation and di-
etary guideline approaches rather than 
considering more systemic influences 
on food choice. Despite this limitation, 
there has been a clear shift in govern-
ment attention to the growing burden 
of diet-related chronic diseases in terms 
of health system resources. Effort to 
reduce risk factors for these diseases 
largely being coordinated by the suc-
cessful Thai Health Promotion founda-
tion.
Assessing upstream influences 
on consumption and nutrition will also 
be important. The relative price and 
availability of energy-dense, processed 
foods must be addressed. Food corpo-
rations are moving toward corporate 
responsibility programs in developed 
countries and some developing ones 
(Hawkes, 2005; Igumbor et al., 2012), 
and this may be an important way for-
ward for Thailand although collabora-
tion between industry leaders and the 
public health sector requires case by 
case critical appraisal and regulatory 
measures regarding nutritional content 
(Stuckler & Nestle, 2012). The increas-
ing economic importance of the Thai 
domestic food processing industry, 
which produces for local and interna-
tional markets, presents a challenge to 
regulators. Government policy must 
include soft measures such as nutrition 
education and food labeling along with 
hard fiscal and legal measures to regu-
late the food industry in terms of mar-
keting and product formulation. One 
recent step being made in the direction 
of influencing the nutrition environ-
ment for Thai consumers is the intro-
duction of a new excise tax on drinks 
with sugar content which increases 
progressively with increase in sugar 
content.
Researchers, policymakers, and 
food security agencies now realize that 
effective food policy must address all as-
pects of the food system in an integrat-
ed manner, utilizing an ecological ap-
proach (Carlisle & Hanlon, 2014; Lang, 
2009; Lang, Barling, & Caraher, 2009). 
Public health, environmental sustain-
ability, and social inequality are linked, 
and food policies must acknowledge 
these dynamics previously seen to be 
outside the food system. These are now 
the challenges facing Thailand’s Nation-
al Food Committee, the primary body 
governing food policies in Thailand.
In this article, we have discussed 
many of the policy challenges for this 
body. It should be noted, however, that 
although the NFC has the responsibil-
ity to coordinate policies and actions 
across all aspects of the Thai food sys-
tem, the NFC is not supplied with bud-
get and personnel to carry out these 
functions. Under Thai law, the actual 
operation of policies is still devolved to 
individual departments and Ministries 
Integrating Food and Nutrition Security in a Middle-Income, Globalized, 
Food-Exporting Nation: Thailand’s Food Policy Challenge
25
who each have their own budgets and 
legal mandates thus limiting the ability 
of the NFC to carry out its functions in 
the holistic manner envisioned. Never-
theless, the NFC provides an innovative 
approach that should be monitored by 
other countries to determine its effec-
tiveness as a model for food policy de-
velopment and administration.
6. Conclusion
This review demonstrates that the last 50 years of Thailand’s involvement in the global food 
trade has complicated assumptions 
about how best to deliver nutrition se-
curity for agriculturalists and urban 
consumers. Two important strategies 
dominate—the Kitchen to the World 
and the Sufficiency Economy—current-
ly, neither approach is improving farm-
er incomes. Farmers require additional 
training, resources, and formal com-
mercially oriented networks (whether 
cooperatives, locally organized food 
hubs) to be able to enjoy the benefits of 
Thailand’s food export economy.
In the past, Thai health and nu-
trition researchers and policymakers 
have focused on undernutrition, but 
they are now confronting the unfamil-
iar challenge of overnutrition arising, 
in part, from Thailand’s involvement 
in the global food trade. To address 
the rising obesity and health challenge, 
it is necessary to understand the com-
plex ways in which this trade impacts 
on the population’s diet. Over the next 
20 years policymakers in Thailand will 
need to manage the productive and dis-
tributive complexity of the food system. 
The remarkable health gains recorded 
by Thailand in recent decades, includ-
ing the conquest of undernutrition and 
rapid increase in longevity, need to be 
consolidated. Monitored, comprehen-
sive food policy will make a critical 
contribution to this process.
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Abstract
 
Freshwater aquaculture production systems are closely related to 
Integrated Agriculture Aquaculture systems. The systems are tradi-
tionally integrated with crop production, horticulture, and livestock 
husbandry. Improved aquaculture systems are currently able to not 
only improve the nutrients of local farmers’ diets and economic 
conditions, but are also able to create employment opportunities 
and lead to better resource-utilization and rural development. This 
paper aims to present the changes in food systems affected by the 
rapidly developing freshwater aquaculture in northern Vietnam. It 
will shed light on how the aquaculture system plays various roles in 
supporting agrarian livelihoods, their relationships to well-being, 
and food security using a clear example of small-scale aquaculture 
in a province of the Red River Delta. The challenges and opportu-
nities presented to small-scale producers and culture systems are 
assessed, and the likely future of small-scale freshwater production 
systems is discussed and forecast.
Combining historical, adaptive, and systematic approaches, the 
study revealed the features and characteristics of inland aquaculture 
systems at the household level over a decade of the evolutionary 
process (1997–2015). By investigating 151 aquaculture households 
in two representative districts of the region, the three existing sys-
tems are identified: VAC system (23%) (whereby V=vuon-gardens 
(horticulture), A=Ao-ponds (aquaculture) and C=Chuong-animal 
1 Faculty of Accounting and Business Management, Vietnam National University of Agriculture, 
Hanoi,  Vietnam
2 Gembloux Agro BioTech, University of Liège, Belgium
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sheds/pens (livestock husbandry)); aquaculture/livestock (AF) sys-
tem (43%); and the commercially intensive fish culture (FS) system 
(34%). Beyond the positive benefits to the food system and rural 
development, potential considerably exists for further aquaculture 
integration within VAC systems in the region, which will contrib-
ute to poverty reduction and improvement of the livelihoods of 
small-scale rural farmers.
 
Keywords: Freshwater aquaculture, production, systems, food, ru-
ral development
Resumen 
Los sistemas de acuacultura de agua dulce están muy relaciona-
dos con los sistemas integrados de acuacultura de agricultura. Los 
sistemas están tradicionalmente integrados con la producción de 
plantaciones, horticultura y la cría de ganado. Los sistemas de agri-
cultura mejorada pueden actualmente no solo mejorar los nutrien-
tes de las dietas de granjeros locales y las condiciones económicas, 
sino que también pueden crear oportunidades de empleo y llevar 
a una mejor utilización de recursos y desarrollo rural. Este docu-
mento busca presentar los cambios de sistemas alimenticios cau-
sados por la acuacultura de agua dulce que se está desarrollando 
rápidamente en el norte de Vietnam. Resaltará cómo el Sistema de 
acuacultura juega varios papeles para apoyar la subsistencia de los 
agricultores, sus relaciones al bienestar y la seguridad alimenticia 
al utilizar un claro ejemplo de acuacultura a pequeña escala en una 
provincia del delta del Río Rojo. Los desafíos y oportunidades que 
se le presentan a los productores a pequeña escala y a los sistemas 
culturales son evaluados, y el futuro probable de los sistemas de 
producción de agua dulce a pequeña escala se discute y predice. 
Al combinar los acercamientos históricos, adaptativos y acerca-
mientos sistemáticos, el estudio reveló las funciones y caracterís-
ticas de los sistemas de acuacultura en zonas interiores, a nivel de 
hogar y a lo largo de una década del proceso evolutivo (1997-2015). 
Al investigar 151 hogares acuacultores en dos distritos representa-
tivos de la región, los tres sistemas existentes se identifican: Sistema 
VAC (23%) (donde V=jardines Vuon (horticultura)), A=estanques 
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Ao (acuacultura) y C=establos de animales Chuong (cría de ga-
nado)); Sistema (AF) de acuacultura/ganado (43%); y sistema de 
cría de peces comercialmente intensiva (FS) (34%). Más allá de 
los beneficios positivos del sistema alimenticio y desarrollo rural, 
existe un potencial considerable para más integración de acuacul-
tura dentro de los sistemas VAC en la región, que contribuirá a la 
reducción de pobreza y el mejoramiento del sustento de granjeros 
rurales a pequeña escala.
Palabras clave: Acuacultura de agua dulce, producción, sistemas, 
alimentación, desarrollo rural
摘要
淡水养殖生产系统和一体化农业水产养殖系统紧密联系。这
些系统一般都和谷物生产、园艺以及畜牧业合并在一起。改
进后的水产养殖系统不仅能提高当地农民的膳食营养和经
济情况，还能创造就业机会，并引导更好的资源利用和农村
发展。本文致力呈现越南北部因淡水养殖急速发展而产生的
粮食系统变化。本文将红河三角洲范围内一个省的小规模水
产养殖作为案例，清晰阐述了水产养殖系统如何扮演不同角
色，为农业生计、农业生计与安乐的关系、以及粮食安全提
供支持。本文评估了小规模生产者和养殖系统面临的挑战和
机遇，探讨并预测了小规模淡水生产系统的未来。
本文结合历史方法、自适应方法和系统方法，揭示了内地家
庭水产养殖系统经过十多年演变后的特点（1997-2015）。
通过调查两个代表区中的151户水产养殖家庭，识别了三种
现有系统，它们分别是：VAC系统（V=vuon-gardens，即园
艺，
A=Ao-ponds，即水产养殖，C=Chuong-animal，即畜牧业）
，占比23%；水产养殖/畜牧（AF）系统，占比43%；商业性
强的鱼类养殖（FS）系统，占比34%。水产养殖除了给粮食
系统和农村发展带来积极益处，未来还很有可能在该区域
VAC系统中进一步合并，这将促进减少贫困，提高小规模农
民生产者的生计。
关键词：淡水养殖，生产，系统，粮食，农村发展
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I. Introduction
Freshwater aquaculture is an im-portant component of the supply of animal-based protein, amino 
acids, fatty acids, minerals, and vita-
mins in the diets of predominantly 
poor populations in the developing 
countries of South East Asia (Dey & 
Ahmed, 2005; Dey et al., 2005; Mish-
ra & Ray, 2009; Prein & Ahmed, 2000; 
Tacon, 1997). Belton and Little (2011) 
predicted that the aquaculture produc-
tion systems would become more in-
tensive and uniform and output will, 
on the one hand, satisfy the growing 
demand of mass markets for safe ani-
mal-source products but, on the oth-
er, is unlikely to meet the strong cul-
tural attachment to the diverse and 
local that is still prevalent in rapidly 
growing areas of Asia, where the cul-
tural value was characterized as tra-
ditional and often “wild” foods. This 
resilience of food cultures would be 
possible to anticipate the continued 
existence of considerable market de-
mand for small-scale producers. The 
rapid growth and widespread develop-
ment of aquaculture have been occur-
ring at a critical time in human history, 
especially increasing unpredictability 
associated with climate change and 
greater volatility in food prices and 
food security would be a reality. Cli-
mate change would be expected to 
bring particularly severe impacts to 
the densely residential deltas of Asia 
where small-scale aquaculture is most 
prevalent and where, if maintained or 
further developed, it might be respon-
sible for an important role in adapta-
tion approaches oriented to enhance 
social–ecological resilience.
In Vietnam, freshwater fish 
contributes to 12.4% of the 29 g capi-
ta−1 day−1 animal-based protein supply 
(FAO, 2013), of which 37% is supplied 
by the cyprinid and cichlid species and 
mainly produced through aquaculture 
(FAO, 2011). It has been widely recog-
nized that farm product diversification 
through aquaculture can contribute to a 
sustainable method of developing food 
security, alleviating poverty (Edwards, 
2000; Prein & Ahmed, 2000; Tacon, 
1997), and also may increase resilience 
to financial shocks in developing coun-
tries such as Vietnam. Promoting the 
aquaculture separate from, or integrat-
ed within, broader livelihoods therefore 
becomes a crucial policy issue. Aqua-
culture has, in some cases, been inher-
ent in national poverty reduction strat-
egy plans or has become a key part of 
macro-economic growth. The renewed 
approach in which various types of 
aquaculture can contribute to poverty 
alleviation at household, community, 
and national levels is critical (Little et 
al., 2010). Although aquaculture farm-
ing has greatly improved in the past 
decades, few studies have focused on 
the entire range of benefits within the 
existing systems of freshwater aquacul-
ture production in the Red River Delta 
region.
In diverse and highly populated 
regions in Asia like China and north-
ern Vietnam have a long and acknowl-
edged history of freshwater aquaculture 
production systems (Edwards, 1993; 
Luu, 2001; Ruddle & Zhong, 1988), 
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suggesting that aquaculture is the key 
component of Integrated Agriculture 
Aquaculture (IAA) farming, common-
ly known as the “VAC” model. This ac-
ronym is derived from the Vietnamese 
words for orchard (vuon), pond (ao), 
and livestock pen (chuong), and was 
the farming system become popularly 
to exploit in the 1980s in order to proj-
ect and to expand food security strate-
gies. The VAC system’s success among 
the local and rural people in terms of 
food security pushed the Vietnamese 
government to implement the Sustain-
able Aquaculture for Poverty Allevia-
tion (SAPA) strategy and to carry out 
the Programme of Hunger Eradication 
and Poverty Reduction (Luu, 2002). 
Initially, the system was introduced in 
the Red River Delta area and then be-
came widespread and developed in oth-
er regions. As a result, freshwater aqua-
culture became a strategy in sub-sectors 
to improve nutritional standards and to 
generate income in small-scale farming 
households (Luu et al., 2002; Pekar et 
al., 2002).
In Hai Duong, a central province 
of Red River Delta in northern Viet-
nam, rice cultivation is still the tradi-
tional and principal source of income 
for farmers. Alternative land use and 
livelihood options such as aquaculture, 
fruit production, and livestock (Hanh, 
Ton, & Lebailly, 2013) are integrated 
components in farms and create more 
cash income, food, and foodstuffs in 
order to meet subsistence needs (Leb-
ailly et al., 2015). In this province, the 
targeted areas to develop freshwater 
aquaculture were those large lowland 
areas of rice fields which had low pro-
ductivity and were being inefficiently 
utilized due to unstable crops during 
the flooding season. Statistical data and 
records indicate that, by 2014, the land 
used for aquaculture had expanded 
rapidly, increasing by 64% from 5,668 
ha in 1996 (Hai Duong Statistics Of-
fice, 1999, 2014). Government policy 
strongly supported these changes. Since 
1999, the Vietnamese government and 
local authorities have promoted the 
restructuring and diversification of 
the agricultural sector with the goal of 
reducing the share of rice in the total 
agricultural output value while increas-
ing the contribution of aquaculture to 
economic growth. This policy resulted 
in the growing importance of aquacul-
ture and is reflected in the following fig-
ures: in 1996, aquaculture production 
contributed approximately 2.7% to the 
total gross production of agriculture 
in Hai Duong and in 2014, it made up 
12%. Between 1997 and 2014, aquacul-
ture production increased annually by 
13% and in surface area by 3.9% annu-
ally (Hai Duong Statistics Office, 1999, 
2014).
II. Methodology
As qualitative and quantitative 
methods were employed in this study, 
the secondary data were gathered from 
the local statistical offices and annual 
records at the survey sites. In addition, 
primary data and information (group 
discussions and household interviews) 
were used for the research analysis of 
household aquaculture data, including 
information such as general character-
istics of households, their aquaculture 
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systems, integrated farming activities, 
and on-farm income sources related 
to the fish farming. The data collection 
and analysis were implemented as fol-
lows:
Site selection and sampling design
Central location in the Red River Del-
ta (see Figure 1), Hai Duong province’s 
fishery has, recently and quickly, been 
developed in both surface area and out-
put. Because this province is situated en-
tirely inland (with no coast), only fresh-
water aquaculture and the VAC system 
can be found and were developed early 
in northern Vietnam—the Red River 
Delta, its freshwater aquaculture tends 
to be unique and quite notable.
Figure 1. Site Selection of Two Districts in Hai Duong
Source: Vietnam department of survey and mapping 2015.
Although, over the decades, 
freshwater aquaculture has been pro-
jected to develop in the province, there 
has been limited data and information 
or studies about the freshwater produc-
tion systems. It is also quite difficult to 
define and verify the classification, cat-
egory, and characteristics of the aqua-
culture production systems existing at 
the research site. Therefore, three stag-
es were applied in order to design the 
sampling. First of all, the two districts 
of Tu Ky and Cam Giang were selected 
in order to investigate the aquaculture 
households because of their strongly 
developed and diverse fish production 
systems. Secondly, two communes were 
identified from each district. Finally, the 
more prevalent fish-rearing village was 
chosen from each selected commune. 
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The sampling design was defined 
from the selected villages, of which 151 
households with fish farming were ran-
domly selected from the lists that were 
provided by local officials and authori-
ties such as leaders of The People Com-
mittee, Cooperatives, and/or Villages. 
The sampling design is described in 
Table 1. The number of households was 
39 from Thuong Son; 41 from Lac Duc; 
36 from Hoa Binh; and 35 from An Lai 
village. 
Data analysis: Multivariate fac-
tor analysis was employed to analyze 
the cross-relationships between aqua-
culture production systems in order 
to identify any major underlying fac-
tors between these relationships. Three 
models were established: (1) first for 
households with VAC farming—VAC 
system; (2) second for those engaged in 
aquaculture and livestock husbandry— 
aquaculture/livestock (AF) system, and 
the (3) third for commercially intensive 
fish culture farms—FS system. 
According to McConnell and 
Dillon (1997), the farm analysis was 
based on the collected data and farm 
records or received as estimates from 
memory of members of the household. 
In reality, the production/disposal data 
are activity-specific, but the inputs/
costs are “all mixed up” with no indi-
cation of which inputs have been used 
for which activities. However, the study 
protocol managed to obtain a picture of 
the farm operation as a whole. On the 
other hand, on small farms, it is usually 
necessary to distinguish between dif-
ferent classes of outputs: final products 
that are sold or consumed by the house-
hold and intermediate products used 
in another farm operation as resourc-
es. For subsistence-oriented farms, it 
is necessary to impute the prices/val-
ues of products which are not sold for 
cash. Therefore, the values of all final 
products (A—All Outputs/Returns) 
are consolidated as a total gross return 
for the household and all direct input 
costs (B—All Purchased Activity Direct 
Inputs) of all activities are also consol-
idated to give a total direct cost. This 
excludes the value of farm-generated 
Table 1. Samples of Fish Households (HHs) Selected in Hai Duong Province
Location Fish HHs
Animal/
Fish HHs
VAC 
HHs Total
District Commune Village        
Cam Giang
Cam Doai Hoa Binh 13 13 10 36
Cam Dong An Lai 8 18 9 35
Subtotal 21 31 19 71
Tu Ky
Hung Dao Lac Duc 19 15 7 41
Tai Son Thuong Son 11 19 9 39
Subtotal 30 34 16 80
Total 51 65 35 151
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resources. There are General Charges 
and Capital Equipment Repairs, Opera-
tion (C—All Farm Fixed Costs), which 
are recorded as part of the Total Farm 
Fixed Costs. 
Table 2. Indicators and Derived Measures for Annual Whole-farm Evaluation
Source: McConnell and Dillon (1997).
The Total Farm Gross Margin is 
the easiest to derive: it consists of the 
sum the gross margins of all activity, 
or if activity costs/returns have been 
pooled, the total value of farm output of 
final products minus total farm direct 
costs. If required, this is a good mea-
sure of performance to compare similar 
farms supposing their capital structures 
(levels of fixed costs) are similar or rel-
atively unimportant. An alternative 
measure is to use the index of Farm Net 
Returns. But this level of “income” is 
not stable over the long term because it 
makes no provision for replacing capital 
equipment as it wears out. If this is an 
important consideration, the Farm Net 
Actual Returns should be decreased by 
the depreciation charge in order to ob-
tain the Farm Net Sustainable Returns. 
In this study, the analysis mea-
sured terms of farm performance from 
records in the following areas: Farm 
Gross Margin (E), Farm Net Actual Re-
turns (F), Farm Net Sustainable Returns 
(G), Family Farm Available Income 
(H), Family Farm Sustainable Income 
(I), and Total Available Family Income 
Measure Calculation Notes Notes
A. All outputs/returns (pooled)
B. All purchased activity direct inputs (pooled)
C. All farm-fixed costs (except depreciation)
Depreciation recorded in 
D below
D. All capital depreciation
E. Farm gross margin A − B
F. Farm net actual returns E − C Depreciation not yet charged.
G. Farm net sustainable returns F − D Depreciation charged; system now sustainable.
H. Family farm available income H = F But only if depreciation is not covered.
I. Family farm sustainable income I = G Long-term sustainable farm income.
J. Total available family income (H or I) + S
S is non-farm income, 
here assumed to be zero.
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(J). While these indicators are desirable 
because E, F, G, H, I, and J are ade-
quate records and over time to indicate 
the degree of variability in the perfor-
mance of the subject farm, they do not 
in and of themselves provide any basis 
for comparing a farm's income levels 
to those of other farms. If whole-farm 
comparison is introduced at this point, 
the results are summarized in Table 2. 
Thus, fish farms would be compared 
in terms of the measures E, F, G, H, I, 
J with other farms in the village or area 
having a similar size, soil, water supply, 
etc. but not necessarily the same mix of 
activities. 
III. Research Results  
and Discussion 
A Key Role of Aquaculture in 
the Food Production System
To understand the context of aquaculture development, group discussions were used to iden-
tify the basic features and characteris-
tics of the existing freshwater aquacul-
ture production systems in the survey 
areas. The findings showed that fish 
farms usually have three components: 
(1) the homestead and perennial trees 
(fruit orchards created by pond dikes), 
(2) the pond, and (3) the rice field. The 
livestock, fruit orchards, and the pond 
are usually located together. The home-
stead area consists of livestock, fruit 
orchards, vegetables, and other trees 
which are located close to the residence, 
with an average area of around 433 m2. 
In addition, the link between the com-
ponents, the scale of livestock produc-
tion, area and number of fruit trees, and 
the household’s economic status as well 
as their experience in fish production 
were determined (see Table 3). 
It was reported by the house-
holds with animal/fish production 
(AF systems) and commercially inten-
sive fish production (FS) systems that 
their fish cultures in the past origi-
nated with the traditional homestead 
VAC model which, to a certain extent, 
has disappeared. However, the modern 
VAC and other systems still exist due 
to the number of farmers who believe 
strongly that the current VAC mod-
el has been restructured by increasing 
and balancing its economic scale level 
of components, namely fish pond size, 
orchards, and animal husbandry. VAC 
households are, thus, not characterized 
as aquaculture ventures. On the other 
hand, most farmers belonging to AF 
or FS household groups answered that 
they were able to develop their fish pro-
duction thanks to the accumulation of 
knowledge and experience in aquacul-
ture, as well as capital investments from 
establishing the traditionally small VAC 
model.
The benefits of aquaculture in 
food systems within the context of ru-
ral development relates to health and 
nutrition, employment, income, the 
reduction of vulnerability, and farm 
sustainability. In the municipal survey, 
the freshwater aquaculture systems 
provide high-quality animal protein 
and essential nutrients, especially for 
nutritionally vulnerable groups such as 
pregnant and lactating women, infants, 
and pre-school children. In particular, 
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it also provides protein at prices gener-
ally affordable to the poorer segments 
of the community. Most survey house-
holds responded that fish ponds have 
created an enterprise for self-employ-
ment, including jobs for women and 
children, and creates income through 
the sale of surplus aquaculture prod-
ucts. Income from employment oppor-
tunities are also possible for the people 
who work for larger farms, in seed sup-
ply networks, market chains, and man-
ufacture/repair supporting services. 
Indirect benefits include increased 
availability of fish in local rural and ur-
ban markets, which leads to an increase 
in the local consumption of fish.
The inland aquaculture systems 
in Hai Duong can shed light on the pre-
vious observation of Prein (2002) that 
integrated aquaculture systems are di-
verse and have a wide range of small- to 
large-scale systems that are fully orient-
ed to the market. For small-scale VAC 
systems, part of the production is used 
for subsistence purposes with some lev-
el of market involvement or communal 
exchange. In such systems, aquaculture 
enterprises are only a minor component 
of the farm as a whole. However, with 
Table 3. Freshwater Fish Production System (FFPS) Characteristics in Hai Duong
Source: Discussion with key informants in the research site, 2015.
FFPS
Integrated 
levels between 
sub-systems
Farm house-
hold situa-
tions
Animal  
husbandry Horticulture
Intensive or-
chard—low in-
put aquaculture 
(New VAC)
High with 
closed nutrient 
flow of food
Less expe-
rience in 
aquaculture 
production
With or without 
small pig pro-
duction (1–5 
pigs/HH), or 
small- to medi-
um-scale poul-
try production
Large number 
and area of 
perennial 
trees
Semi-intensive 
orchard—medi-
um input aqua-
culture (Animal 
+ Fish produc-
tion—AF)
Medium
Experience in 
aquaculture 
and animal 
production
With or with-
out medium 
pig production 
(10–50 pigs/
HH) or com-
mercial poultry 
production
Small number 
and area of 
perennial 
trees
Extensive or-
chard high input 
aquaculture
(Commercial 
fish produc-
tion—FS)
Low with 
more external 
supplement of 
food flow
Experience in 
aquaculture
Self-subsistence 
poultry produc-
tion
Small number 
of perennial 
trees
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greater farm specialization and market 
orientation, aquaculture enterprises 
could become a dominant feature. This 
supposes a key role of aquaculture in 
food production systems in the future.
Classification and Structure 
of Freshwater Aquaculture 
Production Systems
Misui and Horiuchi (2006) in-dicated that the Vietnamese government misuses a cri-
terion of agricultural sales that would 
be suitable in developed countries like 
Japan and misclassifies VAC farming 
systems in the Red River Delta. These 
farming systems have 14 types of 
farming enterprise combinations, i.e. 
VAC, VA, VC, AC, V, A, C, VAC+rice, 
VA+rice, VC+rice, AC+rice, V+rice, 
A+rice, and C+rice. The systems can 
be classified by many optimum criteria, 
the most appropriate of which in VAC 
farming systems is agricultural income, 
classified by self-sufficient farm house-
holds in Vietnam.
In populated rural regions like 
Hai Duong, extensive to semi-inten-
sive aquaculture systems are prevalent 
and produce the bulk of aquaculture 
products. Extensive farming usually in-
volves unsophisticated methods, relies 
on natural food, and has a low input to 
output ratio. As production intensity 
increases, fish are deliberately stocked 
and the natural food supply is enhanced 
by using organic and inorganic fertiliz-
ers, industrial feeds, and low-cost feed 
supplements derived from agricultural 
by-products. The survey results showed 
extensive and semi-intensive (stock-
ing rate less than 1 fish/m2) aquacul-
ture production systems in the region. 
However, based on the aquaculture 
integration to agriculture patterns, or 
IAA system, the structure of aquacul-
ture production systems is determined 
by analyzing the household survey. The 
number of households applying the im-
proved VAC system accounted for 23%, 
the animal/fish (AF) production system 
made up of 43%, the largest percentage, 
and 34% for the commercially intensive 
fish production (FS) system (Figure 2).
Figure 2. The Structure of Freshwater Aquaculture  
Production Systems in Hai Duong
Source: survey, 2015.
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The Evolution of Freshwater 
Aquaculture in Food 
Production Systems
In recent years, the food production system in Hai Duong has changed significantly. In spite of engaging 
principally in farming activities, the 
output of cereal production showed a 
downward trend before increasing to 
842,826 tons in 2000. In contrast, vege-
table and fruit crops, livestock produc-
tion, and fish production grew positive-
ly in their annual gross outputs. These 
outcomes resulted from the strong 
movement to develop the VAC systems’ 
components in the province (see Fig-
ures 3 and 4). Along with this process, 
the traditional VAC system (model) has 
been modified and improved in other 
“hybrid” aquaculture systems in which 
fish ponds, livestock, and orchards have 
moved from the residence areas to the 
rice field areas and developed a more 
commercial orientation under the im-
pact of urbanization and socio-eco-
nomic changes.
The traditional VAC model was 
understood and initially developed in 
1980s, although it was not a far-reach-
ing system with closed nutrient food 
flows. In just over a decade, the achieve-
ments of the system were undeniable; it 
provided a large quantity of food and 
foodstuffs to farmers in rural areas. 
Thus, the statistical data, records, and 
information prove that the gross output 
of vegetables and fruit crops rose also 
from 315 and 51 thousand tons in 1997 
to 657 and 192 thousand tons in 2014, 
respectively; and this was in addition to 
strongly developed animal husbandry 
Figure 3. Changes in the Gross Output of Different Crop Cultivation 
in Hai Duong (1997–2014)
Source: Hai Duong Statistics Office.
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practices. The availability of eggs great-
ly increased as well, going from 72.5 
million in 1997 to 310 million eggs in 
2014 (Hai Duong Statistics Office, 1999, 
2005, 2014). This period also witnessed 
a sharp increase in the output of pig and 
poultry production from 35,895 and 
7,524 tons in 1997 to 90,575 tons and 
27,421 tons in 2014, respectively.
The current trend increases fish 
production by intensifying and expand-
ing the areas under aquaculture produc-
tion, and this trend can be maintained 
and encouraged. Generic technologies 
used to intensify the existing produc-
tion systems are in place, and it is main-
ly socio-economic and institutional is-
sues that will significantly foster greater 
contributions from aquaculture to rural 
development. In Hai Duong, the fresh-
4 Haiduong was re-established in 1997 from the before province of HaiHung—a merged Hung Yen 
and Hai Dduong province.
water aquaculture production system 
has become complex and diverse, not 
only at the scale of the ponds, the level 
of fish intensification, techniques, and 
technology but also in the integration 
of other agricultural operations such as 
livestock and crop cultivation. Because 
fish production can be integrated with-
in agriculture on current agricultural 
lands in smallholder and commercial 
farms, the expansion of freshwater 
aquaculture in the province has great 
potential. Therefore, freshwater aqua-
culture can be assessed to have a key 
role in food production systems by ob-
serving the boom of fish production in 
the province since its re-establishment 
in 1997 (Figure 5).4
The food production system in 
Hai Duong evolved significantly over 
Figure 4. Changes in Livestock and Fish Production in Hai Duong (1997–2014)
Source: Hai Duong Statistics Office.
World Food Policy
46
the last decades. It changed not only in 
the structure of the food it produces, 
but also in its production systems, espe-
cially for the freshwater production sys-
tems. The total production of fish in Hai 
Duong rose from 9,963 tons to 64,887 
tons from 1997 to 2014. There was also 
a significant increase of aquaculture 
in the area, from 5,660 (ha) to 10,064 
(ha) during the period 1997–2005. The 
turning point of aquaculture expan-
sion was in 2005 when the Vietnamese 
government set up a program of food 
security which prioritized a large area 
of agricultural lands to maintain rice 
production (3 million ha) in order to 
ensure the national food security pro-
gram. This has clearly impacted the 
aquaculture expansion in the province. 
As it was, 70 households (46%) out of 
the total (151) investigated households 
started their fish cultures in the period 
from 1997 to 2005, while only 38% of 
total households established their fish 
cultures during the period 1980–1996 
(Table 4).
The essential characteristic of 
IAA systems is the ﬂow of nutrients be-
tween enterprises, i.e. wastes from one 
enterprise become inputs to another 
in order to increase production. These 
wastes do not ﬂow exclusively to the 
pond, but from the pond to other en-
terprises (in the form of pond mud and 
nutrient-rich water) such as in vegeta-
ble production around the pond. Some 
of these new enterprises and ﬂows may 
only have been feasible through the 
introduction of the pond. Increased 
enterprise diversity provides opportu-
nities for more nutrient linkages, and 
a possibility to meet increased nutrient 
requirements for enhanced production, 
Figure 5. The Area and Production of Freshwater Aquaculture 
in Hai Duong Province (1997–2014)
Source: Hai Duong Statistical Book, 1999, 2005, 2014.
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although this requires additional labor. 
This opens avenues for on-farm or con-
current integration, both on small-scale 
farms and in large-scale commercial 
agri-businesses, with manure and ﬁsh 
production taking place on the same 
farm. At the community level, diversiﬁ-
cation leads to opportunities for off-
farm integration (i.e. between-farms), 
such as the sale of chicken manure 
by poultry growers to specialized ﬁsh 
farms.
The one-way ANOVA tests re-
vealed changes in the household size, 
paddy land, homestead land, agricul-
tural land, number of fruit trees, and the 
total head number of animals raised be-
cause of their systems (Table 5). Farms 
with VAC systems had a larger number 
and area of fruit trees than those of two 
other systems, but also fewer fish ponds 
in the area. Additionally, the VAC 
households’ ownership of agricultural 
land was the smallest; the households 
with animal/fish production systems 
are characterized by more reared ani-
mals, paddy land, homestead land, and 
more family members in comparison 
with those of households belonging to 
commercially intensive fish production 
systems. Although the fish pond was 
the smallest area for the households 
with the VAC system, the pond plays 
an important role in effectively utilizing 
households’ production resources and 
recycling wastes. Fish farming was not 
considered as a high priority because 
it was employed by poor households 
with limited agricultural land and cap-
ital investment. The main goal of their 
farming is to meet their food securi-
ty and subsistence needs. In contrast, 
among farmers engaged in animal/fish 
production and highly commercial fish 
production, the fish production was the 
major objective from the outset, rather 
than the pond being simply a develop-
ment of the homestead and fruit or-
chards.
Economic Effectiveness  
and Efficiency of Freshwater 
Aquaculture Production Systems
In fact, freshwater aquaculture sys-tems were greatly diversified and intensified. There was increased 
reliance on plant residue/manure, in-
creased inorganic fertilizer inputs, and 
use of low-cost feeds. Furthermore, 
some manure and inorganic fertilizer 
use requires aeration and closer fish 
Table 4. The Start-Up Period of Fish Production at Farms in Hai Duong
       (Unit: household)
Source: survey, 2015.
Period FS system AF system VAC system Total
1980–1996 23 27 8 58
1997–2005 17 31 22 70
2006–2014 11 7 5 23
Total 51 65 35 151
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health management. Often in more 
intensive aquaculture production sys-
tems, there is a change in food man-
agement during a production cycle, 
e.g. from an initial basis of manure and 
fertilizer inputs, to a gradual shift to 
pellet feeding as the main input. The 
freshwater aquaculture system’s trends 
are characterized by product specializa-
tion, market/commercial orientation, 
off-farm or between-farm integration, 
and de-integration (i.e. reduction in 
emphasis on recycling ﬂows) and great-
er emphasis on inorganic fertilizers and 
ﬁsh feeds, compared with a previous re-
liance on manure or sewage as the main 
nutrient sources. However, a trend to-
ward diversiﬁcation of the produced 
ﬁsh into the production of high-value 
marketable species is emerging in the 
survey sites.
In Hai Duong, polyculture is 
applicable mainly for fish production 
in which the number of species of fish 
ranges from 2 to 6; carp being the most 
common species found in stock in the 
survey households. Fish were normal-
ly harvested after 10 months of being 
stocked. The stocking density was cal-
culated based on the total area for fish 
production (included bankers/dikes 
of the pond), so the calculation of the 
Table 5. The Characteristics of Fish Farms in Hai Duong Province
(#)1 sao = 360 m2.
(*) The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
Parentheses are standard deviations. 
Source: survey, 2015.
Unit
FS system 
(N=51)
AF system 
(N=65)
VAC system 
(N=35)
Age Year 52.1 (9.79) 52.5 (8.35) 55.8 (8.36)
Household size People 3.02* (1.09) 3.80* (1.12) 3.51 (1.40)
Number of laborers Labor 2.45 (0.92) 2.86 (1.10) 2.66 (1.45)
Agriculture land Sao(#) 18.7 (9.10) 18.3 (7.76) 11.7* (3.82)
Homestead land m2 353.0* (271) 512.3* (430) 459.5 (228)
Paddy land Sao(#) 4.20* (3.48) 6.17* (3.10) 5.20 (3.42)
Area of fruit trees m2 230 (371) 317.2 (600) 515.6 (878)
Number of fruit 
trees Tree 36* (56.00) 45 (64.75) 103* (171.20)
Number of animals 
raised
Heads of 
animals 23* (26.36) 188* (234.4) 39 (36.01)
Area of aquaculture 
land Sao
(#) 14.49 (9.58) 12.12 (7.01) 6.51* (2.46)
Number of owned 
ponds Ponds 2.27* (1.56) 1.88 (0.89) 1.34* (0.48)
Experience in aqua-
culture Year 16.5 (7.23) 17.6* (7.27) 14.1* (4.85)
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stocking density was less than one in 
every m2. The total production ranged 
from 150 to 17,740 kg/household annu-
ally. On average, the largest fish produc-
tion was concentrated to FS households 
with 4,727 kg/household, followed up 
by AF households with 4,254 kg/house-
hold, while it was only 2,144 kg/house-
hold for VAC households. However, the 
yield (339 kg/sao) of VAC households 
is larger than that of the FS households 
(325 kg/sao). ANOVA tests revealed the 
significant difference in the number and 
area of fish ponds between the groups 
of FS and VAC households (Table 6).
In recent decades, a number of 
studies on the impact of aquaculture 
production systems on household nu-
trition have been conducted in rural ar-
eas. The studies reveal that considerable 
beneﬁts result either from the direct 
consumption of ﬁsh by the producing 
households or from gains in income, so 
that fish farms can afford to purchase 
other cheaper foods, which neverthe-
less leads to an improved household 
diet (Ahmed & Lorica, 1999; Prein & 
Ahmed, 2000; Ruddle & Prein, 1998; 
Sultana, 2000; Thilsted & Roos, 1999; 
Thompson, Sultana, Nuruzzaman, 
& Firoz Khan, 1999). Further direct 
beneﬁts from rural integrated aquacul-
ture, aside from increased household 
nutrition and income, are the local 
availability of fresh ﬁsh and the pro-
vision of employment for household 
members. Indirect beneﬁts are the in-
creased availability of ﬁsh to local and 
urban markets which may lead to a 
reduction in prices; increased employ-
ment beneﬁts through the development 
of an industry providing work on ﬁsh 
farms and in related services; and the 
development of seed supply networks.
In Table 7, All Purchased Activi-
ty Direct Inputs, resources, and beneﬁts 
associated with the three systems are 
shown. When calculating the economic 
beneﬁts, only resources that are trad-
able in the region were taken into ac-
Table 6. The Status of Fish Production at Farms in Hai Duong Province
(*) The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
Calculation of stocking density included pond-dike area. Parentheses are standard deviations.
Source: survey, 2015.
Unit FS system (N=51) AF system (N=65) VAC system (N=35)
Area of aquaculture Sao 14.49* (9.58) 12.12 (7.01) 6.51* (2.46)
Number of ponds ponds/household 2.3* (1.56) 1.9 (0.89) 1.3* (0.48)
Production cycle 
time Months 9.8 (2.59) 10.5 (1.88) 10.7 (2.03)
Stocking density fish/m2 0.81 (0.59) 0.84 (0.62) 0.78 (0.47)
Kinds of fish Fish/stocking 4.31 (1.22) 4.37 (1.18) 4.31 (1.39)
Production kg/household 4,727 (4,176) 4,254 (2,475) 2,144 (1,233)
Yield kg/sao 325 (166) 359 (176) 339 (164)
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count. The operation of the pond was 
carried out through family labor; thus, 
the opportunity costs from the labor of 
collecting leaves and grasses as feed and 
manure as fertilizer were not included 
here, as these resources had no mone-
tary value in the research area. Under 
the VAC system, cereals (maize and 
rice), rice bran, and some agricultur-
al by-products were resources with a 
market value and showed a high varia-
tion in the amount used as pond input. 
Under the farming management of AF 
and FS systems, compound feed was the 
highest ﬁnancial input, comprising on 
average (90%) of the total value of pond 
inputs. The variable costs were feed, fer-
tilizer, lime, chemicals, electricity, and 
other operational costs. Labor is exclud-
ed in the price of the total cost. How-
ever, labor employment was estimated 
and research calculations showed that 
fish farms with the VAC system are the 
most labor-intensive (32.64 man-day 
Table 7. Economic Effectiveness and Efficiency of Fish Production 
per Sao at Farms in Hai Duong Province
                                                                 Unit: 1,000 VND
*The fixed cost is calculated based on depreciation over 10 years.
Source: survey, 2015.
 
FS system 
(N=51)
AF system 
(N=65)
VAC 
system 
(N=35)
Total value of fish  13,336.7  15,610.2  15,100.8 
All variable costs (Purchased 
Activity Direct Inputs)  6,043.8  7,596.4  6,700.2 
Fingerlings  2,202.8  2,577.4  2,995.3 
Feed  5,480.2  6,821.1  5,655.5 
Fertilizer  3.6  1.0  9.4 
Lime  92.7  113.2  84.5 
Chemicals  242.4  283.6  208.2 
Energy  187.6  335.7  338.7 
Other  48.6  48.6  28.5 
Gross margin of fish  7,292.9  8,013.8  8,400.7 
All capital Depreciation*  775.3  1,079.5  1,028.0 
Family farm available Income 
of Fish  6,517.6  6,934.4  7,372.7 
Working labor (man-days) 14.03 16.43 32.64
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per sao). Chemical, lime, and inorgan-
ic fertilizers accounted for 5% of the 
ﬁnancial input. The VAC farms’ Gross 
Margin (8.4 mill VND) and Family 
Farm Available Income (7.4 mill VND) 
of fish gained much better than those of 
from AF and FS systems. These results 
implied that the fish production sys-
tems benefited through integration by 
becoming more effective and better at 
resource-utilization. The integration of 
the aquaculture systems would be A-C 
or V-A-C.
Contribution of Freshwater 
Aquaculture to the Food System 
and Rural Development
Taking aquaculture’s contribution into account when discussing food systems and rural devel-
opment, it is, perhaps, not surprising 
that aquaculture production has grown 
rapidly since the 1980s and has been the 
fastest growing food production sector 
in the survey areas for more than three 
decades. In 1996, aquaculture produc-
tion contributed approximately 2.7% 
and in 2014, 12% of the total gross pro-
duction of agriculture in the province. 
The average gross income of 
households in which off-farm income 
was excluded (from 6/2014 to 6/2015) 
ranged from 10,000,000 VND/year 
(US$ 500/year) to 333,530,000 VND/
year (US$ 15,000/year). This figure for 
the FS group was 72,136,000 VND/year 
(US$ 3,200/year), less than that of the 
AF group, 98,430,000 VND/year (US$ 
4,406/year), but higher than those of the 
VAC group, 53,586,000 VND/year (US$ 
2,613/year). However, the difference 
between the total household income 
among the groups was not statistically 
signiﬁcant. On-farm income includes 
revenues from various enterprises such 
as cultivating rice, raising livestock, ﬁsh 
production, growing non-rice crops, 
and growing fruit trees, which all create 
an annual cash income for the farmers. 
Any enterprises that were just for per-
sonal consumption or recreation, but 
not for earnings, were ignored in this 
study because they do not contribute 
to the farmers’ income. Similar to the 
results for whole-household income, 
the Kruskal–Wallis tests did not ﬁnd 
any signiﬁcant differences between the 
groups in terms of the income of farm-
ing enterprises. However, the calcula-
tions of the average income from vari-
ous sources gave a general impression 
of income differences among the three 
groups. At the whole-farm level, the AF 
farmers appeared to obtain the highest 
returns from their farming, although 
the difference in terms of gross house-
hold income was not signiﬁcant at the 
time of the study. This result is consis-
tent with the assumption that aquacul-
ture development aimed to improve the 
situation of the food and foodstuffs, and 
the diversity of income sources for poor 
households in rural communities (Ta-
ble 8).
IV. Conclusion
Over time, freshwater aquacul-ture production systems are dynamic and are subject to 
economic and environmental chang-
es. The development of aquaculture in 
World Food Policy
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Table 8. Sources of On-Farm Income at 
Fish Farms in Hai Duong Province
Source: survey, 2015.
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the Red River Delta has shown 
the evolution from low-input 
on-farm integrated systems to 
high-input off-farm integrated 
and commercial systems, sup-
plying signiﬁcant amounts of 
ﬁsh to rural and urban consum-
ers. The aquaculture production 
systems play a key role in the de-
velopment and diversity of food 
systems. This is clear evidence 
that these fish production sys-
tems, especially IAA—VAC and 
AF systems are becoming more 
and more important in northern 
Vietnam for food security and 
rural development. 
The mono-aquaculture 
or intensive fish farming (FS 
system) seems to be less effi-
cient and stable in terms of re-
source-utilization and economic 
fears (production risks, market 
risks ... ). With similar levels of 
farm resources, and investment 
capital, farms with the AF sys-
tem are able to obtain a much 
better return than that of farms 
belonging to the FS system. 
Moreover, the most efficient 
farms use the VAC system. This 
strongly supports VAC as a sus-
tainable food system in develop-
ing countries in the context of 
rapid loss of agricultural land to 
urbanization and industrializa-
tion. What will be the sustain-
able food production system of 
the future? Which will feed the 
growing population on smaller 
and smaller areas of cultivated 
land?
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Aquaculture integration has con-
siderable potential within the VAC sys-
tem in the region, which is significant 
for poor farmers in developing coun-
tries where access to farming resources, 
investment capital, and food security 
are still problematic. Further research 
on the system that focuses on econom-
ic, environmental resource-utilization, 
and social benefits will shed light on its 
contribution to poverty reduction and 
improvements to livelihoods, as well as 
food security for most small-scale rural 
farmers.
Furthermore, poor rural people 
might also benefit from the provision of 
low-cost fish. If it is well planned and 
managed, VAC farming can significant-
ly contribute to the process of the ag-
ricultural diversification, the reduction 
of vulnerability and farm sustainability, 
and rural development, i.e. diversifying 
the sources of income, increasing the 
employment and welfare of rural peo-
ple, and safeguarding against environ-
mental pollution.
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What shapes the governance of the 
dairy value chain in Vietnam? Insights 
from Ba-Vì milkshed (Hanoi)
Mai-Huong Nguyen1, Guillaume Duteurtre2, Paule Moustier3
 
Abstract 
Vietnam has experienced a rapid growth in the dairy sector since 
the early 2000s. However, the organization of the sector is said to 
be inequitable and its motivational mechanisms are not sufficient 
to ensure the development of smallholder farmers. To assess small-
holders’ prospects in the upgrading process of the whole dairy 
sector, we conducted a study in Ba-Vì district, the largest “milk-
shed” in the Red River Delta, which has undergone a remarkable 
transition from state-owned concentrated production to small-
holder farms. The study focuses on value chain governance and 
upgrading strategies. The local dairy value chain is dominated by 
smallholders and characterized by contractual relations between 
private milk collectors and industrial, semi-industrial, and cottage 
processors. The local chain is featured by a mixed relational-cap-
tive governance pattern. Relational governance characterizes the 
two sub-channels in which small-scale industries operate. Captive 
governance describes the leading role of a medium-size dairy firm 
that has invested in UHT processing facilities and benefited from 
support from the local government. The strong role of public au-
thorities and some challenges for chain upgrading are discussed. 
Keywords:  dairy sector, value chain governance, livestock devel-
opment, Vietnam
Resumen
Vietnam ha tenido un crecimiento rápido en el sector lechero des-
de los primeros años de la década del 2000. Sin embargo, se dice 
que la organización del sector es inegalitaria y sus mecanismos 
1 RUDEC/ IPSARD, Hanoi, Vietnam/ CIRAD-MOISA, Montpellier, France.
2 CIRAD, UMR SELMET, Montpellier, France. 
3 CIRAD, UMR MOISA, Montpellier, France.
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de motivación no son suficicientes para asegurar el desarrollo de 
granjas pequeñas. Para evaluar los prospectos de las granjas peque-
ñas en el proceso de renovación de todo el sector lechero, llevamos 
a cabo un estudio en el  distrito Ba-Vì, la región lechera más grande 
del delta del Río Rojo, que ha tenido una transición asombrosa: de 
producción concentrada y estatal, a granjas pequeñas. El estudio 
se enfoca en la gobernanza de la cadena de valor y en estrategias 
de renovación. La cadena de valor lechera local está dominada por 
granjas pequeñas y está caracterizada por relaciones contractuales 
entre recolectores de leche y procesadores industriales, semi-in-
dustriales y pequeños. La cadena local está ofrecida por un patrón 
de gobernanza relacional-captiva mezclada. La gobernanza rela-
cional caracteriza los dos subcanales dentro de los cuales opera la 
industria a pequeña escala. La gobernanza captiva describe el papel 
principal de una compañía lechera que ha invertido en plantas de 
procesamiento de UHT y se ha beneficiado del apoyo del gobierno 
local. El importante papel de las autoridades locales y algunos de-
safíos de la renovación de cadenas se discuten.
Palabras clave: Sector lechero, gobernanza de cadena de valor, de-
sarrollo de ganado, Vietnam
摘要 
自21世纪初，越南的乳制品行业已经历了迅速增长。然而，
该行业组织机构据说是不公平的，其激励机制不足以确保小
农的发展。为评估小农在整个乳制品行业升级过程中的前
景，本文在红河三角洲最大的“牛奶场区”（milkshed）—
巴维区—进行了一项研究。巴维牛奶场区经历了从国有集中
生产到小农生产这一巨大转变。研究聚焦于价值链治理和升
级策略。当地乳业价值链由小农主导,其特征表现为私人收
奶员和产业、半产业、以及农舍加工商之间的合同关系。当
地链的特点则是，（其治理模式是一种）由关系型和俘获
型共同存在的混合治理模式。关系型治理（Relational gover-
nance）是供小规模产业运作的两大子渠道的特点。俘获型治
理(captive governance)描述的是中型乳制品公司的主导角色，
这类公司拥有超高温加工设备，并从当地政府处获得支持。
本文探讨了公共权威的强有力作用以及价值链升级所面临的
挑战。
关键词：乳制品行业，价值链治理，畜牧业发展，越南
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Introduction 
The economic reforms that be-gan in Vietnam in 19864 affected agriculture and the whole agro-
food sector through land allocation to 
individual farmers, liberalization of ag-
ricultural production, and the gradual 
privatization of state-owned enterpris-
es (Dang 2009). The agricultural GDP 
grew annually by 4.2% and by 3.5% in 
the periods of 1986-2004 and 2005-2013 
respectively. The livestock sector has 
been particularly dynamic with an an-
nual growth of 5.3% for the 2005-2013 
period and, in 2014, represented 26.4% 
of agricultural GDP. Pig and poultry 
production accounted for 90% of live-
stock output (GSO 2014)5  while milk 
production has increased significantly, 
both in terms of the national dairy herd 
and of the average milk yield. The dairy 
herd quintupled from 41,241 to 227,020 
cows between 2001 and 2014, mainly on 
smallholder farms. During the same pe-
riod, milk production augmented from 
64,703 to 549,533 tons (DLP 2014)6. 
Economic growth induced higher de-
mand while enabling environment 
favored an increase in both milk pro-
duction and consumption7. National 
policies were promulgated to encourage 
the dairy sector, such as the Decision 
1678 supporting dairy development for 
the 2001-2010 period with a focus on 
4 The ‘Đổi Mới’ (Renovation) has moved Vietnam away from a centrally-planned economy to a “so-
cialist-oriented market economy”
5 General Statistics Office
6 Department of Livestock Production (under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MARD))
7 Per capita milk consumption increased from 3.7 liters in 1995 to 20 liters in 2013 (FaoStat, 2014)
8 Decision 167/2001/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister (26th October  2001) 
9 MARD’s Decision n°984/QD-BNN-CN (2014) approving the “Restructuration of the livestock sec-
tor towards improvement of added value and sustainable development”
smallholder production. In 2011, 90% 
of all dairy cows were raised on small 
farms of less than 20 cows. Larger dairy 
farms were formed out of partially and 
progressively privatized state agro-for-
estry farms (FCV 2011).
Despite these improvements, 
the dairy industry only satisfies 30% of 
domestic demand (DLP 2014), and the 
remaining demand is covered by im-
ported milk powder and dairy products 
worth US$1,097 million in 2014 (Viet-
nam Custom 2015). The new livestock 
development policy (2014)9 gives prior-
ity to the development of large commer-
cial farms. While some authors report 
efforts by large dairy corporations to 
exclude small-scale vendors and fam-
ily farms from value chains in devel-
oping countries (GRAIN 2011), others 
highlight the complementarity between 
firm-led governance and contracted 
smallholder farmers (Humphrey and 
Memodovic 2006). 
This paper aims at characteriz-
ing the governance pattern of the local 
dairy value chain, and linking the gov-
ernance to the economic performance 
and development of the chain. The re-
spective roles of private firms and of 
government in value chain governance 
are explored to assess current upgrad-
ing trajectories and future prospects for 
smallholder dairy production.
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Materials and Methods
Value chain governance and 
determinants of governance 
patterns: an integrated approach
The emergence of governance in economics is linked to integra-tion of international trade and 
disintegration of production (Feenstra 
1998). As production is increasingly 
fragmented across geographical space 
and between firms, many studies focus 
on how these fragmentations are coor-
dinated and exchanged (Gereffi et al. 
2005). While some economists see mar-
ket coordination in governance pat-
terns, Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) 
refer to governance as any coordina-
tion of economic activities “through 
non-market relationships”. This relates 
to various ways of steering activities 
that are embedded in value chains, not 
only networks but also more hierarchi-
cal forms. Between the two extremes of 
market and hierarchical governance, 
three governance modes are identified: 
“modular”, “relational” and “captive” 
(Gereffi et al. 2005). In these three gov-
ernance modes, lead firms exert their 
power by coordinating production vis-
à-vis suppliers without direct owner-
ship of the firms. In agribusiness value 
chains, such patterns include out-grow-
er schemes, contract farming, category 
management by supermarket suppliers, 
marketing contracts, and farmer coop-
eratives (Humphrey and Memodovic 
2006; Moustier 2010). These forms of 
coordination influence the costs of gov-
ernance through their effects on the 
complexity of transactions, the codifi-
ability of transactions, and the capabil-
ities of the suppliers required for a spe-
cific transaction. 
The global value chain approach 
(GVC) draws on Transaction Cost Eco-
nomics (TCE) and Network theories, 
while focusing on the internal logics 
of sectors, such as industrial structure 
and production-process characteristics 
(Bair 2005). The TCE framework pro-
vides insights into the factors that deter-
mine value chain governance patterns 
by convening the effect of transaction 
characteristics (asset specificity, uncer-
tainty and transaction frequency) and 
the associated transaction costs (both 
ex-ante and ex-post costs of contract-
ing) (Williamson 1979). This approach 
argues that increases in uncertainty 
and the risks of opportunism result 
in greater use of complex contracts or 
vertical integration (Williamson 1991). 
Complementarily, Network theorists 
propound that problems as contractu-
al hazards need to be managed at the 
inter-firm level through social mecha-
nisms, i.e. trust, trustworthiness, rep-
utation, norms, mutual dependence 
and information exchange (Powell 
1989; Jones et al. 1997) that are called 
‘mundane’ transaction costs (Gereffi et 
al. 2005). Institutional economists also 
suggest that such formal and informal 
institutions are “embedded” in their 
cultural and social environment. Hence, 
they underline historical processes and 
path-dependency by which specific in-
stitutional arrangements emerge in a 
given context (North 1990). Different 
forms of social embeddedness raised 
by network theory refer to the concept 
of ‘proximity’ which valorizes the re-
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sponse to market demand of arrange-
ments and connections among actors 
engaged in the value chain (Moustier 
2012). Recent literature highlights three 
levels of proximity: physical proximity 
(Gilly and Torre 2000), organizational 
proximity (Torre 2000), and functional 
proximity (Gereffi et al. 2005).
Governance arises when “some 
firms in the chain work to parameters 
set by others” (Humphrey 2005). A 
lead producer or a lead buyer play an 
important role in setting and enforcing 
parameters (product, process, logistic 
parameters) because they have a strong 
position in “core nodes” of the chain 
that allows them to extract different 
types of rents (Gereffi 2001; Humphrey 
and Schmitz 2002). The “captain” of 
the chain can be identified by key in-
dicators: (i) share of chain sales, value 
added, and profits; (ii) relative rate of 
profit; (iii) share of chain buying pow-
er; (iv) control over key technology; (vi) 
holder of distinctive competence; and 
(vii) holder of chain “market identity” 
(brand-name) (Kaplinsky and Morris 
2012). 
The GVC framework, which 
has mostly been used for international 
chains, puts forward that increasing de-
mand for quality and competition be-
tween firms translate into a shift from 
market to captive governance, driven by 
processing and retailing firms. From the 
literature on milk chains in emerging 
economies, it is hypothesized that milk 
chains tend to be steered by processing 
firms that place large-scale investments 
in processing and quality control, and 
develop contracts with farmers, those 
are provided with intermediate goods 
and technical assistance, in exchange of 
commitments to deliver milk. This has 
been evidenced in Brazil, Chile and Ar-
gentina (Reardon and Berdegué 2002); 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia (Dries 
et al. 2009); India (Birthal et al. 2009). 
The governance of chains through con-
tracts can be described as modular or 
captive depending on the asymmetry 
of power between suppliers and buyers 
and the strictness of contracts. In India, 
cooperatives facilitate farmers’ access 
to services and markets, that some-
how balances the power of industrial 
plants (Upadhyay and Ranjan 2007). In 
the quoted studies, contracted farmers 
benefit from higher profits and pric-
es thanks to quality premiums. Public 
and private standards and services are 
described as complementary. In the 
paper, we consider if similar trends are 
observed in Vietnam through variables 
characterizing the governance (Table 1). 
We also assess the main economic re-
sults of the chain and ongoing upgrad-
ing strategies. Finally, our discussion of 
the role of public services contributes 
to the debate on livestock development 
policies.
Study zone
Ba-Vì district, located 60km from Hanoi center, is the largest milk-shed in the Red River Delta and 
includes a cluster of small farms that 
typically supply both regional and local 
markets (Hostiou et al. 2012). The dairy 
farms are mostly smallholding with 
fewer than 10 cows fed with less than 1 
hectare of elephant grass, corn, or other 
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forage. In 2014, the district dairy herd 
numbered 8,871 cows for a total milk 
production of nearly 30,000 tons (Fig-
ure 2). The development of smallholder 
dairying contributes to improved rural 
livelihoods through income generation, 
employment opportunities and better 
nutrition (Nguyen et al. 2013). How-
ever, the presence of industrial dairy 
processing companies, which have 
made well-targeted investments in the 
dairy chain, and cottage industry raises 
concerns about the effective and sus-
tainable governance of the local value 
chain (Duteurtre et al. 2015). The roles 
of public services and private firms in 
sustaining transactions and linkages 
between actors are thus of particular at-
tention in this paper.
Table 1: Variables to be analyzed in value chain governance
Source: Authors’ synthesis adapted from TCE, Network Theory and the CGV approach
Variables
Governance pattern
Market Modular Relational Captive Hierarchy
Term of the 
relation
Short-term 
orientation
Medium/ 
Long -term 
orientation
Long-term 
orientation
Long-term 
orientation
Long-term 
orientation
Information 
exchange Limited Frequent Frequent
Frequent and 
idiosyncratic
Frequent and 
idiosyncratic
Enforcement 
mechanism Price
Standards 
and 
information
Social 
embeddedness
Parameters 
set by lead 
firm
Parameters 
set by lead 
firm
Dependence 
level Independent
Inter- 
dependent
Inter-
dependent
Inter-
dependent Dependent
Power 
asymmetry No Low Low High High
Physical 
proximity Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
Organizational 
proximity Yes/No Yes/No Yes Yes/No Yes/No
Functional 
proximity Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes
Captain of the 
chain
Upstream/ 
Intermediate/ 
Downstream/
No captain
Upstream/ 
Intermediate/ 
Downstream/
No captain
Upstream/ 
Intermediate/  
Downstream/
No captain
Upstream/ 
Intermediate/ 
Downstream/
No captain
Parent firm
Complexity of 
transaction Low High High High High
Codification of 
information High High Low High Low
Competence of 
suppliers High High High Low Low
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Data and analysis
The secondary data (socio-eco-nomic, agriculture, etc.) from the target district and com-
munes were collected to picture the lo-
cal dairy sector. We mapped the dairy 
channels using the value chain scoping 
exercise developed by ILRI (ILRI 2014) 
and focused on the three communes 
of Tản-Lĩnh, Vân-Hòa and Yên-Bài, 
which together represent 80% of the 
milk production in the district. Seven-
ty people involved in dairy production 
and marketing in Ba-Vì were invited to 
focus-group discussions. Three main 
Figure 1: Map of study site
Figure 2: Increase in the dairy cow herd in Ba-Vì
Source: Economic Division, Ba-Vì district, 2014
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channels were identified corresponding 
to three types of processing: artisanal, 
small-scale, and large-scale. 
An in-depth survey was se-
quenced in September 2014 (50 inter-
viewees) and September 2015 (20 inter-
viewees) comprising semi-structured 
interviews with different actors in the 
local chain (local authorities, 5 input 
and service suppliers, 21 producers, 9 
collectors, 5 processors, 10 milk shops 
and 15 consumers) to characterize the 
value chain and scrutinize sustainabil-
ity of the value chain. Given this small 
sample, the study should be considered 
as exploratory and the results have to be 
supported by a quantitative survey. Yet, 
some representativeness was sought 
in targeted interviewees according to 
their involvement in the three identi-
fied channels steered by the processors. 
Local actors were questioned about 
their business resources (assets, capi-
tal, know-how, labor, technology used), 
functions and activities (products pur-
chased or sold, delivery and transport, 
services provided or received, access 
to credit, information exchange), eco-
nomic results and management prob-
lems (prices of inputs and outputs, costs 
and margins, regulations, competition, 
strategy), relationship with other chain 
actors (contractual linkages, alliances, 
dependence, groups or associations, 
market relationships, information, 
power asymmetry, proximity), quality 
management (types of products, quali-
ty standards, payment schemes, quality 
labelling, certification), enabling envi-
ronment and supports from local gov-
ernment (technical assistance, exten-
sion services, livestock insurance, etc.). 
Possible changes over time of these 
variables were collected to grasp the 
dynamics of the whole system. Down-
stream flows from milk production to 
milk processing to end-use activities 
were traced to identify the drivers of in-
novations and who received the largest 
share of the margins and value addition 
produced by the chain.
Results
The dairy development trajectory 
in Ba-Vì
Milk production started in Ba-Vì in the early 20th century. The  development trajectories 
of Ba-Vì’s dairy sector correspond with 
the national trends in the periodized 
political economy (Figure 3): milk pro-
duction concentrated on State farms 
(during the collectivism period), milk 
production on individual smallholder 
farms (during the Đổi Mới period) (Su-
zuki et al. 2006), and industrialization 
of the private dairy sector (since 2008) 
(Duteurtre et al. 2015).
The recent industrialization shift 
of the local dairy production has turned 
out since the Government launched its 
2020 livestock development strategy in 
2008. In the same year, the melamine 
crisis caused by adulterated powder 
milk imported from China hit the local 
chain as some local firms had to sus-
pend their milk collection and to stop 
their processing activities. Among the 
processing companies involved in the 
collection of local milk, only Interna-
tional Dairy Products Joint-Stock Com-
pany (IDP) and Bavi Milk JSC. (BVM) 
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continued to buy fresh milk from local 
farmers, resulting in a concentration of 
the dairy industry. IDP built a new dairy 
processing plant (2010) next to Ba-Vì 
Cattle and Forage Research Center10 
(CFRC) in Tản-Lĩnh commune, and 
extended its collection network. These 
investments were further valorized and 
secured by a memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) between IDP and the 
district authorities. IDP then adopted a 
2012-2020 dairy development program 
aiming at expanding local milk pro-
duction through credit to farmers, im-
proved breeding, new production tech-
niques, supports for an industrial-scale 
“demonstration farm”, and building an 
animal feed mill. 
10 In 1989, Ba-Vì State farm was converted to Cattle and Forage Research Center with mandates to 
conduct research into cow breeding and feeding, animal health and reproduction, and forage culti-
vation
Characterization of the Ba-Vi 
dairy value chain 
The Ba-Vi dairy value chain in-cludes five segments: supply of inputs, milk production, milk 
collection, milk processing, and mar-
keting and distribution of dairy prod-
ucts (Figure 4).
Input and service provision: 
Farmers have their inputs sourced from 
either self-supplied stock, mostly green 
fodder (representing about 50% of the 
farms’ feed requirements), or external 
inputs purchased off-farm (industrial 
feed, artificial insemination, veterinary 
services, etc.). Beside the network of 
private veterinarians, local producers 
Figure 3: Dairy production development trajectories in Ba-Vì
Source: Authors
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receive support from extension agents, 
who implement technical assistance 
programs launched by the local govern-
ment and the Hanoi Livestock Devel-
opment Center (HNLDC). The wom-
en’s union, the farmers’ association, and 
private collectors initiate and contract 
credits to producers with funds from 
the IDP, commercial banks and (in 
the case of the associations) their own 
members’ savings.
Dairy farming: Milk production 
in Ba-Vì is done on small farms of 0.5-
1 hectare (Pham et al. 2011). Regard-
ing feed availability, a “typical” family 
farm with three dairy cows has around 
3000m2 (around 60% of its cultivated 
land) under forage crops. Both farms 
diversified in crop-livestock produc-
tion and farms specialized in milk pro-
duction target stable markets based on 
contracts with industrial and semi-in-
dustrial processors. Some rely on verbal 
agreements with small-scale processors 
and cottage industry, who generally buy 
milk on a less strict quality at higher 
price but at a very limited volume.
Milk collection: Collectors are 
crucial middlemen who greatly con-
tribute to the organization of local milk 
Figure 4: Ba-Vì dairy value chain
(Note: solid lines represent normative relationship; dash line illustrates non-regular re-
lationship happening in winter when the surplus volume unabsorbed by semi-industrial 
processors (given their limited processing capacity) are sold to IDP)
Source: RUDEC’s survey (Revalter, 2014-2015)
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production and marketing. The collec-
tion of fresh milk anchors on annual 
contracts or verbal agreements with 
fixed prices, or spot market exchanges. 
Out of 44 local collection points, IDP 
has the largest network (32 stations) 
and buy up 85% of total district out-
puts. Most collection stations belong 
to private collectors who are supported 
by the companies for credit access and 
the provision of equipment and know-
how. All private collectors are part of 
the IDP milk payment scheme, which 
gives premium to high quality milk. 
The companies grade the milk deliv-
ered by producers through monthly 
quality analysis. The CFRC organizes 
its own collection network involving 
their contracted farmers11 and then 
sells the milk to IDP. Semi-industrial 
processors also rely on collection points 
where they buy 6% of all the fresh milk 
produced locally. Business relations be-
tween producers and semi-industrial 
processors stand on verbal agreements 
through those collection points. Most 
of the collection points are located 
along main roads to reduce time spent 
on transport from farms to the pro-
cessing plants.
Processing: Eighteen registered 
milk processors operate in Ba-Vì. How-
ever, 93% of the milk is processed by two 
industrial processors (IDP and BVM) 
who produce a wide range of industri-
al products. IDP is the only processor 
to use the UHT technology. Around 
6% of the milk is processed by semi-in-
dustrial processors (Ba-Vì Milk Cake 
- BVMC, Ất-Thảo, Xuân-Mai, etc.), the 
11 CRFC’s contracted farmers are those perform dairy activities based on rental leasing contracts. 
Some of their cows and all their land are leased from the CFRC. 
rest is processed by small cottage pro-
cessors. The semi-industrial and small 
processing units produce pasteurized 
milk, milk cakes, caramel cream, and 
yoghurts. 
Marketing and distribution of 
dairy products: Increasing income, 
rapid urbanization, changing diet 
habits have driven the increased milk 
consumption in Vietnam. The strong 
territorial identity of Ba-Vì (nature, 
tradition, culture, know-how) and 
quality label (certification trademark) 
spur the preference of consumers for 
Ba-Vì milk products. Industrialized 
products are sold by modern distribu-
tion (supermarkets, convenient stores) 
and shops mostly outside the district, 
particularly in Hanoi, whereas the 
semi-industrial and artisanal prod-
ucts are sold locally to tourists in small 
shops located along highways connect-
ing Ba-Vì and Sơn-Tây town and to 
Ba-Vì national park. 
Family farming is still secure 
thanks to major constraints on access 
to land and capital, which precludes the 
development of large industrial farms. 
Landless and labor-intensive milk pro-
duction have allowed smallholders to 
stabilize their business and guarantee 
economic returns to family labor. Writ-
ten contracts with milk collectors are 
underlined in controlling price fluctu-
ations and enforcing contractual link-
ages between producers and processing 
companies. 
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The mixed governance pattern of 
the Ba-Vì dairy value chain
Importance of product characteristics 
in the governance of the local value 
chain
Coupled with the functional charac-
teristics of chain actors, the technical 
properties of the milk products affect 
inter-firm relationships and governance 
patterns. First, the perishability of raw 
milk and unsterilized dairy products lo-
calizes collecting and processing facili-
ties close to production areas. This per-
ishability restricts marketing flexibility 
for farmers and traders but increases 
their marketing risks. Marketing fresh 
milk products is thus characterized by 
physical proximity and contractual re-
lationships, whereas sterilized prod-
ucts can be sold very far away through 
market adjustments. Second, seasonal 
variation in milk production and con-
sumption raises concerns about the ad-
justment of milk collection, processing 
and storage, and more generally about 
balancing supply and demand. This sea-
sonality creates trading risks for farm-
ers, puzzles cost-efficient utilization of 
labor and processing facilities and com-
plicates the structure of products for 
processors. IDP upgraded its process-
ing line to diversify its products and to 
handle the abundance of raw milk in the 
off-season and contracted to purchase 
surplus milk from external collection 
points of semi-industrial processors 
and cottage industry. The UHT line 
installed in 2010, which manufactures 
storable dairy products, plays a signifi-
cant role in this respect. Third, although 
milk is a relatively homogeneous prod-
uct, its nutrient content varies consid-
erably among producers, upon cow 
breed, feeding, and farm management 
practices. The heterogeneous quality re-
quires significant investments and extra 
costs for grading, especially measuring 
the fat and dry matter content of the 
milk procured. 
 
Relational governance: linkage 
between dairy farmers and collectors
The governance of the milk collection 
schemes is mainly relational. Linkages 
between farmers and collectors are de-
fined by physical proximity, organiza-
tional proximity and functional prox-
imity (Table 2).
Table 2: Characterization of transactions determining proximity 
between farmers and collectors
Source: RUDEC’s survey (Revalter, 2014-2015)
Type of proximity Characteristics of transactions 
Physical proximity Distance between farmers and collection points is less than 2 km
Organizational 
proximity
Family relationships between producers and collectors
Moral factors that shape mutual confidence
Functional proximity Agreed sharing of collection areas between collectors (and 
processors)
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Besides the proximity of col-
lecting points and milk producers, 
processing facilities have been built in 
the district to ensure just-in-time pro-
cessing. Collection points of indus-
trial processors are installed along the 
main roads to enable access by big tank 
trucks, whereas the collection points of 
semi-industrial processors settle farther 
away. While most of dairy farmers de-
liver their milk to the collection points 
within their village, some farmers fetch 
milk to collection points of another vil-
lage because of social connections. The 
social proximity reduces uncertainties 
related to price, quality, and quantity 
while enables access to informal credit, 
information, and knowledge. 
Collectors bridge farmers and 
companies through formal contracts. 
The bilateral contracts between farm-
ers and processors refer to the collec-
tor’s name and are signed at collector’s 
place. As the collector is responsible 
for managing and enforcing the con-
tracts, actors consider those contracts 
as “tri-party” agreements. Beside terms 
regulating rights and responsibilities of 
farmers and processors, the contract 
defines different tasks performed by 
the collector (delivering milk to the 
factory, sampling milk for quality test, 
proceeding payments, etc.). However, 
the one-year term implies contractu-
al ties not being the only institution 
to ensure the regularity of milk deliv-
ery and the loyalty of the producers. 
There is always a risk that a farmer will 
switch from one collector to another 
12 Equivalent: US$1,000–US$2,500 
13 “Red Book” is the Land Use Right Certificate delivered by local administration
when the contract ends. Thus, financial 
and moral aspects as well as interper-
sonal proximity enforce the contract. 
Trust between farmers and collectors 
is sustained by other supports: credit 
at low interest rates to farmers to buy 
cows or to build facilities (VND 20-50 
million12 for a term of 6 to 12 months 
with extension possibility), or advanc-
es (VND 1-3 million) for the purchase 
of feed, which farmers can reimburse 
in milk. Since farmers find it difficult 
to access to formal credit provided by 
banks (due to the high interest rate, ab-
sence of mortgages or collateral assets 
such as Red Book13), financial support 
from collectors has largely contrib-
uted to the local dairy development. 
Connections between collectors and 
farmers hang on social principles and 
on events taking place in the villages 
and communes (weddings, funerals, 
house-warming, religious events, etc.). 
Milk collectors strengthen their rela-
tionship with farmers by buying milk 
of lower quality rejected by the proces-
sors (in this case, milk is bought at a 
lower price for feeding young calves), 
delivering veterinary services free of 
charge, providing technical assistance 
and information or giving bonuses for 
milk delivered. These incentives are 
regarded as tools for collectors’ trans-
actional assurance and improving milk 
quality (Saenger et al. 2013). Other at-
tributes of relational governance are 
evidenced by frequent information 
exchanges between dairy farmers and 
milk collectors. Any changes in the 
policy or strategy of processing compa-
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nies, or price fluctuations are passed to 
farmers by collectors. Milk collectors 
are obliged to invest their time and re-
sources in building such networks, but 
they themselves benefit from relational 
governance in two ways: (i) it enables 
them to expand their input business 
(feed, animal medication); (ii) they are 
able to obtain necessary information to 
reduce risks connected with milk qual-
ity at farm level. The above-mentioned 
legal and social mechanism facilitates 
the symmetric relationship between 
dairy producers and collectors. 
 
Captive governance: outstanding role 
of IDP as lead firm
Different from the informal link be-
tween farmers and cottage industry, 
mixed connection between farmers 
and semi-industrial processors, the re-
lationship between farmers and IDP is 
formal. Facilitated by the MOU with 
the district authority (2009), IDP has 
a quasi-monopoly in purchasing local 
milk as IDP collects 85% of the milk 
locally produced and imposes pur-
chase prices and the quality norms 
(dry matter content, fat content, an-
tibiotics, etc.) that are a reference for 
the whole district. Semi-industrial 
processors organize their collection 
and price their purchases based on 
the price range defined by IDP. Both 
the pricing and the payment system 
(penalty, bonus, and quality standard) 
are decided by IDP without formal 
discussions with the farmers, who are 
in a weak position in the chain. Dairy 
farmers are not organized to benefit 
from collective actions, and are thus 
unable to exert power or negotiate the 
milk prices and other concerns. Dairy 
farmer groups are established in only 
three out of seventeen dairy farming 
communes. Except for technical train-
ing classes and visits to farmers, these 
groups don’t have any collective activ-
ities (as bulk purchase of inputs) or 
action plan to dialogue and negotiate 
with the processors.
IDP drives the technological ad-
vances in local industry by investing in 
UHT technology. This investment al-
lows IDP to produce pasteurized long-
life milk, which helps balance supply 
and demand in winter, and target larger 
markets outside the district (i.e. Hanoi 
city and even Central and Southern 
provinces). Moreover, IDP has built 
up professional teams for the different 
stages (collection, processing and sale) 
to provide technical assistance to their 
farmers and collectors. Besides, IDP 
commits short-term and medium-term 
credit to the farmers linked to their net-
work. While formal bank loans usually 
require collateral, informal loans and 
microfinance enable dairy farmers to 
purchase cows or make other invest-
ments. 
IDP officializes its operations 
by contractual relationships with pro-
ducers and private collectors aiming at 
securing supplies and reducing risks. 
The written contract system has been 
in use since IDP’s debut in the region. 
Today, most local producers have a 
contractual link with a processor (large 
or small, industrial or semi-industrial), 
although a small number of producers 
supply their milk to cottage industry 
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without written contracts. Under the 
contract terms, together with techni-
cal aspects, hygiene requirements, and 
respecting sanitary norms, IDP agrees 
to buy all milk that meets quality cri-
teria. The penalty and bonus policy is 
also defined by quality attributes. IDP 
encourages farmers to produce quality 
milk by offering premiums tied to the 
milk quality and quantity. Other bo-
Table 3: Specifications of governance patterns in the local dairy value chain
Variables Relational Governance Captive Governance
Term of relation Long-term orientation Long-term orientation
Information 
exchange
Frequent information ex-
change between producers and 
collectors (at collecting points, 
social events, etc.)
The connection between dairy 
farmers and processing compa-
nies is created and maintained 
by a network of collectors
Enforcement 
mechanism
Social relations between dairy 
farmers and collectors are 
driven by relational linkage, 
mutual trust 
The terms and conditions in the 
contract between dairy farmers 
and processing companies con-
cern the milk that is purchased 
and processed 
Dependence 
level
Inter-dependence of farmers 
and collectors
Inter-dependence of collectors 
and processors (processing com-
panies)
Power 
asymmetry
Relatively balanced/symmetric 
partnership between farmers 
and collectors
Farmers are highly dependent on 
processing companies who de-
cide on the required milk quality 
and purchase price.
Captain of the 
chain 
IDP IDP
Complexity of 
the transaction
Tri-party milk procurement 
contract
Tri-party milk procurement con-
tract
Codification of 
information
Norms and standards to en-
sure the quality of milk to be 
collected and processed
Norms and standards to ensure 
the quality of milk to be collect-
ed and processed
Certification trademarks are 
granted to 2 local processors 
(IDP and BVM)
Competences of 
suppliers
Improvement in technical 
knowledge and economic sit-
uation thanks to training and 
credit 
Improvement in technical 
knowledge and economic sit-
uation thanks to training and 
credit 
Source: RUDEC’s survey (Revalter, 2014-2015)
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nuses are awarded for respecting the 
code of practice (certified by IDP), use 
of tanks and equipment for transport-
ing milk, and compliance with farm 
sanitary standards. A stable year-round 
purchase price discourages farmers 
from switching to another processor. 
Although the prices set by IDP are 
somewhat lower than cottage indus-
try on spot market, farmers appreciate 
selling to IDP because of regular milk 
purchase during year. Along with the 
quality-based payment, IDP frequently 
monitors compliance of its contract-
ed farmers with hygienic and farming 
practices. Captive governance led by 
IDP, on the one hand, has contributed 
to the rapid adoption of the Code of 
practice at the farm level and, in turn, 
to the company’s success in creating 
a stable source of raw material for its 
large-scale processing. On the other 
hand, under this governance pattern, 
by founding a decentralized collec-
tion network, IDP aims at reducing its 
transaction costs (particularly search, 
screening and transfer costs) since 
third-party collectors take over coor-
dinating exchanges with small farmers. 
Yet, the costs of monitoring and enforc-
ing the contracts with dairy farmers, in 
particular supervision of husbandry 
practices and control of milk quality, 
are still relatively high since most  local 
producers are smallholders spreading 
out over a large area. 
The milk chain is therefore char-
acterized by a two-facet governance 
(Table 3): relational governance be-
tween farmers and collectors, and cap-
tive governance between farmers and 
IDP, the industrial processing firm. 
Figure 5: Distribution of profit and added value among actors in the dairy value chain
Source: RUDEC’s survey (Revalter, 2014-2015)
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Economic performance of the 
value chain
Economic returns for chain stakeholders reflect chain op-erations and forms of gover-
nance. The unequal distribution of 
the profit and value added highlights 
the supremacy of processors, espe-
cially IDP, in the local dairy chain 
(Figure 5). IDP takes the largest 
share (63.77%) of the profit, where-
as farmers receive less than one-third 
(26.01%) of the total profit made in 
the chain, which is disproportionate 
with respect to their investment costs 
(which account for up to 50% ex-
penses of the chain as a whole). The 
dairy value chain is a typical chain in 
which the processors lead the chain 
forward, and the majority of added 
value of the chain is subsequently 
captured by processors like IDP. This 
asymmetric distribution has weak-
ened the bargaining power of the 
dairy farmers. It is prevailing that all 
investments made by the processors 
(even small) are counted in their pro-
duction costs and value addition. On 
the contrary, family labor, self-sup-
ply of grass for feed, and opportunity 
costs are neglected in earnings ob-
tained by the farmers. If all costs were 
included, the added value gained by 
dairy farmers in the chain would be 
significantly lower. This unequal dis-
tribution proves the captive gover-
nance led by IDP, but raises concerns 
about the sustainable development of 
the dairy sector in general and of the 
dairy chain in Ba-Vì in particular.
Enabling environment: the role 
of public services in value chain 
governance
Following the National Dairy De-velopment Plan (2001), a num-ber of research and scientific 
efforts were made in the dairy sector 
with the participation of international 
development actors. CFRC strength-
ened its research activities through 
government funds and internation-
al research and development (R&D) 
projects (JICA-funded dairy projects, 
Vietnam-Belgium Dairy project, the 
establishment of Moncada frozen se-
men centre, etc.). The international 
R&D projects built capacity for the lo-
cal farmers and collectors as well as em-
powered the CFRC and contributed to 
transform its role from production de-
velopment to the scientific research and 
technical consulting.
The dairy production in Ba-Vì is 
high on the agenda of Hanoi’s rural and 
agricultural development strategy. Many 
actions have been done to support all 
the chain actors. CFRC land was allocat-
ed to former state farm workers to raise 
dairy cows. A long-term land lease was 
granted to IDP for its investment in the 
large-scale farm and processing plant. 
Technical assistance has been provided 
through extension programs delivered 
by CFRC, HNLDC, and IDP to farm-
ers (concerning farming practices such 
as animal care, feeding, heat-stress con-
trol, etc.). Around 100 training courses 
were provided to 7,000 farmers between 
2000 and 2014. Furthermore, the local 
government also cares genuinely for 
the territorial identity of Ba-Vì milk by 
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applying for certification mark “Ba-Vì 
cow milk”, in 2009, as intellectual prop-
erty rights protection. The district gov-
ernment’s control over the certification 
mark aims at maintaining the quality 
and reputation of Ba-Vì milk; but re-
serving the mark rights for only two 
companies (IDP and BVM) may prevent 
other companies who are qualified from 
obtaining the certification mark and, to 
some extent, ensures IDP’s monopoly on 
collecting milk locally as IDP and BVM 
have partially merged.
Since 2012, the district dairy de-
velopment strategy appears to be close-
ly linked with the IDP development 
plan. Beyond the use of certification 
mark, the district government supports 
IDP in many institutionalized opera-
tions in the 5-year MOU. Together with 
the government’s favorable policies (ag-
ricultural insurance for producers14, 
favorable loans and taxation regimes, 
etc.), the district administration con-
trols the entrance of other dairy com-
panies by gauging daily collection ca-
pacity of minimum 600kg for placing 
collection points. This structural mech-
anism endeavors to a stable supply of 
milk to IDP and BVM.
Discussion and Conclusion
Structural transformation and 
organization of the value chain
As a snapshot of national dairy sector which has been expe-riencing a rise of medium 
14 The State provides grants to cover the insurance fees: 100% of insurance fees for poor farmers, 80% 
for quasi-poor farmers, 60% for non-poor farmers, and 20% for cooperative groups (who are part 
of a pilot project on livestock insurance).
and large farms, Ba-Vì district, in the 
2010-2014 period, witnessed a relevant 
change in farm size: decreasing number 
of small farms of 1-5 cows (from 89.55% 
to 61.17%), and increase in number of 
farms of more than 5 cows (farms of 
6-9 cows: from 8.14% to 32.17%; farms 
of more than 9 cows: from 2.31% to 
6.66%). Priority is given to the medi-
um and large farms in view of higher 
economic returns, better epidemic and 
quality control and improved effluence 
management. 
Despite the rapid structural 
changes in parts of the sector, small-
holders till dominate dairy production. 
Low entry barriers to production are set 
by both dairy processors and local gov-
ernment to ensure smallholder farmers 
access to credit, public services (ex-
tension and veterinary services), and 
training as well as improved infrastruc-
ture. Higher barriers concern land con-
straints, dependence on concentrates, 
demanding quality standards and per-
manent contracts with companies. 
Smallholder production shows more 
resilient against market fluctuations, 
but it is difficult to generate sufficient 
volume to meet increasing demand and 
face higher competition from import-
ed milk products. Accordingly, a niche 
marketing seems to be an important 
opportunity that help Ba-Vì milk over-
come barriers to trade (special demand 
for fresh milk, quality local product, 
local market for tourists, restaurants, 
etc.). Increasing domestic demand and 
improved roads would facilitate sale 
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of the products in the urban markets. 
Besides, technology is highlighted in 
transforming the chain and shaping 
the value chain governance (crossbred 
cows, new technology, and market dy-
namics such as prices). 
 
Governance structure and 
upgrading strategy
The governance of the value chain relies on very complex social networks including dairy pro-
ducers, collectors, processors, and pub-
lic authorities, and resulting from long 
historical processes. Informal relations 
play a crucial role alongside formal 
contracts in this regulation (Culas and 
Pannier 2014). Although IDP makes 
contracts with farmers and defines 
quality standards and prices (which are 
attributed to captive governance), col-
lectors are a key node between farmers 
and IDP, and the link between farm-
ers and collectors is embraced by rela-
tional governance. Captive governance 
emerges in relation with large-scale in-
vestments by IDP and quality manage-
ment objectives. Despite IDP’s attempts 
to introduce strong vertical coordina-
tion of the local chain, private collec-
tors have been able to maintain their 
position and keep some power in their 
relations with dairy farmers. Like dairy 
production in Son-La province, Ba-Vì 
dairy farmers suffer from a very weak 
professional organization, meaning 
they have very little bargaining power 
to negotiate the prices dictated by IDP 
(Bui et al. 2013; Nguyen et al. 2013). 
Hence, captive governance is parallel 
with chain upgrading, but it translates 
into an asymmetric sharing of incomes. 
Yet our data is lacking to assess wheth-
er contracted farmers earn more or less 
income than non-contracted ones, in 
particular through coercive measures 
on quality.
The investments made by IDP 
have had a major impact on the upgrad-
ing trajectory of the local value chain. 
Among the upgrading dimensions, 
vertical integration and upgrading of 
both processes and products appear to 
be the most significant changes. The 
capacity of IDP to invest in farmers’ 
development projects and in UHT pro-
cessing technology has provided new 
opportunities and value addition for 
farmers and for other small-scale pro-
cessors, through improved processing 
and packaging. The future of processing 
firms may depend on their capacity to 
set up contracts with appropriate incen-
tives. The role of the authorities in man-
aging the Ba-Vì certification trademark 
and milk quality control will certainly 
affect success chances of semi-industri-
al processing plants in the future. 
While the problems of melanine 
contamination in China are linked to 
the rapid and unregulated develop-
ment of the sector (Pei et al. 2011), a 
weak cooperation of firms in the Viet-
namese fast-growing dairy sector has 
led to new challenges and compro-
mised  the ability of the value chain to 
maintain the viable link among actors 
and food safety. The different forms 
of local collective organizations (the 
processor federation initiated by IDP, 
BVM and BVMC in 2013 to guarantee 
the quality of local dairy products, to 
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protect the interest of those concerns 
and to reduce risks; association of 14 
collectors in Tản-Lĩnh commune es-
tablished in 2013 aiming at mutual aid, 
strengthened solidarity, and limited 
competition among collectors) have no 
operational protocol to undertake their 
mission in reality. Meanwhile, the dairy 
farmer groups cannot perform collec-
tive actions. A national dairy manage- 
ment board encompassing different 
stakeholder representatives (produc-
ers, processors, state and consumers) 
is recommended to improve coordina-
tion between local actors and to han-
dle all emerging issues and conflicts of 
the value chain.
 
Value chain governance and 
territory governance
As Vinamilk, the biggest milk company in Vietnam, IDP and BVM rely on large supply net-
work of smallholder farmers and inter-
mediary collectors within a milkshed 
where milk is collected into a tank 
mixing milk from different producers. 
Bimonthly payment to farmers for de-
livered milk bases on the quality test 
done by the companies, while collec-
tors receive a collection fee. The cur-
rent decentralized collection system 
is beneficial to processors by reducing 
their investment, but is argued unfair 
and untransparent by both farmers and 
collectors since milk tests are done at 
the dairy plants and they have to accept 
the results and prices published by the 
companies. Such quality and payment 
system crystalize the tensions between 
farmers and processors; thus, an inde-
pendent quality test agency is crucial in 
stabilizing the dairy zone.
Dairy smallholders in Ba-Vi, 
like in other milksheds in Vietnam and 
other countries in the South, are fac-
ing challenges related to strengthened 
health regulations and increasing re-
source competition among operators 
that weakens the participation of small 
producers in the market. Innovations 
in the dairy industry, such as concep-
tion of new products manufactured in 
the territory (cheese for example), will 
allow small producers and processors 
to have easier market access, to diver-
sify their products and to increase their 
revenues. This would also help to meet 
other issues such as addressing season-
al fluctuations of milk products, lower 
costs to food, or the improvement of 
the quality of milk.
The recent strategy for eco-tour-
ism development of Hanoi to 2020-
2030 opens opportunities and chal-
lenges to the sustainable development 
of the dairy chain. From economic per-
spective, a fashion trend would be to 
create more diversity in dairy products 
and tours integrated with homestay at 
and visit to dairy farms. Community 
eco-tourism contributes to higher in-
come for the locals. From social per-
spective, with a strong territorial iden-
tity, the local chain should involve more 
the local farmers and artisanal and 
small processors. From environmental 
perspective, for the non-grazing dairy 
system characterized by the confine-
ment of animals, attention should be 
paid to effluence management and sus-
tainable development of the territory. 
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The current certification trade-
mark has contributed to the higher 
price of the local milk in the market. 
However, the upgrading to protected 
geographical indication (PGI) would 
be strategic in view of a stronger qual-
ity label as an integral attribute to the 
sustainability of the products in the 
market. Plus, PGI strategy will further 
valorize local natural resources, local 
know-how and the proactive partici-
pation of territorial organizations and 
actors to the sustainable and inclusive 
development
 
Institutional framework and 
enabling environment
Reardon et al. (2012) argued that the dynamics of the food chain in Asia is driven by economic 
development and public actions. Pub-
lic services contribute to the upgrading 
and modernization of the value chain. 
The MOU between IDP and district 
government (2009) and the processing 
plant built by IDP on the land of CFRC 
are outstanding examples of public-pri-
vate partnership in the agri-food sec-
tor. The Livestock Restructuring Plan 
(2014) converges with the Livestock 
Development Strategy (2008) in orient-
ing the focus of dairy production in tra-
ditional regions, including Ba-Vì. Apart 
from controlling imports of milk pow-
der and milk prices, the support pro-
vided by the State (technical assistance, 
credit, and building infrastructure) in-
centivizes dairy production, improves 
market connections and promotes mar-
ket integration. At the provincial and 
district levels, strong local government 
involvement is apparent in economic, 
technical, organizational and other an-
gles.  However, the definition of quali-
ty is not shared by all the actors in the 
chain.
Dairy industry, as a component 
of livestock sector is proved to be neg-
atively affected by increasing interna-
tional integration, notably TPP (VERP 
2015). Import of livestock and livestock 
products, especially dairy products, 
from countries of comparative advan-
tages (New Zealand, United States) is 
on rise. From the perspective of con-
sumers and importers, the dairy mar-
ket becomes more competitive after 
tariff removals, but it uncertainly could 
help domestic prices fall. While dairy 
(processed) products will suffer more 
from acute competition of imported 
products, raw milk can take advantage 
of natural trade barriers (i.e. perishabil-
ity of fresh milk). Competition pres-
sure mainly comes from powder milk. 
Short-term impact is not really clear, 
but to ensure the long run, it is nec-
essary to push sector restructuring to 
raise quality and competitiveness (dairy 
zoning, feed crop production, control 
over imported powder milk). Vietnam-
ese dairy enterprises have to invest into 
modern and advanced technology and 
sustain their market shares. Addition-
ally, given imprecise packaging regula-
tions and insufficient quality control as 
institutional bottlenecks (Pedregal and 
Nguyen 2009), it requires transparen-
cy in defining fresh milk, publicizing 
information of milk products to pro-
tect benefits consumers and businesses. 
Moreover, the prices of milk products 
must be under good control to ensure 
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the access of consumers to products of 
quality and of reasonable prices and to 
encourage enterprises to invest in milk 
production rather than being depen-
dent on imports
 
Policy implications
Our analysis highlights the role played by private companies and government intervention 
in promoting the dairy sector in Ba-Vì, 
which has emerged recently and un-
dergone a rapid transition. The context 
of the local dairy industry led to the 
emergence of three factors that influ-
ence transaction costs and hence shape 
a “mixed” type of governance needed 
to facilitate transactions along the lo-
cal dairy chain. The three factors are 
(i) the structure of the local dairy value 
chain, which is driven by private indus-
trial-scale processing companies; (ii) 
specific agricultural characteristics, and 
(iii) strong backstop of public services. 
Strong state involvement has taken dif-
ferent forms but is responsible for the 
initial impulses to the local dairy sector. 
Entry barriers to production and trade 
have increased significantly over time. 
The State uses the barriers by partner-
ing with private firms to facilitate the 
flows of products and information. 
Smallholder dairy farmers still have 
a role in local economy in the context 
of land constraint and livelihood as-
surance, but further support is needed 
to ensure their access to stable mar-
kets and help them understand quali-
ty and food safety regulations through 
training, improved support services 
and protection of intellectual property 
rights. These measures should be com-
bined with specific regulations aimed at 
preventing or reducing potential nega-
tive effects (exclusion of small produc-
ers and processors, environmental deg-
radation, unfair distribution of added 
value, market competition, etc.). Uni-
lateral decision making by the “captain” 
of the chain should be replaced by new 
rules of the game co-constructed with 
all the actors to ensure a sustainable and 
inclusive value chain. 
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Land, State, and Society in Laos: 
Ethnographies of Land Policies
Pierre Petit1
Abstract
Land policies are a contentious topic in Laos. The banning of swid-
den agriculture in the 1990s prompted widespread resettlements, 
while land allocation was implemented during the same period; 
the following decade saw massive land grabs. Unfavorable to small 
farmers, these processes transformed everyday social relations 
with land, which used to be managed at the village level but pres-
ently fall more and more within the administration’s domain. How-
ever, State employees are not alone in using a new lexicon to refer 
to land issues; those impacted by such measures are also adopting 
it to protect themselves, sometimes with relative success. Gossip 
and rumor can affect the authorities’ decisions. And land policies 
can never be implemented without vernacularization, which ends 
up constructing a practical order on land negotiated—in uneven 
terms—by the local administration and the local actors. Ethno-
graphic case studies throughout Laos illustrate how the state has 
become an inescapable mediator between people and land, trans-
forming the social fabric and reshaping people’s agency.
Keywords: Laos, Anthropology of the State, Micro-Politics, Land 
Policies, Land Grabbing, Resettlement
Resumen
Las políticas de tierras son un tema controvertido en Laos. La pro-
hibición de la agricultura itinerante en los años 1990 resultó en 
muchos movimientos de personas, mientras que la asignación de 
tierras fue implementada durante el mismo periodo; la siguiente 
década vio apropiaciones de tierra masivas. Al no ser favorables 
para los pequeños granjeros, estos procesos transformaron relacio-
1 Pierre Petit is Senior Research Fellow at the Belgian National Funds for Scientific research (FNRS). 
He is the director of the Laboratoire d’Anthropologie des Mondes Contemporains at the Université 
libre de Bruxelles (ULB). He currently works on mobility, youth, and religion among the Tai Vat of 
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nes sociales cotidianas con la tierra, que antes eran gestionadas a 
nivel de aldea pero que actualmente yacen más y más dentro del 
dominio de la adminstración. Sin embargo, los empleados estata-
les no están solos en su uso del nuevo léxico para referirse a los 
problemas con la tierra; los que fueron impactados por aquellas 
medidas también están adoptándolo para protegerse a sí mismos, 
a veces con un relativo éxito. El chisme y el rumor pueden afectar 
las decisiones de las autoridades. Y las políticas de tierras nunca 
pueden ser implementadas sin “vernacularización,” lo que termina 
construyendo un orden práctico de la tierra negociada—en térmi-
nos desiguales—por parte de la administración local los y actores 
locales. Los estudios etnográficos de caso a través de Laos ilustran 
cómo el estado se ha convertido en el mediador inescapable entre 
la gente y la tierra, transformando el tejido social y dándole nueva 
forma al poder de la gente.
Palabras clave: Laos, antropología estatal, micro políticas, políticas 
de tierras, apropiación de tierras, reasentamiento
摘要
土地政策在老挝是一个争议性话题。20世纪90年代老挝禁止
了刀耕火种农业，这推动了大范围的土地安置。尽管土地分
配也在此期间开始实施，但接下来的10年发生了大规模土地
争夺。  不利于小农户的是，这些过程转变了日常社会与土地
间的关系。土地过去由农村管理，而如今却越来越多地进入
了（国家）行政领域。然而，使用新术语来代指土地问题的
并不是只有国家员工；受此类措施影响的那部分人也采取同
样的方式试图保护自己，有时还取得了相对成功。绯闻和谣
言能影响权威（政府）的决定。土地政策在没有被地方口语
化（vernacularize）之前是绝不会实施的。本地口语化最终将
对地方行政和地方行为者在不平等谈判中的土地建构实际秩
序。本文对老挝进行民族志案例研究，阐述了该国如何在成
为人民和土地间不可避免的调停者的同时，改变社会结构、
重塑人民机构。
关键词：老挝，国家人类学，微观政治，土地政策，土地争
夺，安置
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Introduction
In 2013, I was chatting with a taxi driver in Vientiane, explaining that I had come back from Attapeu Prov-
ince where I was working for a food se-
curity project. I mentioned it was diffi-
cult to work in a context where rubber 
tree plantations were implemented so 
extensively. The driver went on with hu-
mour, saying that the government had 
sold all the land north of Louang Pra-
bang to Chinese, and all the land south 
2 Lao transliterations are based on Mingbuapha & Becker (2003); usual spelling has been conserved 
for toponyms.
of Paksan to Vietnamese. He concluded 
without further ado that “lattabaan kôn 
boo dii”2, “the government is made up 
of bad people”.
I was surprised that a taxi driver 
would talk so casually on that topic. I 
thought land issues were a “public se-
cret” (Taussig, 1999) and could not be 
debated so openly. However, their pub-
licity seems on the rise nationally. For 
example, the state-owned Vientiane 
Times dedicated its “Opinion” column 
on 18 June 2013 to the question: “Do 
you think that community resettlement 
Figure 1. Map of Laos
© P. Petit 2017
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is fair in Laos?” The four people inter-
viewed were all critical, mentioning 
possible corruption within companies 
and stipulating that the government 
should more responsibly defend public 
interests. On Facebook, a media much 
less controlled by the State, users post 
and share videos showing trucks load-
ed with timber from illegal logging in 
protected areas, lamenting this as an 
alienation of national wealth by foreign 
companies. Land issues are often im-
bued with nationalistic emotions, with 
the feeling that national sovereignty is 
at stake. This makes them a potential 
leverage point for collective action.
Land policies are one of the 
main topics through which the mo-
rality of the state has been debated in 
Laos for two decades. International 
watchers have played an important 
role in the rise of such anxieties. Peo-
ple involved in the defense of human 
rights, the environment, and ethnic 
minorities have repeatedly denounced 
the disastrous impacts of the Laotian 
state’s “grand schemes” as well as the 
global land grab perpetrated by for-
eign companies.3 For example, in 
May 2013, Global Witness published 
a report titled “Rubber Barons”, with 
a telling subtitle: “How Vietnamese 
companies and international finan-
ciers are driving a land grabbing crisis 
in Cambodia and Laos”. It denounced 
at once Vietnamese rubber compa-
nies, political authorities in Laos and 
Cambodia, and international donors 
like Deutsche Bank. The companies 
would have been granted concessions 
3 See Dwyer (2013, pp. 309–312) regarding the coverage of land grabs in Laos by the Western media.
on hundreds of thousand hectares 
without any regard for the basic rights 
of local farmers.
Such large-scale concessions to 
foreign companies (mainly in the sec-
tors of agro-industry, electricity, and 
mining) are presently the main topic 
of land policy discussions, but this has 
not been always the case. In the 1990s, 
debates centered on policies barring 
shifting cultivation in the highlands 
and the ensuing resettlement of villag-
ers to the lowlands. A large national 
report described the often-dramatic 
consequences of these policies for those 
resettled (Goudineau, 1997), beginning 
a long series of publications that took a 
critical stance toward such policies and 
their consequences for rural popula-
tions.
Resettlements took place when 
land-use planning was implemented 
with the support of international aid 
agencies. The land and forest allocation 
policy was supposed to define licit and 
illicit use of land around the villages, 
while farmers were provided temporary 
land-use certificates that would guaran-
tee them access to land (Evrard, 2004). 
Ducourtieux, Laffort, and Sacklokham 
(2005, p. 521) criticized this land re-
form unambiguously, arguing that “the 
impact of the policy has been negative 
both for rural development and for 
environmental conservation” and that 
it would engender counter-effects like 
food shortages, especially among the 
poorest.
Later, High (2008) took a differ-
ent approach in considering the issue of 
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resettlements, focusing on the need to 
consider individual agency in mobility; 
some Laotians have indeed been driven 
by aspirations of “escaping poverty”, as 
the official motto declares, and entering 
what they see as a “modern” life (see 
also High 2014). The problem is not so 
much mobility per se, but the failure 
of the state to provide the conditions 
for its success. High tries to go beyond 
the domination/resistance paradigm, 
showing how people have appropriated 
and reformulated the state’s discourses 
on development in light of their own 
desires. 
Another critical viewpoint has 
been developed by Lund (2011), who is 
concerned by the way land policies are 
linked to and participate in the creation 
of political subjectivities. He argues 
that these policies do not reflect the 
Laotian state’s pre-existing sovereignty 
over land, but rather create it. In local 
contexts, land issues have long been 
settled by village or family authorities. 
The land reforms were not intended to 
protect villagers’ access to land, as of-
ficially announced, but instead to im-
pose the state’s sovereignty over land. 
This made both the people and the land 
visible and legible, and the adminis-
tration became an inescapable actor in 
defining their rights. “This started to 
change people’s political subjectivities: 
the authority to grant rights to land 
inserted government onto the lives of 
people” (Lund, 2011, p. 901). Tan (2012, 
pp. 84–86) suggests that the large land 
concessions and enclaves provided to 
Chinese companies in northern Laos 
cannot be equated with losing sover-
eignty; counter-intuitively, they instead 
entrench the Lao state and its “tech-
nologies of governing” in places that 
had hitherto largely escaped the state’s 
reach. Similarly, Dwyer (2013) presents 
two detailed case studies showing that 
the literature’s focus on the foreign or 
corruptive dimensions of land grab-
bing misses the most important point, 
namely their strong embedding in the 
national and local political landscapes 
of Laos.
Even if High, Lund, Tan and 
Dwyer’s approaches are different, they 
share a common interest in the way 
land policies have become central to 
spreading “state relations” in Laos. Such 
state relations refer to social relations 
predicated on bureaucratic procedures, 
administrative authority, political deci-
sions, or reference to anything emically 
indexed to “the state” by the interacting 
parties. I use this concept as opposed 
to “state–society relations” to refrain 
from an overly substantive view of the 
state as different by nature or separable 
from society. Even if the state/society 
dichotomy is a pervading representa-
tion in modern societies, it should not 
be taken at face value: it is a construc-
tion, not a fact (High & Petit, 2013; Li, 
2005; Mitchell, 2006; Sharma & Gupta, 
2006). Further, a too binary concept of 
state–society relations does not cap-
ture interactions between state officers 
themselves, who may have divergent 
opinions or interests, nor does it cap-
ture interactions between local em-
ployees and citizens who use the law or 
other state rhetoric in promoting their 
views.
I shall try to unpack the modal-
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ities of state relations created through 
land policies in different contexts, 
mainly in rural areas. Most studies on 
the topic are based on a detailed case 
study. To refrain from the tendency to 
present a specific situation as a paradig-
matic example, this article will rather 
develop ethnographic vignettes to de-
scribe state relations related to land in 
a wide range of situations. I will first 
emphasize their pervasiveness, showing 
how they have created a new lexicon, a 
specific “language of stateness” (Han-
sen & Stepputat, 2001) that is obligato-
rily used when discussing land issues. 
And second, I shall show that this does 
not deprive stakeholders of their agen-
cy in their often-tense interactions, but 
instead reframes such interactions en-
tirely.
The Practicalities of  
Land Policies
Based on my visits to Laos since 2003, I have observed how land policies are central to ongoing 
socio-economical changes throughout 
the country, though the range of situ-
ations is wide.4 In some places, land 
policies seem at first glance to have 
minimal impacts. This was the case in 
Dak Seng, a small Talieng village in the 
4 As a Belgian anthropologist, I have been working successively in a research on rural development in 
Bolikhamxay Province (cooperation between the French-speaking universities of Belgium [CUD] 
and the National University of Laos, 2003-2008); in an assessment of Nam Theun 2’s social develop-
ment plan (Agence Française de Développement, 2004); in Annâdya, a food security project imple-
mented in Attapeu and Ratanakiri (EU, 2012-2015); and in a joint research on the socioeconomic 
transformations of Houay Yong village (ULB-NUoL, 2009-2017). See Fig. 1 for locales. Fieldwork 
was carried out in collaboration with Lao research assistants/interpreters. Beside the data collected 
formally throughout these researches, much information was gathered through observation and 
casual discussions with Lao people. My intermediate-level understanding of Lao enables me to 
have basic conversations in that language. I warmly thank all the institutions previously listed, the 
many Lao colleagues who took part in the researches, and the anonymous readers of a former ver-
sion of this paper.
remote mountains of Attapeu Province, 
in the far south of the country. During 
my fieldwork in 2012, no land or forest 
allocation had been carried out yet, nor 
any land-use certificates granted. Land 
use was managed through customary 
practice and swidden cultivation was 
still extensively practiced (Fig. 2). The 
village chief claimed that all residents 
knew the rights of each family, so he 
seldom had to settle land disputes. 
Similarly, in the same period, the Tai 
Vat inhabiting Houay Yong Village in 
the mountainous northern province 
of Houa Phan reported that access to 
their upland fields relied on knowledge 
shared by all of them, for they all knew 
which families had cultivated which 
plots of land in the past (Petit 2015).
However, Dak Seng, and Houay 
Yong were indeed affected by national 
land policies. The 1990s were marked 
by campaigns against swidden culti-
vation. Though cultivation practices 
themselves may not have been changed 
by these campaigns, the villages have 
both been affected by the concomitant 
promotion of migration to the low-
lands. About half of the population 
of both villages left within a decade 
as part of an ongoing process. And in 
2007, Dak Seng was resettled closer to 
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the road serving it, about 1 km from 
its former location; although this was 
not presented as an imposed measure, 
it clearly followed the priorities of the 
administration.
In all the other places where I 
have worked, the constraints intro-
duced by land policies are much more 
onerous: land relations have become 
increasingly mediated by a series of ob-
jects, practices, discourses, officers, and 
institutions related to the state. In most 
regions of the country, district employ-
ees are now the mandatory mediators 
5 Paradoxically, such zoning—intended to protect villagers’ rights—has been used by companies and 
authorities alike to legitimate massive land deals, targeting agricultural or nonagricultural land de-
pending on the context (Dwyer, 2013). Recent (2017) field researches in Houay Yong revealed that 
land-zoning and land certification are currently being implemented in the area.
through which one can access land; 
they are in charge of land allocation and 
establishing land-use planning. Most 
villages now have a colored map spec-
ifying land uses within their divisions 
(Fig. 3). Villagers are often unable to 
understand the representation of space 
on these maps and do not seem to care a 
lot about them, but are more concerned 
with obtaining highly valued tempo-
rary land-use certificates from district 
officers specifying the location, surface 
characteristics, and shape of their resi-
dential and cultivated areas5.
Figure 2. Swidden Agriculture in Dak Seng
© P. Petit 2012
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Another practicality of the land 
policies was the organization of village 
meetings. People keep a fresh memory, 
in Houay Yong, of the way district em-
ployees came to hold meetings inform-
ing residents of the problems with shift-
ing cultivation, the protection of water 
sources, and government assistance to 
villagers migrating to the lowlands. In 
2004, I also observed meetings in vil-
lages slated for complete resettlement 
due to the construction of the Nam 
Theun 2 dam. The Laotian officers in 
charge of these “participatory consulta-
tions” for those being resettled on the 
Nakai Plateau brought along materi-
als such as scale models of the houses 
to be built as part of resettlement (Fig. 
4) and colored posters with optimistic 
cartoon drawings describing life af-
6 The main focus of this aid was the catchment plateau itself; much less concern was devoted to the 
populations in the downstream areas impacted by the dam (Manorom, Baird, & Shoemaker, 2017), 
probably because of the lower media coverage.
ter resettlement (Fig. 5); they also had 
specific instructions to involve wom-
en and train small groups of locals to 
“raise awareness” among other villagers 
before a community gathering. Such 
sophisticated equipment and gender 
sensitivity are unusual in resettlement 
procedures in Laos; international atten-
tion aimed at this large-scale, partially 
Western-funded project seemed to have 
prompted an effort (and budget) to an-
ticipate possible criticisms and to pro-
mote the role of the involved agencies.6 
But if the paraphernalia was innovative 
and uncommon, the bureaucratic rou-
tines were rather more familiar. Offi-
cials followed well-oiled village meet-
ing mechanisms for inducing allegedly 
popular “decisions”, which had been in 
fact taken by the authorities long before 
Figure 3. Land-Zoning Map in Phouxay
© P. Petit 2012
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Figure 4. Model Houses for the Participatory Consultation in Nakai
© P. Petit 2004
Figure 5. Board about Occupations for the Resettled  
(Participatory Consultation in Nakai) 
© P. Petit 2004
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the meeting; outreach teams were com-
posed of district officers and members 
of Party-affiliated mass organizations 
such as the Women’s Union and the 
Youth Union. Despite the participatory 
rhetoric and the conspicuous presence 
of international staff, the whole process 
revealed how the Lao state managed the 
mobility of the “target” population.
The practicalities of land pol-
icies also include public events and 
artifacts—seminars, reports, glossy 
publications, TV broadcasts and the 
like—depicting win–win situations, 
empowerment of the poor, smiling 
children confident about their future, 
natural resource protection, and gender 
mainstreaming. All these elements were 
most conspicuous in the case of Nam 
Theun 2. Such public outputs, which 
also include official pictures showing 
decisions being endorsed by those in 
the circles of power, display the political 
legitimacy of such projects.
Let us now turn to a very dif-
ferent case, namely the rubber planta-
tions in Attapeu mentioned earlier. In 
some villages, this project was given no 
publicity, and the inhabitants alienated 
from their land were neither consulted 
nor given information. This does not 
mean that state mediators were absent 
from the process. After Vietnamese 
workers began to cut down the for-
est (Fig. 6), relations with the villagers 
soured and the district head eventual-
ly had to invite the chiefs of all affect-
ed villages to a meeting. He explained 
that the plantation company aimed to 
develop (pattanaa) the region as well 
as the whole country and made it clear 
that the decision was not his own nor 
even the governor’s: it had been taken at 
the central government level and could 
not be changed. A few weeks later, the 
village chiefs received a letter from the 
governor asking them to comply with 
the order and allow the company to 
proceed.
Figure 6. The Border of the HAGL Plantation (200 m. from Phouxay village).  
The place beyond the trench used to be a forest a few months before.
© P. Petit 2012
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The next step was the payment of 
compensation to villagers. This had to 
be carried out properly, for the villagers 
already possessed land use certificates. 
Each village chief collected informa-
tion from the villagers affected by the 
project. Then, agents from the compa-
ny came to carry out payment; villagers 
signed the documents quickly and took 
their money, fearing that if they did not, 
they would lose everything.
It turns out that even when ba-
sic procedures for dispersing informa-
tion and engaging with the public have 
not been completed by the state as it 
should, the latter remains the legitimiz-
ing authority. This was evidenced by the 
meeting in the district chef ’s office, in 
the letter from the governor requiring 
village chiefs to comply with the proj-
ect, and in the payment of compensa-
tion based on land-use certificates. The 
language of stateness is certainly visible 
in these late information and mitigation 
procedures.
Most plantations in Attapeu 
Province belong to the HAGL (Ho-
ang Anh Gia Lai) Company, which 
acquired extensive land rights as com-
pensation for building infrastructure 
when Laos hosted the Southeast Asian 
(SEA) Games in 2009. HAGL has since 
built a sumptuous six-floor hotel in the 
small city of Attapeu. The presence of 
this building, much higher than any 
other in the city, is a clear public re-
minder that the company benefits from 
a special status. The large and usual-
ly deserted lobby of the hotel contains 
large framed pictures above the lift 
doors depicting Doan Nguyen Duc, the 
president of HAGL group, in the com-
pany of Laotian high officials during 
ground-breaking ceremonies or official 
openings. One picture shows him smil-
ing and receiving a giant golden key—a 
symbol of his “access”, perhaps (Fig. 7). 
Another picture shows him standing 
with Choummaly Sayasone, the former 
president of Laos (2006–2016) who was 
born in Attapeu, with the flags of Viet-
nam and Laos flying behind them (Fig. 
8)—a reminder of the “special relation-
ship” linking Vietnam to Laos since 
1975. HAGL is clearly welcome in the 
Lao PDR.
In short, the case studies dis-
cussed above show that people–land 
relations cannot be grasped without 
reference to the state. National land 
policies and land-lease agreements be-
tween the state and private companies 
have drastically transformed the rela-
tionship people have with their living 
space. Ironically, land policies imple-
mented with the support of internation-
al aid agencies aiming to empower local 
communities have instead involved the 
state in formerly micro-local land rela-
tions. This eventually empowered state 
administration more than villagers.
Taking Over the Language  
of Stateness
Does the winner—the State and allied companies—take all? For sure, the new language of 
stateness related to land has come into 
general use and has transformed the 
state administration into a compelling 
intermediary for anything to do with 
land use. This has not deprived locals 
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Figure 7. Doan Nguyen Duc (right) and Lao Officials. Picture exposed 
in the lobby of the HAGL hotel, Attapeu
© P. Petit 2012
Figure 8. Doan Nguyen Duc (right) with Choummaly Sayasone, the Former  
President of Laos. Picture exposed in the lobby of the HAGL hotel, Attapeu
© P. Petit 2012
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from their agency regarding land, but 
has transformed the whole framing of 
negotiation for access and use.
The story of a Hmong leader 
born in Louang Prabang Province and 
presently living in Thongnamy, Bo-
likhamxay Province, is a revealing ex-
ample of the ways people can call on 
the law to protect their rights when they 
have been scorned. In 2000, he learned 
that shifting agriculture would soon 
be prohibited and that villagers would 
need to vacate their land. He and his 
fellows looked for a place to stay, and 
chose a plateau area in Paksong Dis-
trict, Champasak Province, in the south 
of the country. They eventually received 
legal documents and a map of their new 
fields issued by the district authorities 
of Paksong.
7 In that decade, there were still small groups of insurgent Hmong, mostly descendants of the Secret 
Army soldiers trained by the CIA during the civil war in Laos.
They settled in Paksong, but in 
July 2001, the army came quite unex-
pectedly to expel them from their new 
village. According to the Hmong lead-
er, this decision was motivated by the 
“confusion” of the Hmong community 
for spies working for the insurgency.7 
Soldiers came and ordered them leave 
at gunpoint. The leader said he told the 
soldiers to kill him if they dared, as the 
disruption was totally illegal. During 
our interview, he clutched administra-
tive documents and law books. When 
he told us about his confrontation with 
the soldiers, he held up a booklet and 
proclaimed, as if he was reliving the 
scene, “It is not your law, it is not my 
law: this is our law and you have to re-
spect it” (Fig. 9).
The Hmong managed to suspend 
Figure 9: The Hmong Leader Showing his Documents (Thongnamy)
© P. Petit 2006
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the decision for 3 days, but eventually 
had to move; the army transported them 
in trucks to the village of Thongnamy. 
Provincial employees promised them 
compensation upon their arrival: land, 
rice, irrigation. They got most of what 
was promised, but the land they were 
provided never got the expected irri-
gation system—so in 2006, they started 
building a canal by themselves. Their 
leader continued still furious about 
these events. He showed us a document 
stipulating the investment made in Pak-
song by the families: 93,375,000 Kip, or 
about 12,000 USD at the time.
This evidence is revealing on 
many points. Of course, the most ob-
vious element is the authoritative way 
state authorities enforced a decision 
with no regard for previously granted 
rights of resettlement. But the Hmong 
did not simply give up. Their leader col-
lected books on land rights, gathered 
official documents regarding the reset-
tlement in Paksong, and compiled a list 
of the assets and investments his people 
had made in order to calculate a very 
precise bill of 12,000 USD. His attitude 
clearly indicates a clear understanding 
of land rights according to the law, as 
well as how to use evidence to pressure 
authorities. This goes beyond mere eco-
nomic considerations: his insistence 
demonstrates that the issue of compen-
sation was a way for his group to ex-
press their strong disapproval about the 
whole affair, and to phrase it in terms 
that emphasize their right to such com-
pensation under the law.8
8 Green and Baird describe a similar process among the Heuny resettled in Champasak Province 
(2016, p. 13, 18).
Thongnamy provides a second 
example of the ways land policies can 
be used by groups on the social mar-
gins. This village where the above-men-
tioned group of Hmong was forcibly 
resettled has in fact attracted thousands 
of migrants from the north of Laos. The 
hamlet of 40 families in 1995 has now 
become a small rural city of more than 
6,000 inhabitants (Petit, 2006, 2008). 
The migrants who came after the year 
2000 could not be provided with land 
by the authorities, despite access to land 
being an important commitment of the 
resettlement propaganda. This led to 
the creation, in 2002, of a committee of 
52 landless families from various ethnic 
backgrounds, with a majority of Khmu. 
On the advice of two Khmu generals 
contacted by a leader of this committee, 
they officially presented their demands 
at different levels of the state adminis-
tration: the district, the province, and 
the capital.
In 2003, a land allocation pro-
gram was designed under the aegis of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and For-
ests, and in 2004, each family was al-
lotted a few hectares in the forest of a 
neighbouring village, Na Bouay. How-
ever, residents of Na Bouay considered 
themselves the legitimate owners of 
their village’s land and refused to give 
it for free to the new migrants. The sit-
uation was very tense and the district 
authorities ended up not enforcing the 
new land allocation, siding instead with 
the inhabitants of Na Bouay. Altogeth-
er, only five to seven families benefitted 
from the land allocation.
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A third example comes from 
Phouxay, a small Laveng village in Atta-
peu Province. When it became evident 
to the villagers that Vietnamese HAGL 
workers had surveyed the border of a 
future plantation to be well inside their 
village’s territory, the village chief gath-
ered a delegation of six people to meet 
the workers, explaining that they would 
not allow the work to proceed if the 
company could not produce an autho-
rization from the governor of the prov-
ince. Though the Vietnamese agreed to 
sign a document in which they prom-
ised to seek the governor’s approval be-
fore doing anything, they did not end 
up respecting this commitment.
What is revealing here is the 
villagers’ reaction: they assembled an 
official delegation, including the chief 
of the village, a policeman, a militia-
man, a village forest warden, etc.; they 
asked for a permit from the governor; 
and they made the Vietnamese sign 
a document. They were framing their 
contestation in legal language to most 
effectively protect themselves from the 
company. Miles Kenney-Lazar (2010), 
who wrote a detailed report on land 
concessions in Attapeu, lists other in-
stances in which households tried, 
based on what they knew of their land 
rights, to oppose sub-standard financial 
compensation offered by the company 
in addition to cases of villages that re-
fused to sign away their land (2010, p. 
25–28, 46–47). In at least one case, this 
opposition was successful.
As these examples demonstrate, 
the new land policies and their vari-
ous implementations cannot be simply 
equated with a story of dispossession 
without resistance. New bureaucratic 
language allowed the villagers to formu-
late legitimate claims that were not al-
ways in line with the dominant groups’ 
interests. To be sure, our case studies 
are not success stories: the Hmong were 
resettled against their will with limited 
compensation; the 52-family commit-
tee was not granted the land it claimed; 
and the bulk of Attapeu villagers ended 
up with no choice but to sign away their 
land to the Vietnamese company. But 
in all three cases, individuals drew on 
state relations to contest decisions and/
or claim compensation. This eventually 
helped to bring benefits they would not 
have gotten, had they reacted passively. 
The apparent insufficiency of the com-
pensation and its limitation to a few 
people should not obscure the fact that 
using the bureaucratic idiom was met 
with partial success in the three areas, 
and allowed for voicing discontentment 
in an authoritarian regime.
Hidden Transcripts
This point addresses another modality of the social relations emerging from land policies, 
namely forms of resistance popularized 
by James Scott as “hidden transcripts”, 
a concept referring to these “low-pro-
file forms of resistance” of “subordinate 
groups” that fight an “ideological guer-
rilla war” against power holders (Scott, 
1990, p. 19, 137). These are distinct 
from the contestations discussed above 
that use the legal lexicon to defend one’s 
rights; hidden transcripts circulate un-
der cover, and have more to do with 
moral economy than with legal rights.
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Everyone in Laos has learned 
what (s)he can say and what (s)he can-
not. Self-control is an embodied quality 
and everyone seems to know what the 
touchy topics to avoid in public are (Pe-
tit, 2013). “Boo waô”, they say, “Don’t 
speak about that”—or you can create 
problems; “Gaanmüang ... ”, “It’s poli-
tics ... ”—a friendly reminder that the 
conversation is starting to lean toward 
a sensitive issue. This of course applies 
to land policies. I had a discussion in 
Attapeu with a Laotian project manager 
whose program partly dealt with land-
use planning and allocation. I told him 
that I shared his interest in land issues, 
but he immediately denied having any 
interest in “land issues”. I presume his 
reaction was motivated by a fear of being 
seen as critical of the Vietnamese rub-
ber plantations in the province, as many 
NGO workers were. This would then be 
a case of self-censorship. Censorship is 
well-attested in relation to land issues, 
as evidenced by Baird’s (2010) experi-
ence with a Canadian NGO working on 
land rights in Bachieng District.
However, widespread censor-
ship and auto-censorship do not seem 
to impede the diffusion of “politically 
incorrect” information. Laotians enjoy 
chatting about touchy issues in private 
circles and among people they trust—
or when they feel confident, as the anec-
dote with the taxi driver illustrates. This 
kind of critical conversation or gossip is 
called jôm, which can be translated as 
“grumbling” or “complaining”. Jôm top-
ics range from the corruption of local 
9 Providing infrastructure for an international event like a conference or a sporting competition is a 
common bargaining chip for companies negotiating access to land at the national level; see Dwyer 
(2013, pp. 314–321) for another telling example.
authorities to the government’s immo-
rality in granting land concessions to 
foreign companies.
Jôm can be a means of political 
action. In Vientiane, a 1,640-hectare 
shopping, industrial, and residence area 
was recently slated for construction on 
a 50-year concession in the vicinity of 
That Louang marsh. The project, run by 
Chinese companies, was compensation 
for China’s help in the building of sport-
ing infrastructure for the SEA Games in 
2009 (Stuart-Fox, 2009; Tan, 2012). The 
inhabitants of Vientiane were shocked 
with this project and took every op-
portunity to express their dismay and 
anger. This anxiety was certainly fueled 
by some land owners, including Party 
members, who were afraid that their 
expropriation would not be properly 
compensated, as often happens. It was 
also stoked by a nationwide fear of the 
invasive Chinese presence in Laos: it 
was rumored that Chinese alone would 
settle in this area and that 50,000 of 
them were expected (Stuart-Fox, 2009, 
pp. 142–143). It is unclear to what ex-
tent gossip was instrumental in the 
reorientation of the initial project—
which was reduced in scope though not 
cancelled—but it seems to have been an 
important factor.
At the southern end of the coun-
try, Attapeu was another place where 
complaints were voiced about the huge 
concessions granted to companies in 
exchange for infrastructure provid-
ed for the 2009 SEA Games.9 Villag-
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ers were alienated from their lands, as 
in the village of Phouxay, and sharply 
expressed their dismay. They declared 
that they were not given a choice, that 
their rights were violated, that they did 
not have any more rice fields to culti-
vate, and that the Vietnamese had pol-
luted and depleted the forests and rivers 
upon which they had previously relied 
for their livelihoods. Two women who 
lost their fields spoke with me in 2012 in 
a small shop, complaining that the vil-
lage chief had been unable to preserve 
the rights of his fellows; they said there 
had been no real resistance (dtaan), in 
contrast with how locals had bravely 
fought (dtoosuu) against the French in 
the past; they thus adopted the rhetoric 
of patriotic resistance, which is still very 
popular today in Laos (Tappe, 2013).
In downtown Attapeu City, the 
Laotian population felt as having be-
come a minority by 2012. This led to 
fierce jôm regarding the villagers’ com-
plaints about land grabbing, as locals 
denounced the collusion of corrupt au-
thorities with foreign companies and 
their lack of concern for their fellow cit-
izens. However, new rumors also began 
to circulate: the Vietnamese were whis-
pered to be taking part in large-scale 
amphetamine trafficking, with the com-
plicity of the police, in order to addict 
Laotian plantation workers as well as 
schoolchildren; a river was so polluted 
by the outflow of chemicals from a Chi-
nese-operated gold mine that villagers 
living downstream got skin problems 
from contact with the water; infuriated, 
they would have thrown stones at the 
Chinese workers of the mine; etc.
I do not intend to discriminate 
between what is true or not in such de-
nunciations. I am rather interested in 
the use of these “horror stories” ped-
dled as evidence against the compa-
nies, the Vietnamese presence, and the 
local authorities. It would be difficult 
to verify whether stones were really 
thrown at mine workers, but similar 
rumors according to which a villager 
shot a Vietnamese worker were re-
ported regarding rubber plantations in 
Bachieng District (Baird, 2010). Such 
rumors are not grounded, according to 
Baird, but “are created to discursive-
ly support what many villagers might 
hope would happen, even if nobody 
dares to take the risk” (2010, p. 27); 
they are very telling examples of the 
“weapons of the weak” popularized by 
Scott (1985).
Despite the pervasive sense that 
state officers and the rest of the popu-
lation are on opposite sides of a great 
divide, “weapons of the weak” are not 
used only by the weak. In some con-
texts, state officers state similar cri-
tiques regarding the livelihood conse-
quences of the plantations. In private 
conversations, they complain about the 
massive Vietnamese migrant presence 
and express their fear that Vietnamese 
will eventually own all of the province’s 
land, pollute and deplete its rivers and 
forests, and push local ethnic groups to 
the most peripheral zones. Such griev-
ances were articulated to me by two 
officers of the Provincial Agriculture 
and Forestry Office of Attapeu during 
a long car drive appropriate for discus-
sion.
World Food Policy
100
Accommodations 
The case studies discussed so far involve denunciation and con-frontation, whether based on 
official rhetoric or circulating under-
ground. The implementation of land 
policies, however, usually leads to less 
antagonistic relations, using “practic-
es of compromise and collusion to fill 
the gap between project plans and on-
the-ground realities” (Li, 2005, p. 391). 
Land policies often appear too restric-
tive to villagers as well as to state offi-
cers, who substitute more pragmatic 
arrangements for them. Such arrange-
ments often do not abide by land reg-
ulations, but they respect some formal 
aspects attached to them.
Such accommodations were ob-
served in Thongnamy. The rapid influx 
of migrants stimulated the need to find 
new lands to cultivate. However, res-
idents of neighbouring “old” villages 
like Na Bouay and Nam Khou were not 
eager to provide “their” land rights for 
free to these new settlers—even if, in 
theory, land in Laos belongs to no one 
but the state. 
A pragmatic system emerged in 
which the district employees became 
middlemen between the former inhab-
itants and the migrants. The old inhab-
itants registered unused plots of land 
on their village territory through tem-
porary land-use certificates; they then 
sold the certificates to the migrants, 
with district land officers “legalizing” 
10 The land-use certificates, valid in theory for three years, must be distinguished from (full) land 
titles. The former are mostly used in the countryside, while the latter are mostly restricted to urban 
and suburban areas. Only the latter can be sold (Evrard, 2004; Prime Minister’s Office, 2008, art. 3 
and 16). 
this illegal10 sale and taking their share 
in the process through an alleged “tax” 
on the procedure. The name of the for-
mer land user was replaced on the cer-
tificate by the name of the new one (the 
migrant). With this validation, the lat-
ter was assured of his right to cultivate 
peacefully.
Such arrangements were not re-
ally legal, but were still framed as if they 
were official. This sort of exchange has 
given rise to neologisms and euphe-
misms, like referring to the “changing 
names” procedure; in hiding the com-
moditization of land, people did not 
say that plots were sold or bought, but 
claimed that they were “exchanged for a 
motorbike” or other assets. 
Another related accommo-
dation involved legalizing illegal ac-
quisitions through a regime of fines. 
When the pressure on land was high 
in Thongnamy, some people cleared 
plots in protected forests. Paradoxically, 
when they were found guilty and fined 
by the village authorities, the perpetra-
tors then felt endowed with rights to 
their previously illegal lands after pay-
ing the fine. 
Such practices showcase how 
the land regulation system is vernac-
ularized. Accommodations take place 
through (relative) consensus and with 
an eye to meeting the demands and 
needs of various stakeholders. This goes 
together with a strong will to (arguably) 
respect the rules, explaining why people 
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resort to certificates, district officer sig-
natures, fines, and meetings with village 
authorities. The language of stateness is 
conspicuous in these transactions that 
paradoxically do not abide by the law. 
This could be labeled, to quote Strauss 
(1978), a “negotiated order” of land. In 
contrast to the contestations and denun-
ciations addressed in the two preceding 
subsections, the present case studies 
demonstrate how state officers and us-
ers of land can find common ground be-
tween the strict application of land laws 
and a total departure from them.
Lestrelin (2011) elaborated on 
this topic in fine-grained ethnographies 
of two villages close to Louang Prabang. 
In his own terms, territorialization, as a 
powerful technique of regimentation of 
rural populations (especially ethnic mi-
norities), cannot be addressed without 
taking into account the counter-terri-
torialization processes through which 
official plans are rephrased, mitigated, 
or ignored once implemented at the lo-
cal scale. Such accommodations clearly 
blur the state/society divide, as employ-
ees are enmeshed in the local networks 
of power. This pragmatic dimension of 
land issues has been under-studied, but 
seems to be a most interesting research 
avenue for an ethnography of bureau-
cratic routines.
Conclusion
Land policies are one of the main vectors through which the Lao-tian state imposes itself onto the 
population’s daily life. The expansion 
of these policies’ scope has progres-
sively transformed the local adminis-
tration into the inescapable mediator 
in land issues, increasingly replacing or 
overlaying the village institutions that 
used to govern such issues in the past. 
Land policies have thus often been ap-
proached with a critical stance and 
framed as the imposition of decisions 
made by the state or companies working 
under its aegis. However, this article has 
traced ethnographic vignettes showing 
how people and groups react; how they 
comment, appropriate, and possibly 
transform such measures; and how they 
sometimes resist their implementation. 
I have demonstrated that the lexicon of 
land policies is not used by state em-
ployees alone, for it is often appropriat-
ed by those the administration intends 
to control. Land policies arouse critical 
comments in private among the weak 
as among the powerful; such “hidden 
transcripts” can, through a war of attri-
tion, reorient policies. Finally, land pol-
icies exist only through their concrete 
implementation, entailing processes 
of vernacularization in the local arena. 
A negotiated order on land eventually 
emerges from these usually tense inter-
actions.
However, unpacking the dynam-
ics of state relations on land from an 
ethnographic point of view and stress-
ing the agency of impacted populations 
should not lead to the underestimation 
of the disruptive consequences of such 
policies. The recent transformations of 
land relations worldwide have deep-
ly affected small farmer societies. As 
recently reported by Li regarding the 
rural highlanders of Sulawesi (2014), 
such process can create a great divide 
between the few who can take advan-
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tage of the new system and the many 
who fail to do so. In Laos, as elsewhere, 
struggles over land create conflict 
among groups that are not equally en-
dowed with political, social, and eco-
nomic capital. Obviously, national and 
local elites have the upper hand in defin-
ing, for example, which “commodities” 
are eligible for compensation or not 
(Green & Baird, 2016). The inhabitants 
of Vientiane, who for the most part be-
long to the Lao ethnic group, were able 
to oppose and eventually transform the 
plans of the Chinese building project 
because academics, local bourgeoisie, 
and city political elites left on the side-
lines of the project were able to unite 
under the banner of national integrity. 
This shows that in such circumstances, 
nationalist arguments seem particular-
ly efficacious for justifying opposition. 
At the other end of the continuum, the 
ethnic minorities of Attapeu—rural, il-
literate, and often despised by local Lao 
who decry their “backwardness” and 
“laziness”—had very limited means to 
face a massive land grab organized by 
a multinational Vietnamese company 
and supported by both the Laotian and 
Vietnamese governments, in a remote 
province with little media coverage11. 
The other case studies developed here 
would fall somewhere in-between in 
terms of capacity for mobilization and 
media coverage. 
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One Size Fits all or Tailor-Made? Building 
Appropriate Certification Systems for 
Geographical Indications in Southeast Asia
Delphine Marie-Vivien1 and Isabelle Vagneron2
Abstract
 
Geographical indications (GIs)—i.e. indications identifying goods 
originating in a specific place and having quality, characteristics, 
and reputation attributable to their geographical origin—are de-
veloping fast in the Southeast Asian food sector, with a wide range 
of new products such as Khao Hom Mali and Thung Kula Rong-Hai 
(fragrant rice), Kampot pepper, or Nuoc Mam Phu Quoc (fish sauce). 
After concentrating their efforts on registering GIs (to protect the 
name against counterfeit), GI promoters needed to decide how to 
control product compliance with GI specifications for specific qual-
ity. This paper analyzes the control and certification procedures for 
GIs in four Southeast Asian countries—Thailand, Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, and Laos—and the challenges faced in building an efficient 
yet appropriate system of controls in these countries. Influenced 
by the “gold standard” of certification in place of organic agricul-
ture, finding appropriate GI control systems is one of the dilemmas 
faced by these countries. The article discusses the main differences 
between GIs and other agricultural standards—specifications that 
are unique to each GI, endogenous, and based on local production 
practices—and the consequences in terms of certification. Indeed, 
in the case of GIs, other options than private third-party certifica-
tion could better ensure that GI rules are followed, which may rely 
on the knowledge producers and connoisseurs have of the product.
 
Keywords: geographical indication, control, third-party certifica-
tion, standard, ASEAN
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Resumen
 
Las indicaciones geográficas (GIs)—por ejemplo, indicaciones que 
identifican bienes que originan en algún lugar específico y que tie-
nen una calidad, características y reputación que se le pueden atri-
buir a su origen geográfico—están teniendo un rápido desarrollo 
en el sector alimenticio del sudeste asiático, con un rango amplio 
de nuevos productos como Khao Hom Mali y Thung Kula Rong-
Hai (arroz aromático), Pimienta de Kampot o Nuoc Mam Phu Quoc 
(salsa de pescado). Después de concentrar sus esfuerzos en registrar 
GIs (para proteger el nombre contra las falsificaciones), los promo-
tores de las GIs necesitan decidir cómo controlar el cumplimiento 
del producto con las especificaciones de las GIs para una calidad 
específica. Este documento analiza los procedimientos de control y 
certificación para las GIs en países del sudeste asiático—Tailandia, 
Vietnam, Camboya y Laos—y los desafíos que se enfrentan al crear 
sistemas de controles que sean eficientes y también apropiados en 
estos países. Bajo la influencia del “estándar dorado” de la certifi-
cación en lugar de la agricultura orgánica, encontrar sistemas de 
control de GIs apropiados es uno de los dilemas que enfrentan es-
tos países. Este artículo discute las principales diferencias entre las 
GIs y otros estándares agrícolas—especificaciones que son únicas 
para cada GI, endógenas y basadas en prácticas de producción lo-
cal—y las consecuencias en términos de la certificación. De hecho, 
en el caso de las GIs, opciones diferentes a la certificación privada 
de terceros podrían ser mejores para asegurarse que las reglas de 
las GI se sigan, lo que podría depender del conocimiento que los 
productores y expertos tienen del producto. 
Palabras clave: indicación geográfica, control, certificación de 
terceros, estándar, ASEAN
摘要 
地理标志（Geographical indications，GIs）—即能够识别商品
源自特定地点并具备可归因于该地理来源的品质、特性和声
誉的标志—正在东南亚粮食产业中迅速发展，许多新产品由
此诞生，例如Khao Hom Mali 和 Thung Kula Rong-Hai (泰国香
米)，Kampot pepper（贡布胡椒）和Nuoc Mam Phu Quoc（越
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南鱼露）。GI推动者集中精力注册地理标志（用以保护产品
名称，抵制假冒）后，需要决定如何控制产品达到GI规范，
获得特定品质。本文分析了东南亚四国地理标志的控制和认
证程序，这四国分别是泰国、越南、柬埔寨和老挝。同时分
析了以上国家在建立高效且适宜的控制系统时面临的挑战。
受到有机农业产地的“黄金标准”认证的影响，找到适合的
地理标志控制系统是这些国家面临的困境之一。本文探讨了
地理标志和其他农业标准间的主要差异，后者对每一项地理
标志而言都是独特的、具有内源性、且基于地方生产实践。
文章还探讨了认证结果。的确，针对地理标志，比第三方认
证更能确保GI规定得以遵循的选择方式可能要依赖生产者和
内行对产品知识的把握。
 
关键词：地理标志，控制，第三方认证，标准，东盟
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Introduction
A geographical indication (GI) identifies a good as originating in a place, where a given quality, 
reputation, or any other characteristic 
of the good is essentially attributable to 
its geographical origin. GIs encourage 
diverse agricultural, food, and handi-
craft production and contribute to the 
socioeconomic dynamics of the regions 
in which they are anchored. They enable 
producers and operators to dedicate 
themselves to the commercialization of 
traditional products in response to the 
demands of quality-conscious consum-
ers while promoting regional develop-
ment (Bowen 2010). The aims of the 
legal protection conferred by the GI are 
to protect the producers against unfair 
competition and misappropriation, to 
protect consumers against a misleading 
description of the origin of the prod-
uct, and to foster international trade 
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(Crespi and Marette 2003; Rangnekar 
2004; Barham and Sylvander 2011). 
Since the implementation of the WTO 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement 1994), GI protection has 
expanded remarkably worldwide (Ev-
ans and Blakeney 2006), in particular 
in Asia. Despite different econom-
ic contexts and different GI schemes, 
Cambodia (François and Prak 2006), 
Thailand (Ngokkuen and Grote 2013), 
Vietnam (Pick, Marie-Vivien, and Bui-
Kim 2015), and Lao PDR (Marie-Vivi-
en and Chabrol 2014), all have opportu-
nities to develop high-quality products 
with a strong geographical identity, and 
have already engaged in the identifica-
tion and registration of GIs as a tool to 
expand their presence on international 
markets. 
Examples of emerging GIs in 
South-East Asia include: Khao Hom 
Mali and Thung Kula Rong-Hai fragrant 
rice (Thailand), Kampot Pepper (Cam-
bodia), Nuoc Mam Phu Quoc (Viet-
nam), or Bolaven coffee (Laos). Despite 
encouraging developments, challenges 
to maximizing GI development in the 
region persist at institutional and oper-
ational levels. One of these challenges is 
to enhance capacity for GI control. A GI 
is a signal that a product possesses cer-
tain qualities and characteristics, and 
enjoys a certain reputation related to its 
geographical origin. Such information 
is described in the GI specification, and 
compliance with the GI specifications 
by the value chain operators must be 
properly controlled to maximize trust 
by local and international buyers/con-
sumers. An independent efficient GI 
control system is consequently vital to 
allow the system to benefit all the par-
ties involved. Failure in the control sys-
tem is likely to significantly reduce the 
benefits of GI protection, and to dam-
age the image of the GI product and its 
economic prospects, both locally and 
abroad. In addition to GI control re-
quirements expressed in national laws 
and regulations (when these exist), ex-
porting GI products to foreign markets 
may also require compliance with the 
requirements of the importing country 
(Bramley, Marie-Vivien, and Biénabe 
2013). In the EU, while GIs are qualified 
as an Intellectual Property Right (IPR), 
their control system is increasingly sim-
ilar to those developed for agri-food vol-
untary standards such as “Label Rouge” 
(“Red Label” superior quality standard) 
in France {Marie-Vivien, 2017 #609} or 
organic agriculture, in which third-par-
ty certification prevails. For example, 
in France, GI control must be carried 
out by an ISO 17065 accredited certi-
fication body. We hypothesize that EU 
regulations influence domestic schemes 
for GI controls in countries willing to 
export their products to Europe, for ex-
ample in Vietnam, Lao PDR, Cambo-
dia, and Thailand. 
Many authors have studied the 
importance of third-party certification 
for voluntary standards such as organic 
agriculture or fair trade, and explain it 
in terms of neoliberal governmentality 
(Gibbon and Memedovic 2005; Guth-
man 2007; Hatanaka, Bain, and Busch 
2005). Third-party certification also 
appeals to techno-scientific values such 
as independence, objectivity, and trans-
parency in an attempt to increase trust 
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and legitimacy among customers and to 
limit liability. In contrast, the literature 
on the control of GIs is much more lim-
ited, with some works describing the 
evolution of the governance of controls 
in France {Marie-Vivien, 2017 #609}, 
the effect of the certification costs in It-
aly (Belletti et al. 2007), or the issue of 
State intervention in controls in African 
developing countries (Hughes 2009). 
Other works aim to compare the gov-
ernance of GIs with that of other volun-
tary standards (e.g., ecofriendly labels) 
by analyzing how the standard is set (its 
content) rather than how it is controlled 
(Marie-Vivien et al. 2014). 
Third-party certification is now 
clearly expressed as the preferred op-
tion by the EU regulation on GIs and 
is mandatory in France. It is, therefore, 
important to understand how the need 
for third-party certification is handled 
in countries with a burgeoning GI 
system, and how it builds on control 
mechanisms already in place for other 
voluntary standards. 
The purpose of the paper is thus 
to analyze the options for GI control in 
four Asian countries—Thailand, Cam-
bodia, Vietnam, and Laos—and to 
highlight the challenges faced by these 
countries, which have very different 
control capacities. We highlight the 
close relationship between the diffusion 
of the third-party certification model 
for GI certification in Asian countries 
and the shift in GI control in the EU 
(with a specific focus on France) from 
public bodies and collective producer 
organizations towards third-party cer-
tification. Based on desk research and 
qualitative interviews conducted in 
each country, this paper details for each 
of the four countries: the GI system, 
the control mechanisms implemented 
for GIs (when these exist), the control 
mechanisms implemented for vol-
untary/compulsory standards (when 
no GI control exists), and the control 
mechanisms in place for pilot GIs. Ulti-
mately, the paper aims to provide poli-
cymakers with relevant information on 
how to build efficient but appropriate 
GI control schemes at the country and 
regional level. 
The rest of the article is orga-
nized as follows: Section 2 describes 
the GI control system in the EU; in 
Section 3, an analytical grid is used to 
compare the GI control schemes in the 
four countries. Section 4 is dedicated to 
a discussion of the results of our survey. 
A GI Control Model 
Advocated by the EU 
1.1 Towards third-party 
certification
Drawing largely on the tradition of appellation of origin, born in France in 1905 (Sylvander, 
Casabianca, and Roncin 2008), GIs have 
been homogeneously protected in the 
EU since 1992 by Regulation 2081/92 on 
the Protection of Geographical Indica-
tions (PGI) and Designations of Origin 
(PDO) for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs. This is a two-tier system: 
the PDO/PGI application is first pro-
cessed by the competent authority of the 
Member State in which the geographical 
area is located—e.g., the National Insti-
World Food Policy
110
tute for Origin and Quality (INAO) in 
France3—the application is then exam-
ined by the Directorate General for Ag-
riculture of the EU Commission.
In 2006, the EU Regulation was 
amended4 to enable foreign GIs to ben-
efit from protection within the EU and 
to introduce third-party certiﬁcation, 
as deﬁned in the EU food law. The reg-
ulation was again amended in 2012, to 
merge all quality certifications for food. 
The general EU food law principles re-
shaped the organization of controls by 
differentiating between what fell within 
the ambit of public authorities, and what 
could be delegated to private bodies.
Since EU regulation 510/2006 
was promulgated, the overall control of 
the whole PDO/PGI system has to be 
ensured by the competent authority of 
the Member State. Monitoring compli-
ance with the speciﬁcation of each PDO/
PGI can be ensured by the competent 
authority of the Member State and/or 
by a certiﬁcation body, i.e. an indepen-
dent body in charge of inspecting and 
certifying the conformity of the PDO/
PGI product with its specification, and 
accredited against the European stan-
dard EN 45011 or ISO/IEC 17 065. The 
certification body is accredited at the 
level of the Member State by the nation-
al accreditation body, which is the body 
responsible for officially recognizing the 
capability of the certification bodies to 
inspect and certify PDO/PGI specifica-
tions. The term “certiﬁcation body”, in-
3 Even though INAO is governed by a Board composed of both public and private stakeholders (see 
Marie-Vivien et al. (2017)), INAO is recognized as the national competent authority in conformity 
with the EU Regulation.
4 Regulation (EC) No. 510/2006 of March 20, 2006 on the protection of geographical indications and 
designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs. 
troduced by the 2006 regulation, marks 
the inclusion of PDO/PGI in the gen-
eral standards for product certiﬁcation 
(Gonzales Vaque 2006). Member States 
that choose a public entity to verify 
compliance with the speciﬁcations must 
offer adequate guarantees of objectivity 
and impartiality. 
1.2 The French case
Although it was not mandato-ry, France chose to shift from controls undertaken by the 
competent public authority (INAO) to 
controls undertaken by ISO 17 065-ac-
credited certiﬁcation bodies {Ma-
rie-Vivien, 2017 #609} accredited by the 
national accreditation body, COFRAC 
(French Accreditation Committee) and 
approved by INAO, which remains the 
supervisor of the control system. Be-
fore 2006, while controls were official-
ly under the authority of INAO (public 
third-party control), in practice they 
were delegated by INAO to GI produc-
er associations and were consequently 
considered as insufficiently impartial, 
especially concerning wines for which 
“arrangements” between producers 
were notorious (Olszak 2007). The ob-
jectives of shifting to third-party pri-
vate certification bodies were to meet 
the expectations of consumers, who of-
ten questioned the impartiality and the 
effectiveness of controls, and to reduce 
public spending. 
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Since 2006, in collaboration with 
the appropriate GI producer/proces-
sor organization (GI organization), for 
each PDO/PGI, the certiﬁcation body 
has been designing a control plan based 
on the GI specification drafted by the 
GI organization. The certiﬁcation body 
carries out the inspections and, based 
on the inspection reports, decides 
whether or not to grant certification. 
All costs incurred in monitoring com-
pliance with the speciﬁcation are borne 
by producers/processors. The sensory 
tests—which mainly involve tasting and 
were maintained for PDOs despite be-
ing criticized as subjective—are carried 
out by a panel of skilled producers and 
experts who can ensure that the inspec-
tion of the product is independent and 
impartial. The producer organizations 
are responsible for training their mem-
bers and forming these panels, which 
still play an important role in charac-
5 A similar shift was described for organic agriculture by Sylvander (1997) and by Muttersbaugh 
(2005).
terizing the typicity/distinctiveness of 
PDOs and in recognizing the know-
how of the producers. In addition to ex-
ternal controls by the certiﬁcation body, 
the control plan includes self-controls 
by producers/processors, and internal 
controls by the producer organization 
(audited by the certification body). 
Control by third-party certiﬁcation 
bodies ends INAO’s responsibility and 
the practice of delegating the organiza-
tion of controls to GI organizations. In 
this process, the philosophy of control 
shifts from peer review to third-party 
control.5
2.3 From gray zones to windows  
of opportunity
It is the French/EU control and certi-fication model that is now dissemi-nated to countries implementing GI 
protection schemes. Indeed, EU Reg-
Figure 1: French system of GI control
Source: Authors’ survey, using initial figure of Certipaq.
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ulation 510/2006 clearly requires that, 
in the case of foreign GIs, verification 
of compliance with GI specifications 
is to be ensured by one or more pub-
lic authorities designated by the third 
country and/or one or more product 
certification bodies, which, from May 
1, 2010 onwards, shall be EU standard 
EN 45 011 or ISO/IEC Guide 65 (now 
17 065)6-accredited. Interestingly, when 
the EU Regulation on PDO/PGI was 
amended in 20127 for GIs from third 
countries, the reference to the EN 
45  011 accreditation was dropped. In 
this context, third countries are left with 
a range of options: in October 2012, the 
Vietnamese GI Nuoc Mam Phu Quoc 
was registered in the EU as a PGI with 
a control system based on a Control 
Board8 headed by a representative of 
the Agro-Forestry-Fisheries Division 
of Phu Quoc district; in 2013, Thai GI 
Khao Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai 
rice was also registered in the EU as a 
PGI, but was certified by Bioagricert, a 
European ISO 17  065-accredited cer-
tification body. Despite this apparent 
flexibility, control by a private accred-
6 Art 11.2 of EU Regulation of 2006.
7 Regulation (EU) No. 1151/2012 of November 21, 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products 
and foodstuffs.
8 October 19, 2005 decision by the People’s Committee of Kien Giang Province approving the Reg-
ulation on the organization and operation of the Control Board for the Appellation of the Origin 
Controlled of Phu Quoc fish sauce.
9 Geographical Indication Protection Act, B.E. 2546 (2003).
10 Geographical indications were first protected by recognition of the appellation of origin introduced 
in the Civil Code of 1995, and later by the Intellectual Property Law drafted for the country’s acces-
sion to the WTO.
11 Royal Kram No. NS/RKM/0114/006 dated January 20, 2014 promulgating the Law on Geograph-
ical Indications and its Ministerial Regulation (Prakas) on the Procedure for the Registration and 
Protection of Geographical Indications of December 29, 2016, replacing Prakas no. 105 MOC/ SM 
2009 of May 18, 2009.
12 Law on Intellectual Property (No 08/NA, December 24, 2007) revised and amended by the Nation-
al Assembly in 2011 (No. 01/NA, December 20, 2011), Regulation for the implementation of the 
law of October 25, 2016.
ited third-party certification body is 
strongly advocated and largely influ-
ences the architecture of GI control sys-
tems in many countries, in particular, 
in the four countries in our study.
Appropriate for the Control 
of GIs in Southeast Asia? 
1.3 National architectures for the 
protection of GIs
Geographical Indications have been protected by sui generis law in Thailand since 2003,9 in Viet-
nam since 2005,10 in Cambodia since 
201411, and in the Lao PDR since 2011.12 
Thailand is the region’s GI champion, 
with 90 registered GIs—among which 
are 76 Thai GIs and 14 international 
GIs. Vietnam is also quite dynamic with 
52 GIs for Vietnamese products and 6 
GIs for foreign products. Finally, two 
GIs are currently registered in Cambo-
dia for Cambodian products—Kampot 
pepper and Kompeug Speu palm sugar 
and two for foreign products. The Lao 
PDR has none yet, but has two possible 
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GIs for Bolaven coffee and Khao Khai 
Noi rice and one application from a for-
eign country (Champagne).
In Thailand and Cambodia, the 
competent authority in charge of reg-
istering GIs is the Department of In-
tellectual Property (DIP) under the au-
thority of the Ministry of Commerce, 
whereas in Vietnam and Laos, the 
competent authorities are under the au-
thority of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (the National Office of In-
tellectual Property in Vietnam and the 
Department of Intellectual Property in 
the Lao PDR).
The competent authorities are 
in charge of examining the GI applica-
tions, which will be the “standard” to 
be controlled, like in the EU. In contrast 
to the EU system, in which the nature 
of the applicant, a producer/processor 
group is always the same, the rules for 
a GI applicant are quite diverse in the 
four Asian countries. In Thailand, the 
GI applicant can either be a private enti-
ty (an individual person or a company), 
a group of producers/processors (asso-
ciation, cooperative, or non-formalized 
group), a group of consumers, or a pub-
lic authority13 (Provincial Authorities, 
the Rice Department, the Queen Sirikit 
Department of Sericulture).14 In Viet-
nam, the right to register a GI belongs 
to the State, but the State can delegate 
it to organizations and individuals who 
13 Public authorities are sometimes involved in the preparation of the GI Book of Specifications, in 
cooperation with the local communities and with the DIP GI Office.
14 Section 7 of the GI Law 2003.
15 Art. of the IP Law 2005.
16 Art.2.5 of the Lao Decision 2016 on Geographical Indications and art.7 of the GI Law of Cambodia.
17 The use of the GI National Logo is regulated by the “Department of Intellectual Property’s Regula-
tion for Thai Geographical Indication Logo Approval B.E. 2008”.
produce the product bearing the GI, 
collective organizations, or the admin-
istrative authorities of the locality to 
which the GI pertains.15 In practice, ap-
plications are often filed by the provin-
cial Department of Science and Tech-
nology, the Peoples’ Committees of the 
province/district, or the Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development of 
the province/district. In Cambodia and 
in the Lao PDR, the producer associa-
tion is the only body authorized to ap-
ply for a GI.16
In contrast to other standards, 
what matters for the GI is the protec-
tion of a name (usually the geograph-
ical name of the location where it is 
produced). National GI logos indicat-
ing that the name is registered  as a GI 
are increasingly used, especially since 
the GI concept is new in Asia. Thailand 
has its own GI logo,17 which reads “Thai 
Geographical Indication” and “GI” in 
Thai and in English characters against 
a gold background. In Cambodia, the 
national logo for GIs was launched in 
2015 and in Lao PDR in 2016. Vietnam 
is in the process of launching its own 
logo.
The four countries have been 
following distinct pathways in imple-
menting controls and certification sys-
tems: while Thailand’s implementation 
of controls was quite gradual, Cambo-
dia immediately jumped on the certifi-
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cation bandwagon with strong support 
from France, but applied it to only two 
GIs. At the other end of the spectrum, 
control systems for GIs are still far from 
operational in Vietnam and the Lao 
PDR, although certifications systems 
have been introduced for other stan-
dards and new avenues for certification 
are being explored (e.g. Participatory 
Guarantee Systems), which could be a 
source of inspiration. 
 
1.4 National accreditation systems 
Accreditation bodies in charge of recognizing certification bod-ies’ capability to certify stan-
dards exist in Thailand and Vietnam, 
both members of the International Ac-
creditation Forum (IAF). While in Viet-
nam, the accreditation to certify the “GI 
standard” does not yet exist, Thailand 
already has a specific accreditation sys-
tem for GIs. In Cambodia, institutions 
have been created but the accreditation 
scheme for product certification bodies 
is not yet in force. In the Lao PDR, the 
national accreditation system is under 
development as several initiatives are 
currently underway to connect emerg-
ing institutions with the global arena 
(no specific action has yet been taken 
for GI certification). 
Accreditation of certification 
bodies in Thailand comes under the 
National Standardization Act B.E. 2551 
(2008) and belongs to one network, the 
18 https://www.tisi.go.th/home/en. 
19 http://www.acfs.go.th/eng/. 
20 Certification bodies that are already accredited by ACFS to certify standards such as GAP, GMP, 
and HACCP will be able to certify GIs.
21 http://www.boa.gov.vn/en. 
National Accreditation Council, under 
the Ministry of Industry.18 The network 
includes several accreditation agencies 
including the National Bureau of Ag-
ricultural Commodity and Food Stan-
dards (ACFS), which is in charge of 
accrediting certification bodies for ag-
ricultural commodities and food prod-
ucts.19 In 2012, the DIP signed a Mem-
orandum of Understanding with ACFS 
and the Thai Industrial Standards Insti-
tute on Cooperation for Certification 
and Recognition of Geographical In-
dications. The ACFS must now submit 
to the IAF an official request to include 
GIs as a standard to be certified besides 
other standards such as GAP (good 
agricultural practices) that are already 
recognized by IAF. Once this procedure 
is completed, the ACFS GI accredita-
tion scheme will be internationally rec-
ognized as ISO 17 065-accredited by all 
members of the IAF.20 In the meantime, 
the ACFS can accredit certification 
bodies using Thai standards for GI cer-
tification.
In Vietnam, the accreditation 
body is the Bureau of Accreditation 
(BoA) established in 1995 under STA-
MEQ, the Directorate for Standards, 
Metrology and Quality of the Ministry 
of Science and Technology.21 The BoA 
offers accreditation programs for lab-
oratories, certification bodies, and in-
spection bodies, for the certification of 
compulsory and voluntary standards, 
be they domestic, foreign, regional, or 
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international. Voluntary standards in 
agro-food products include VietGap 
(Vietnam Good Agricultural Practices), 
safe vegetables, and organic agriculture. 
The BoA’s accreditation programs op-
erate according to international stan-
dards. The Vietnam Certification Ac-
creditation Scheme (VICAS) is one of 
these programs. At the time of writing, 
certification bodies are only accredited 
to certify VIETGAP (not GIs).
The Cambodian Ministry of In-
dustry and Handicraft has set up an 
Institute of Standards. A new product 
certification scheme conforming to the 
requirements of the ISO/IEC Guide 65 
is currently being developed. The De-
partment of Accreditation, created in 
2016, is the authority responsible for 
Accreditation of Conformity Assess-
ment Bodies, but Cambodia does not 
yet have an accredited body for GI cer-
tification.22
The Lao PDR is currently set-
ting up the Lao National Accreditation 
Bureau (LNAB) to be hosted by the 
Ministry of Science and Technology 
(Department of Standardization and 
Metrology) with the support of ASE-
AN’s Consultative Committee on Stan-
dards and Quality (ACCSQ), which 
organizes training courses to strength-
en accreditation services in Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam. The 
LNAB will be in charge of granting, 
22 http://www.da-canc.gov.kh/en and http://www.isc.gov.kh/en/. 
23 Decree on the Implementation of the Law on Standardization (June 2012). 
24 ACT 2534 revised by ACT (No.5) BE 2545 (Art.1 point 5.1)
25 In 2015, 15 GIs used the Thai National GIs Logo; 39 GIs had the GIs Manual; 35 GIs had an Internal 
Control Plan; and 27 GIs also had a Committee to coordinate the control activity, take decisions, 
and verify the internal control. Of these 27, 19 had a “Provincial Committee”. However, this system 
is not recognized internationally.
maintaining, extending, suspending, 
and withdrawing accreditation to lab-
oratories and conformity assessment 
bodies, among which are certification 
bodies.23 Once the LNAB is fully oper-
ational, certification bodies will be able 
to be accredited locally and will no lon-
ger have to rely on foreign accreditation 
services.
 
1.5 Certification and control 
schemes for Geographical 
Indications
In Thailand, the law does not require a control mechanism for the use of the GI, i.e. the use of the name 
protected as a GI. This is different for 
producers/processors willing to use the 
Thai national GI logo. The producers/
processors group must file an appli-
cation with the DIP and develop a GI 
operating manual and a control plan.24 
In practice, the control plan is generally 
prepared with the support of the pub-
lic authorities and is first implemented 
by the group of producers/processors 
(internal control) followed by exter-
nal control by a Provincial Committee 
composed of individuals from the DIP, 
the local authorities, and producers/
processors. The external control can be 
delegated by the Provincial Committee 
to the Province or to another public 
agency.25 If there is no producer/pro-
cessor group, the Provincial Committee 
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can directly control all producers/pro-
cessors.
The new 2012 regulation allows 
ISO 17  065-accredited certification 
bodies to inspect and issue certificates 
for Thai GIs. This is a voluntary choice 
of the GI producer/processor groups. 
Such a certification body can be ac-
credited by the EU or by the Thai ACFS 
once the new GI accreditation scheme 
is effective. The Thai system thus allows 
GI producers/processors to choose be-
tween several control options.
In Vietnam, in the absence of a 
homogeneous national system, rules 
for managing GIs, i.e. granting and re-
voking the right to use the GI, are very 
diverse. The right to use the GI is grant-
ed by the management body (the public 
authority that registered the GI), but is 
not conditional upon control of com-
pliance of the product to the GI spec-
ification, even if in some cases control 
boards were created. The control board 
usually comprises representatives from 
the Directorate for Standards, Metrol-
ogy and Quality (STAMEQ) under the 
MoST, at the Provincial level. Initial-
ly involved in the creation of the GI 
for Nuoc Mam Phu Quoc (fish sauce), 
NAFIQAD (National Agro-Forest-
ry-Fisheries Quality Assurance Depart-
ment, under the Ministry of Agricul-
ture) mainly controls compliance with 
mandatory food safety regulations and 
with some voluntary standards such as 
VietGAP through a network of labo-
ratories scattered around the country. 
It considers that State agencies should 
not be involved in the control of volun-
tary standards such as GIs. NAFIQAD 
is funded by the State and by certifica-
tion fees. Hai Phong Branch employs 15 
people for laboratory analyses, 15 peo-
ple for certification, and 10 people for 
administrative work. Each department 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Ru-
ral Development (MARD) is in charge 
of accrediting certification agencies 
against specific standards, which cre-
ates considerable confusion: e.g., the 
Department of Crop Production is in 
Figure 2: GI control system in Thailand
Source: Authors’ survey.
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charge of accrediting agencies for Vi-
etGap for crops, while the Department 
of Livestock is in charge of accrediting 
agencies for VietGap for livestock.
No certification bodies inspect 
GIs, although there are many private 
Vietnamese certification bodies accred-
ited by foreign accreditation organiza-
tions, such as Vinacert, which certifies 
mangoes from Hoa Loc, tea from Van 
Chan, and tea from Yen Bai against Vi-
etGAP. In the absence of Vietnamese 
organic agriculture standards, foreign 
certification bodies—e.g., Organic Ag-
riculture Thailand (ACT) in Thailand—
certify that Vietnamese products com-
ply with foreign organic agriculture 
standards. This is the case of organic tea 
from Yen Bai, or organic star anise from 
Lang Son, two GI products.
The GI control system devel-
oped by Cambodia is very similar to 
the French system. It is detailed and 
includes an internal control by the GI 
association, and is funded by a fee paid 
26  Art.26 and 27 of the GI Law 2014 and art.37 to 41 of the Prakas of 2016.
by all members (producers, processors, 
packagers) of the GI association, an ex-
ternal control by a private or public ISO 
17  065-accredited certification body, 
chosen by the GI association and ap-
proved by the Ministry of Commerce, 
the authority responsible for official 
controls.26 The certification body au-
dits the internal control system and 
inspects a subsample of GI association 
members. As Cambodia does not yet 
have an accreditation system for GI or 
Cambodian certification bodies that 
would be internationally recognized, 
the two Cambodian GIs are controlled 
and certified by foreign certification 
bodies accredited in the EU. Indeed, the 
only certification body in the country is 
the Cambodian Organic Agriculture 
Association (COrAA), a small private 
organization in the sector promoting 
organic agriculture in Cambodia that 
is not recognized internationally but 
conducts a few inspections each year 
for foreign certification bodies willing 
to certify foreign standards (e.g., GAP, 
Figure 3: GI control system in Vietnam
Source: Authors’ survey.
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organic). No laboratories are accredited 
to carry out analytical tests.
The Kampot pepper GI is a per-
fect illustration of how a multi-tiered 
system can work. It combines: (i) 
self-control at the producer/processor 
level (each producer/processor verifies 
the requirements of the specification 
using the “auto check list”); (ii) inspec-
tion of all the members of the GI asso-
ciation by the 18 inspectors working 
for the association’s internal control 
system; (iii) inspection of 30% of the 
producer/processor and of the internal 
control system by Ecocert, the certifica-
tion body. In 2014, 20% of the pepper 
producers and 100% of the companies 
were reinspected by the external body. 
The organoleptic characteristics of the 
Kampot Pepper GI were verified by a 
sensory analysis panel. These checks 
showed that 95% of the producers 
kept their records properly, and that 
only a few needed to improve their re-
cord-keeping. Both the internal and the 
external control systems were satisfac-
tory. Certification costs were borne by 
the GI association, owing to success-
ful domestic and international sales of 
Kampot pepper.
The GI certification system in the 
Lao PDR is patterned after the French 
system. The DIP is the competent au-
thority for official controls. Control of 
compliance with the GI specifications 
must be carried out by a certification/
control body that is (1) legally regis-
tered or authorized to provide control 
or certification activities in Lao PDR 
and (2) 17 065-accredited. The certifi-
cation/control body has to send an an-
nual report to the DIP including a list 
of certified producers, operators, prod-
ucts, quantities, and measures taken, if 
any. This system has not yet been im-
plemented.
Since 2008, the national insti-
tution Lao Certification is in charge of 
providing certification services to the 
agriculture and food sectors. Currently 
it inspects and certifies that producers 
and producer groups comply with Lao 
national organic standards and national 
Figure 4: GI control system in Cambodia
Source: Authors’ survey.
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standards for Good Agricultural Prac-
tices issued by the Ministry of Agricul-
ture. The LCB is under the auspices of 
the Standard and Accreditation Divi-
sion of the Department of Agriculture 
within the Ministry of Agriculture. It 
currently employs 12 permanent staff. 
The inspectors at LCB were trained 
by inspectors from the Department of 
Agriculture, Agriculture Certification 
Thailand (ACT), and the Thai Organic 
Trader Association (TOTA). Around 
20 organic inspections of organic farms 
are currently conducted throughout the 
country each year. As there are no in-
spectors at the provincial and district 
levels, the inspectors cannot monitor 
the producer groups under their re-
sponsibility very closely. Operational 
ICSs have been developed for organic 
rice and vegetables (Vientiane Capital), 
the future GI Bolaven coffee (Cham-
passak Province), and the future GI 
Khao Khai Noi (Xiengkhouang and 
Huaphanh provinces). Farmers are 
usually inspected once a year. The in-
spection process lasts between 2/3 days 
and a week, depending on the number 
of farmers to be inspected in a group. 
Inspection of paperwork is usually fol-
lowed by field inspections. Total certi-
fication costs depend on the size of the 
area to be inspected and certified and 
on the number of farmers involved, and 
may vary from 100,000 to 1,000,000 
LAK (US$13-125). Organic Agricul-
ture Certification Thailand (ACT) is the 
main certification body that performs 
inspections and certifies that products 
comply with foreign organic standards. 
For products for export, ACT current-
ly invites LCB inspectors to take part 
in the inspection process to gain expe-
rience. However, the final certification 
process is carried out by ACT alone. 
Other foreign certification bodies op-
erating in the Lao PDR include: BCS 
(Germany), ICEA (Italy), and Bioagri-
cert (Italy), all of which operate from 
Thailand.
Table 1 summarizes and com-
pares the GI systems in the four coun-
tries, underlining the difference be-
tween the approaches.
Figure 5: GI control system of the Lao PDR
Source: Authors’ survey.
World Food Policy
120
Discussion
1.6 Choosing the “right” 
certification model
Existing laws and regulations in Southeast Asia already provide for a GI control system. As they 
are not yet fully operational, we con-
sider that several options are still open 
for drafting a credible certification sys-
tem that is not prohibitively costly for 
the producers and remains manageable 
by local institutions. As certification is 
costly, to be sustainable it must be off-
Table 1:  Comparison between the GI systems in Southeast Asia
Source: Authors’ survey.
Thailand Vietnam Cambodia Lao PDR
Year of IP 
Law
2003 2005 2009 2011
Competent 
authority
MoC
DIP
MoST
NOIP
MoC
DIP
MoST
DIP
GI applicant Private entity, 
group of 
producers, 
public 
authorities
Local public 
authorities 
(can delegate to 
the producers, 
collective 
organizations)
Association Association
External 
control
Certification 
bodies 
or public 
authorities—
operational
Public 
authorities
(Little 
operational)
Certification 
bodies 
(operational)
Certification 
bodies (not 
operational)
Accreditation 
body
National 
Standardization 
Council 
(member of 
IAF)
Bureau of 
Accreditation 
(member of 
IAF)
Department of 
Accreditation 
(not a member 
of IAF)
National 
Accreditation 
Board (not 
operational, 
not a member 
of IAF)
GI national 
logo In process
N° of 
registered GIs
76+14 52+6 2+2 -
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set by higher prices, which is seldom 
the case for new products that may not 
yet enjoy a reputation of uniqueness 
and quality beyond the borders of the 
producer country. Financing internal 
and external controls through member 
fees like in Europe does not seem ap-
propriate for a burgeoning GI system 
that is not well remunerated because it 
not very well known by consumers. The 
EU model was successful for Kampot 
pepper, which benefits from a high pre-
mium on the international market, but 
its costs may be the reason why so few 
GIs have been registered in Cambodia 
since then.
Moreover, certification requires 
an entirely different attitude by the 
farmers, as they not only need to do 
things differently, but must also be able 
to prove that they actually do so. Expe-
rience in the four countries shows that 
it is often difficult for farmers and local 
communities to cope with the detailed 
technical requirements and to under-
stand the need to “write what they do 
and do what they write” on a regular 
basis, as is often requested. This is likely 
to be the case for GI products that need 
to be traced from the farm to the fork. 
It may also be difficult for farmers to 
understand and follow the application 
process without external support (e.g., 
from an NGO) and in the absence of 
properly trained extension officers. The 
Lao Certification Body is severely un-
derstaffed and has no representatives at 
the district level to regularly train the 
farmers on certification procedures and 
paperwork, and on the importance of 
documenting farming practices.
Verification and certification 
systems are likely to be shaped by the 
distance to the final market on which 
the GI product will be sold, their cost, 
and by the financial and human assets 
available at both the farmer’s and insti-
tutional level.
In the end, three main options 
exist for GI control:
(1) Control by 17 065-accredited 
certification bodies seems to be the best 
guarantee for access to distant markets. 
It guarantees that all members of the GI 
group apply the GI specifications in the 
same way. This is an important step to 
avoid the misuse of the GI name and 
logo. This certification system makes it 
more difficult for fraudulent operators 
outside the group to produce GI prod-
uct counterfeits as these operators will 
not have the GI certificate to prove the 
authenticity of their products. Such a 
system could be implemented either by 
foreign certification bodies or, better by 
far, by domestic certification bodies. In-
deed, domestic certification bodies are 
more appropriate and efficient than for-
eign certification bodies, as they do not 
have to face the problem of language 
barriers, they can adjust producer’s vis-
its to the production cycle, they cost 
less, and share the same culture with 
those they control. Domestic certifica-
tion bodies can be locally accredited, 
which is the case of Vinacert, Mekong-
cert (Vietnam), ACT (Thailand), and 
the Lao Certification Body. Local certi-
fication bodies are evidence of a sense 
of ownership by local stakeholders. 
However, as accreditation is also a long, 
costly, and difficult process, in coun-
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tries where different standards may be 
under the responsibility of different 
ministries, it may be difficult to avoid 
the multiplication of accreditation and 
certification bodies, each ministry con-
sidering itself as fully legitimate. This is 
more likely to be the case as the number 
of voluntary standards increases (e.g. 
organic, safe, clean, VietGap, ThaiGap, 
ASEANGap).
(2) Control by a “Board” or “Com-
mittee”: the Thai system, which offers 
the possibility for the GI association to 
choose its system of control (accredited 
certification body, Provincial Commit-
tee), allows the GI to be launched with-
out charging the operators for certifica-
tion costs from the very beginning. The 
problem of cost also justifies the choice 
made in Vietnam. Indeed, in most cases 
the producers/processors cannot afford 
such costs at the beginning of the activ-
ity, but are able to do so later on once 
the GI product is better remunerated 
on the market. These Control boards or 
Provincial committees bring together 
experts from DIP/NOIP, local authori-
ties, experts on the product, and experts 
in control/certification. One possible 
disadvantage of this control system is 
that control is not always optimal or 
may even not work at all because of lack 
of skilled human resources to conduct 
inspection and possible difficulties in 
coordinating such multi-stakeholder 
boards.
(3) Control by participatory gua- 
rantee systems (PGSs)27 are particularly 
27 Defined by IFOAM as “a quality assurance system for clusters based on an active participation of 
all the stakeholders and on the establishment of trust, social systems and knowledge exchanges be-
tween farmers, consumers and members involved” (IFOAM, 20xx). These alternative certification 
systems PGS are close to peer-to-peer systems.
appropriate for short value chains (local 
and domestic markets) as they enable 
producers to reduce certification costs 
and communities to engage in a learn-
ing process. They are also a very inter-
esting instrument to raise consumer 
awareness about issues related to food 
quality. Indeed, PGSs allow greater 
communication and learning between 
farmers and consumers, as well as more 
information-sharing not only between 
the farmers themselves, but also with 
other segments of the value chain. PGSs 
are currently very popular in Vietnam. 
In terms of overall strategy, there 
seems to be some rationale for the 
creation of “one-stop shops for certi-
fication”. Bringing all agri-food certifi-
cations under the umbrella of a single 
certification body (national or region-
al) would make it possible for operators 
willing to access multiple certifications 
to benefit from economies of scale, pro-
vided that several certifications can be 
granted after a single inspection (e.g., 
organic, GAP, GIs, mandatory food 
safety regulations). This system would 
also enable inspectors from the certifi-
cation body to attain a critical mass of 
activities to be fully operational, and 
not lose their skills. Such a system al-
ready exists for voluntary food stan-
dards, with certification bodies propos-
ing certification packages that include 
a broad range of certifications (Djama, 
Fouilleux, and Vagneron 2011). 
In parallel, and during the tran-
sition period until fully operational na-
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tional certification bodies are in place, 
it is important to encourage ongoing ef-
forts toward regional cooperation in the 
area of certification. As multiple accred-
itations are costly and time-consuming, 
certification bodies tend to develop 
partnerships based on a strategy of spe-
cialization in either a geographic loca-
tion or an accreditation. The Certifica-
tion Alliance, a collaborative platform 
for regional certification, is an interest-
ing example of such cooperation. Based 
on the premises that local certification 
may not be viable in countries where 
there are only a small number of opera-
tors, Certification Alliance offers an in-
ternationally accredited inspection and 
certification service to local operators 
as well as collaboration between mem-
bers on information-sharing, learning 
and capacity-building in inspection 
and certification. On this platform, col-
laboration among different certification 
bodies allows each member to benefit 
from a menu of certifications. Local in-
spectors accompany experts from oth-
er member organizations during their 
inspections, and learn from the expe-
rience. In 2008, the Lao Certification 
Body joined this platform along with 
eight other Asian organic certification 
bodies.
Finally, while the European sys-
tem designates a GI-competent author-
ity to supervise the control scheme for 
GIs (INAO in France), such supervision 
of the control scheme by the GI nation-
al competent authority is questionable 
in the four countries concerned here. 
As they are currently learning the fun-
damental principles of internationally 
recognized certification procedures, 
it may be wiser not to further com-
plicate matters by adding mandatory 
coordination of controls between the 
authorities in charge of accreditation 
and certification and those in charge of 
geographical indications (intellectual 
property department or office) to avoid 
extra costs of co-management. 
 
1.7 In the end, are GIs really 
equivalent to standards?
Standards imply a certain level of codification. In this respect, GIs are different from other stan-
dards: each GI specification is a unique 
standard, and inspectors need to tru-
ly understand the history and specific 
quality/uniqueness of the GI product. 
Furthermore, the uniqueness of the GI 
product may make it difficult to trans-
late all its properties in the technical 
specifications without ending up with 
a very complicated document that is 
both unverifiable and unmanageable. 
For example, the experience of Kam-
pot Pepper shows that having too many 
points to control (42 control points) is 
overly difficult and inefficient. The con-
trol points should be classified between 
major and minor points and the senso-
rial analysis should not be undermined: 
more importance should be given to the 
sensorial analysis and tasting panels as 
GIs give added value to typicity and or-
ganoleptic quality.
Another specificity of GIs is their 
collective nature. Each GI is a standard 
built on the practices of a group of pro-
ducers/processors located in a specific 
place that created a product with a rep-
utation. The group of producers/pro-
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cessors is thus essential not only when 
setting up the GI application, but also 
when implementing the internal con-
trol. Internal control was the main con-
trol in France before 2006, under the 
supervision of INAO. Internal control 
is critical as it paves the way for lighter, 
easier external control, enables farm-
ers to share and learn from each other, 
and reduces the risk of non-compli-
ance. External control can be facilitated 
by strong efficient internal control: for 
Kampot Pepper, only 16 farmers were 
subjected to external control. 
Conclusion
This article presents the GI con-trol systems that are currently emerging in Southeast Asia, and 
highlights the difficulties encountered 
at various levels in making these sys-
tems both operational and credible, yet 
at a reasonable cost. While certification 
by internationally accredited third-par-
ty certification bodies is generally pre-
sented as the gold standard, it might not 
be the most suitable system for GIs, in 
terms of costs, sharing, and learning. 
Furthermore, a careful look at the latest 
version of the EU Regulation of 2012 
shows that, for foreign GIs, third-party 
certification might not even be a pre-
condition for entering EU markets. Fi-
nally, an increasing number of foreign 
GIs are protected in Europe through 
bilateral agreements that include a list 
of GIs to be protected in the signato-
ry countries of the agreement, without 
having to rely on the provisions of the 
EU Regulation on GIs. In this sense, 
GIs are much more flexible than the 
EU organic agriculture standard, which 
requires a 17  065 certification system 
or a system judged to be equivalent to 
the European system. This means that 
countries willing to export GI products 
still have considerable latitude in the 
design of their certification schemes, 
and should consider several options in 
the light of the cost, the level of farmers’ 
knowledge and awareness, and the do-
mestic control capacities, with the aim 
of implementing efficient control.
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In Search of the Resilient Sahelian: 
Reflections on a Fashionable Notion
Benoît Lallau1
 
 
Abstract
This paper examines the figure of the “resilient Sahelian” identi-
fied or sought by numerous aid actors and funding bodies in West 
Africa. Does this notion of resilience contribute to something gen-
uinely new, and if so, how? What methodological challenges does 
it raise? Can it be operationalized? And, above all, which policies 
does it require us to implement? These questions need to be ad-
dressed head-on if the “resilient Sahelian” is to be more than a po-
etic metaphor.
Keywords: resilience, food insecurity, Sahel, vulnerability, capabil-
ities.
 
Resumen
Este documento examina la figura del “saheliano residente” identi-
ficado o buscado por numerosas entidades de ayuda y organismos 
financiadores en África occidental. ¿Contribuye esta noción de re-
siliencia a algo genuinamente nuevo?, y si sí, ¿cómo? ¿Qué desafíos 
metodológicos incluye? ¿Puede ser operativizada? Y, sobre todo 
¿qué políticas require que implementemos? Estas preguntas tienen 
que ser abordadas de frente si el “saheliano resiliente” va a ser más 
que una metáfora poética.
 
Palabras clave: resiliencia, seguridad alimentaria, Sahel, vulnerabi-
lidad, capacidades
1 Benoît Lallau is senior lecturer in economics, at Lille University (France). His research is fo-
cused on vulnerability and resilience in African rural areas. He heads the working group on 
resilience within the Clersé (http://resiliences.univ-lille1.fr).
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摘要
 
本文检验了“有适应力的萨赫勒居民”（resilient Sahelian）
这一被无数援助行为者和资助机构在西非所寻求的形象。这
个关于适应力的观念是否促进形成了真正的新事物？如果是
的话，又是如何形成的？它提出了怎样的方法论挑战？它能
投入操作吗？最重要的是，它要求我们实施哪种政策？如
果“有适应力的萨赫勒居民”不只是一个诗意的暗喻的话，
就需要迎面解决这些问题。
关键词：适应力，粮食不安全，萨赫勒，易受影响性，能力
Introduction
The aid sector is subject to fash-ions. And regularly, “experts” are convinced, or claim to be, that 
they have found a framework that will 
allow us solve the ills of humanity. In the 
2010s, that “miraculous” notion is resil-
ience. This notion came from outside 
the aid sector, in two disciplinary fields: 
in psychology, it relates to how a person 
recovers from a shock or a succession 
of unfavorable events (Luthar 2006); in 
ecology, it refers to an analysis conduct-
ed to establish if an ecosystem manag-
es, following a disruption, to maintain 
its vital functions and to adapt (Holling 
1973). The focus of this analysis then 
shifted to social–ecological systems 
combining nature and humans, such 
as urban systems (Walker et al. 2004). 
Centered on shocks, resilience was first 
used by institutions such as the UNIS-
DR2 in the field of natural disasters and 
2 United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.
3 Global Alliance for Resilience in Sahelian areas, implemented by European Union.
their impact on human populations 
(UNISDR 2002). It then spread far be-
yond this field. Initially referring to the 
ability to recover from a major shock, 
resilience was then also considered to 
refer to the capacity to learn and adapt, 
particularly in protracted crisis or pov-
erty situations, and to the capacity to 
anticipate and prevent. Its wholesale 
use has considerably widened defini-
tions of the notion, such as the one used 
by AGIR3: “Resilience is the ability of 
an individual, a household, a commu-
nity, a country or a region to withstand, 
adapt, and quickly recover from stress-
es and shocks such as drought, violence, 
conflict or natural disaster” (European 
Union 2012). It risks becoming a catch-
all notion onto which anyone can proj-
ect whatever meaning they wish.
It can also be seen as the result of 
a long process of reflection on the fight 
against food insecurity and its failures. 
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These failures, as demonstrated by the 
regular recurrence of food crises, sub-
sequently presented a challenge to a 
narrow conception of food insecurity 
that saw hunger as primarily the result 
of insufficient food production, and ig-
nored the fact that hunger is also due 
to “abnormal” variations in price, insuf-
ficient means of production, and prob-
lems accessing food, as revealed in the 
work of Amartv Sen (1981). They also 
highlighted the need to look beyond the 
usual “emergency/development” divide 
to address the structural causes of food 
vulnerability and not simply its cyclical 
occurrences (Pingali, Alinovi, and Sut-
ton 2005). 
Added to these considerations 
are financial arguments. Set against a 
background of shrinking public bud-
gets, the “right” hunger prevention 
model is the one that now gives prior-
ity to increasing value for money. Re-
silience, which by definition is based 
on the local agency and on preventive 
rather than responsive action, therefore 
finds increasing favor. The efficiency 
argument is also used as part of efforts 
to improve coordination between aid 
actors, not simply between emergen-
cy and development, but also between 
the technical response sectors, such as 
food security, water sanitation and hy-
giene (WASH) and health, and between 
actors operating in the same territory, 
and so on. Integration has become the 
new Discourse on humanitarian Meth-
od, which included skills, timeframes, 
scales of analysis and action, and the 
usual funding categories—poverty re-
4 Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters.
duction, climate adaptation, and di-
saster risk reduction. Resilience as the 
purpose, integration as the method, 
and value for money as the common 
constraint, are the new triptych of the 
aid sector in the 2010s.
Since resilience is conceived as a 
tool for the integrated action on human-
ity’s various ills, the world regions where 
these ills are most highly concentrated 
represent priority areas for experiment-
ing resilience policies and programs. 
They include vulnerable coastal areas 
of South Asia, Horn of Africa countries, 
and the Sahelian fringe of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. This Sahelian fringe has to cope 
with climate change local consequenc-
es, still high rates of poverty and food 
insecurity, political instability, adverse 
incorporation in world markets, etc. In 
West Africa, resilience is therefore cen-
tral to multiple initiatives, European 
(AGIR), British (BRACED4), American 
(Global Partnership), and sub-regional 
(Zero Hunger). In the Sahel as a whole, 
it would be unrealistic to apply for fund-
ing without including resilience in the 
“concept note”, or without asserting an 
aspiration to Sahelian resilience. This 
resilience has become a new condition-
ality, after many others in History of the 
aid sector in the Sahel (modernization, 
structural adjustment, governance, pro 
poor growth, etc.).
This paper explores the scope 
of this new requirement for the proj-
ects and policies implemented in the 
Sahelian sub-region. The first section 
focuses on the usefulness of this no-
tion in analyzing Sahelian contexts. The 
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second section looks at the challenges 
involved in measuring resilience. The 
third section establishes a link with the 
sustainability approaches. The fourth 
and final section outlines what could be 
a “pro-resilience” policy in the Sahel.
Resilience: A Useful Notion?
What is New?
The first question we should ask ourselves is: what is new about resilience? Not much, in actual 
fact. First, despite an old reputation for 
resignation and passivity, West African 
peasants and shepherds did not wait 
for the fashion of resilience to respond 
and adapt to risks. Michael Mortimore, 
writing in 1989, described the nature 
of Sahelian livelihoods as “uncertain-
ty-as-norm” and therefore designed 
to adapt to uncertainty. The keywords 
found in the extensive literature on this 
subject, across various disciplines, are 
flexibility, diversification, complexi-
ty, mobility, and adaptation. This long 
tradition also explains why so many 
researchers are irritated by the emer-
gence of a notion that is supposed to 
fill an analytical void, whereas a lot has 
already been written on the practices of 
Sahelians, of which practitioners and, 
particularly, funding bodies are too of-
ten unaware.
Secondly, the drive for integra-
tion is nothing new. Attempts have been 
made to go beyond the usual emergen-
cy/development divide since the 1990s 
with the LRRD (Linking Relief, Reha-
bilitation, and Development) approach, 
a favorite of the European Union. They 
also form part of the “early recovery” 
approach promoted by UNDP in the 
early 2000s, and conceived as a transi-
tional stage between the abnormality 
of a crisis and the normality of devel-
opment; or part of the FAO’s twin track 
approach to improve the consistency 
between emergency food aid and struc-
tural reduction of food insecurity. We 
might also mention here the long-es-
tablished integrated rural development 
approaches aimed at globally address-
ing the development of rural territories 
and more effectively coordinating vari-
ous aid modalities.
 
A New Neoliberal Avatar?
The resilience approach therefore often tends to create something new out of something old. This 
is not problematic in itself, since it can 
provide an insight into Sahelian crises 
and allow aid to be precisely targeted. 
However, for some authors, resilience 
also poses a real threat. For a start, since 
it is conservative by nature, it could be 
dangerous. It is rooted in ecosystemic 
approaches, which focus on the mainte-
nance of the system’s essential functions 
and on an adaptive cycle, in order to 
ensure a return to equilibrium. As a re-
sult, there would be no crises, just nec-
essary and spontaneous adjustments. 
The highly conservative potential of the 
duplication on social area is clear, as is 
the resulting risk of an inability to ad-
dress development issues, which would 
be seen as a disruption. Analysts of so-
cioecological systems have, neverthe-
less, attempted to avoid this stumbling 
block by broadening their thinking 
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on this notion, which started as a per-
sistence-based approach, before being 
expanded to include adaptability, and 
then gradually integrating the ability 
to self-transform as a characteristic of a 
resilient system (Gallopin 2006).
Resilience could also be con-
sidered as dangerous since it is based 
on an individualist vision of the social 
sphere, in association with psychoso-
cial approaches. This raises the risk that 
we consider a person to be always able 
of confronting adversity within a sys-
tem that does not have to be changed. 
Hence the suspicion that this is noth-
ing more than a new form of neoliberal 
thinking, applied to risk management 
in this case (Reghezza-Zitt et al. 2012). 
It would result from an analytical shift 
in three steps: first, vulnerability con-
ceived as the product of economic and 
social structures in analyses of Sahelian 
famines in the 1970s (Watts and Bohle 
1993); second, vulnerability conceived 
as a trap resulting from the behavior of 
individuals themselves (Dercon 2005); 
third, resilience, as the capacity of these 
individuals to release themselves from 
this confinement. Resilience would lead 
to the construction of the myth of the 
“resilient poor” and to the idea that the 
poor are always capable of coping if en-
couraged to use their own resources and 
without the need to reduce inequalities 
or dominations.
 
A New Injunction?
This gives rise to another risk as-sociated with resilience: the in-junction. This injunction places 
the onus of responsibility on local pop-
ulations: they have an agency and they 
need to use this agency to address their 
problems. This poses two potential 
threats: an illusion, on the one hand, 
and an alibi on the other. The illusion 
consists in thinking that, in all situa-
tions, individuals or, better still, com-
munities, will find the means necessary 
to overcome adversity, for which they 
simply need to be empowered. And this 
is where the alibi comes in: if poor pop-
ulations have the capacity to overcome 
adversity, the local emergence of rel-
evant groups has to be promoted, and 
resilience will grow by itself.
Local populations would there-
fore be considered as potentially capa-
ble of overcoming adversity, as long as 
aid workers support the development 
of this capacity. And this gives rise to 
another form of injunction that marks 
a shift from “manage on your own” to 
“we’re going to tell you how to man-
age on your own”. The problems facing 
the poor would no longer (only) derive 
from natural risks, or the economic and 
social structures that produce vulner-
abilities, but rather from mentalities, 
inappropriate behavior on the part of 
populations, or poor governance by 
local authorities (World Bank 2013). 
This vision underpins the “toolbox” ap-
proach, common in the resilience field, 
which identifies “good practices” to im-
plement in local systems or to dissemi-
nate to leaders and authorities. A case 
in point is the characterization of “resil-
ient communities” as communities with 
good leaders, a high level of education 
and risk-awareness, closely knit, diver-
sified, in which women play a major 
role, etc. This can make resilience uto-
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pian and unattainable, since there are so 
many conditions to be met.
If the responsibility for resilience 
is not simply incumbent on local com-
munities, where does the onus fall? This 
leads us to a vital debate, in both West 
Africa and elsewhere: the governance 
of pro-resilience actions. Yet, this gov-
ernance is often highly paradoxical. The 
first paradox is that a large number of 
current initiatives are poorly coordi-
nated, and primarily designed to meet 
the priorities imposed by each funding 
body, whereas the notion assumes, by 
definition, better integrated actions. 
The second paradox is that national 
public authorities (particularly local au-
thorities) and civil society organizations 
often feel deprived of the ability to take 
decisions, or at least the ability to pro-
vide guidance on these issues, whereas 
resilience programs are supposed to be 
based on endogenous dynamics and 
local leadership. In this regard, there is 
obviously a lack of a clearly identified 
and legitimate leader for “resilience” 
programs in the sub-region.
Of course, the injunction of good 
practices, the tendency to circumvent 
local authorities and the segmentation 
of programs are constant features of aid 
sector history. But, since the resilience 
approach is supposed to be about tack-
ling these errors, this leaves them all the 
more open to criticism. 
 
Potentialities of Resilience
Despite the seriousness of these criticisms, resilience does offer advantages for the analysis of 
Sahelian contexts and programs. Since 
it naturally places an emphasis on local 
capacities, resilience provides an oppor-
tunity to take proper account of these 
capacities, in all their complexity and 
historical depth. In this way, it can be 
considered as an extension, in terms of 
risks, of the capabilities approach (Lal-
lau 2008). As such, Gondard-Delcroix 
and Rousseau (2004) consider it to be 
a synthesis capability, to the extent that 
it is the consequence of people’s over-
all capabilities. Based on the active and 
reactive behavior of people in relation 
to their environment, resilience is ex-
pressed through strategic choices. From 
a capability point of view, resilient per-
sons are those who are not only aware 
of the risks they run and of their agency 
but also capable of concrete action in 
response to these risks.
In agriculture, resilience also al-
lows for the extension of risk analysis 
beyond that usually practiced by econo-
mists, that is, beyond the technical and 
commercial risks. The scale at which 
the resilience analysis is applied is more 
that of the household than the holding, 
which would also include life risks. In 
addition, the resilience approach re-
quires perceptions to be taken into ac-
count, since what matters is less the risk 
as probabilized by the economist than 
the risk as perceived by the farmer, and 
the way in which, as a result, it influ-
ences this farmer’s practices. Rather 
than risks, what is at stake is adversity, 
a notion that refers to all events, more 
or less sudden, with the potential to sig-
nificantly impact a person’s livelihood 
and living conditions, even though they 
do not occur. These events could just 
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be major natural disasters as the “small 
shocks” that make up the daily lives of 
the Sahelian poor, they are both local 
events and global or distant trends.
Finally, resilience can be inte-
grated fairly easily into standard hu-
manitarian frameworks. Household 
Economy Analysis (HEA) tools and the 
sustainable livelihoods framework can 
easily integrate the notion into their 
toolboxes. Since resilience is a multi-
scale, systemic, and historical notion; 
however, it requires aid workers to de-
velop an in-depth knowledge of the so-
cial environments in which they imple-
ment response, which could improve 
the effectiveness of this response.
How to Measure Resilience
Since resilience applies to everyone within the aid sector, the challenge is to identify the conditions in 
which the notion can be usefully imple-
mented. The first such condition is the 
ability to measure it correctly.
 
Resilience of What?
First, we need to establish the in-dicators to measure resilience. A factor common to all resilience 
approaches is the focus on the ability to 
cope with risks and shocks. To measure 
resilience, therefore, we need to assess a 
capacity, which is not straightforward. 
Many authors distinguish between dif-
ferent types of capacities, which com-
bine to produce resilience. Research-
ers at the IDS,5 for example, associate 
5 Institute for Development Studies.
absorptive capacity (when the shock is 
neutralized and the system persists), 
adaptive capacity (structural adapta-
tion to shocks through incremental ad-
justment), and transformative capacity 
(shift to a fundamentally new system in 
response to shocks) (Béné et al. 2012). 
However, such distinctions, although 
they allow resilience to go beyond the 
metaphorical stage, do not make it eas-
ier to measure. 
Previous attempts, particularly 
by the FAO (2016a), share two factors in 
common: they aim to develop synthetic 
indicators aggregating different kinds of 
variables (psychosocial, material, etc.); 
they are ad hoc attempts, since the vari-
ables selected are adapted to the local 
context, and are not presented as ex-
tendable without adaptation (Constas et 
al. 2016). All of these attempts have the 
potential for circularity due to the con-
fusion and interdependence between 
causes and consequences, between de-
terminants of resilience and resilience 
itself (Béné 2013). As such, they strug-
gle to take into account the interactions 
between what are seen as the various 
components of resilience: institutions 
are necessary to make assets useful, the 
value of education depends on work op-
portunities, etc. Finally, asset indicators, 
such as the possession of productive 
capital, can be “positive” in certain sit-
uations and disadvantageous in others, 
particularly during protracted conflict 
(Jaspars and O'Callaghan 2010).
It is probably pointless to dog-
gedly attempt to extract a single mea-
sure of Sahelian resilience from more 
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or less sophisticated methodologies. 
The central problem lies elsewhere, in 
the form of variables, the evolution of 
which must be monitored in order to 
identify if there is a resilience trajec-
tory or not. As such, it seems relevant 
to take a local stakes-based approach 
that takes into account the diversity 
of local situations and communities. 
It involves identifying and monitoring 
over time what, locally, is the main is-
sue (or the small number of issues) to 
buffer from shocks and which should 
be recovered, as a priority, following a 
shock. These local stakes will, as a re-
sult, determine perceptions and guide 
practices in front of adversity (Lallau 
and Droy 2014).
 
Resilience Horizons
This raises another major issue: how do you define a resilient Sa-helian household? This presents 
us with two problems. The first relates to 
the choice of a timeframe for observing 
“stake variables”. The second relates to 
the fact that risks are renewed and com-
bined, shocks of different kinds are suc-
cessive and cumulative, and the threat 
continues and influences practices after 
the shock itself; this is precisely what 
characterizes poverty: the scale and 
persistence of adversity experienced. 
This often prevents the identification of 
straightforward “event/response” type 
mechanisms, except perhaps in cases of 
rare extreme events. This makes it es-
sential to address resilience in terms of 
trajectories.
However, these trajectories 
must not be perceived as linear. On 
the contrary, this raises the question 
of discontinuities and the thresholds 
below or above which the nature of 
practices and processes would change. 
Once again, resilience adapts well to 
standard humanitarian frameworks, 
since two thresholds might make sense 
here: a destitution or survival thresh-
old and a resilience threshold, close 
to the livelihood protection threshold 
used by HEA assessors. Below the first 
threshold, the household is trapped 
in a survival situation, and the stake 
variables are at crisis level. The second 
threshold corresponds to the situation 
on the basis of which the household 
can start building an autonomous mo-
mentum to improve its living condi-
tions and its capabilities, and which 
is not compromised by the least un-
certainty. It manifests itself through 
levels judged to be satisfactory con-
sidering what matters locally. Between 
these two thresholds, there is a pre-
vailing form of resistance, dominat-
ed by levels judged dissatisfactory of 
stake variables, and by defensive live-
lihoods practices. Thinking in terms 
of thresholds allows aid to be directed, 
by highlighting the levers that enable 
households to cross them, by statisti-
cally revealing resilience factors and 
vulnerability factors. The threshold 
analysis therefore has two levels. The 
first is static and requires us to distin-
guish between two threshold values 
for each identified stake. The second 
is dynamic and involves studying how 
its values are combined and how they 
move, or do not move, from one state 
to another.
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Resilience is not Survival
This approach has two main im-plications. First, survival and resilience should not be con-
fused. It is therefore important not to 
see resilience everywhere; survival is 
not the same as resilience. From this 
point of view, the return, after a shock, 
to an initial disadvantageous situation 
is not resilience, but at most a form of 
resistance. The expression “resilient 
poor” is nothing more than a medio-
cre oxymoron. And in that sense, most 
of Sahelian peasants and breeders, liv-
ing in difficult places, coping with pro-
tracted crisis, unable to invest for a bet-
ter future, cannot be seen as resilient. 
Second, since it is necessary to study 
household trajectories, we need to use 
specific methodologies. Trajectories 
can be identified through qualitative 
studies, based on network analysis 
and life stories, and the reconstitution 
of individual and collective histories. 
However, past practices can be ineffec-
tive in the present context, hence the 
interest of not only reconstructing tra-
jectories a posteriori but also follow-
ing them in real time. This requires the 
use of observatory methodologies. An 
observatory often turns out to be dif-
ficult to maintain, on the one hand in 
regions experiencing prolonged crises, 
where there is a high level of insecuri-
ty and fairly unpredictable population 
displacement, and on the other hand 
when there is a lack of funding, since 
funding bodies are reluctant to pay for 
these types of methodologies.
Linking Resilience 
and Sustainability
This section explores another im-portant and frequently ignored question: is resilience always 
a good thing? In order to answer this 
question, we need to look more close-
ly at different scales of resilience, and at 
household practices and their sustain-
ability.
 
Focus on Household Practices
Within international insti-tutions, resilience is often considered at various stages, 
from the individual to the national. This 
desire to simultaneously address multi-
ple scales and their interaction clearly 
increases the difficulty of operationaliz-
ing the notion; the resilience of a beaten 
child is not the same as the resilience of 
a village, and the links between them 
are difficult to establish. The household 
may provide a good entry point within 
a resilience approach. It structures the 
daily lives of its members, allows people 
to live together for at least part of the 
year, and covers a significant share of 
risk management practices. It is also the 
preferred scale of aid practitioners, as 
the most effective to assess the impact 
of the programs implemented. Howev-
er, this scale is certainly insufficient and 
it is necessary to look below and above 
them, on the scale of a territory or com-
munity, and as a result link resilience 
and sustainability.
Within a household, this requires 
us to identify the winners and losers of 
practices and adaptations. Gender is 
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central to this research. Forcing your 
daughter into an early marriage in or-
der to clear a debt might enable other 
members of the household to “bounce 
back”, but at the price of limiting the 
young woman’s agency. It raises the 
question of the social sustainability of 
such a practice. If we make a link be-
tween resilience and sustainability, we 
are required to address the risks posed 
by household practices. Humanitarian 
actors have certainly integrated it into 
their analyses, since they usually con-
sider household practices in terms of 
three post-crisis impact levels: practic-
es with low impacts (adaptive), which 
do not compromise the household’s 
future; practices with a moderate im-
pact (distress), which are not sustain-
able but which do not reach irreversible 
levels, and high-impact practices (sur-
vival), which may irreversibly damage 
a household’s situation (ACF-Interna-
tional 2010).
It is important, however, to un-
derline the ambiguity of some human-
itarian practices when studied from a 
resilience perspective. These humanitar-
ian actors have a tendency to focus, for 
ethical reasons, on saving lives, whereas 
households and communities generally 
have a longer term goal that of preserv-
ing the group’s resources to ensure their 
livelihoods. This is a source of potential 
tension between two types of hardship, 
which are also two priorities: lives and 
livelihoods (Hampshire et al. 2009). 
What is a sustainable practice, from this 
point of view? Is it a practice that saves 
vulnerable lives, or which saves the fam-
ily’s livelihood? This is a question that a 
resilience analysis can help resolve, since 
emergency resilience-based responses 
are already supposed to take the long 
term into consideration. More general-
ly, the resilience approach must, there-
fore, encourage to reduce dependence 
on assistance and systematic food aid, as 
quickly as possible, and go toward less 
visible aid practices aimed at promot-
ing self-reliance. Once again, this is a 
long-established debate that resilience 
has simply revived.
 
The “Community”:  
Another Relevant Scale
Linking resilience and sustainabil-ity also means going beyond the household and addressing the is-
sues of social interaction and practices 
aggregation. First, rather than talking 
about “good” or “bad” household resil-
ience, this approach involves establish-
ing if the practices of some households 
directly or indirectly harm others. In 
this case, if there is resilience, it may not 
be socially sustainable. Predation prac-
tices such as looting, for example, may 
enable some people to embark on re-
silience trajectories, but at the expense 
of destroying livelihoods of many oth-
ers. Less radically, the individualization 
of land property or grabbing practices 
with regard to a space previously shared 
by the community may strengthen its 
beneficiaries but weaken others.
Second, an approach applied at a 
household level may not be suitable for 
a local community, particularly due to 
the pressure on natural resources. The 
diversification of activities, usually pre-
sented as favorable to resilience, can 
have negative impacts on a territorial 
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scale. This includes market gardening, 
which can represent a significant drain 
on water resources, and charcoal pro-
duction, which can lead to a major re-
duction in forest coverage. The same 
practice (market gardening, charcoal 
production, etc.) can embark on resil-
ience trajectories if it is implemented 
by a small number of households in a 
given territory, and alternatively foster 
situations of resistance or even survival 
if it becomes widespread.
It is therefore important to link 
the household with the community to 
which it belongs, such as a village in 
a rural area. On this village scale, in 
line with the social–ecological systems 
framework (Walker et al. 2006), resil-
ience can be considered as the continu-
ity or restoration of “functions” essen-
tial to the “village system”. This would 
be based on the following approach, in 
three steps: define and assess functions 
performed by the community (see in-
set); study the community’s resources 
(capital and capacities), which enable 
it or not, through their interactions, to 
maintain and restore these functions; 
highlight the trajectories and possible 
threshold effects. 
The definition and assessment of the village system’s functions are based 
on the four standard dimensions of sustainability: ecosystemic, economic, 
social, and institutional. 
Ecosystemic field, productive function: A village is ecosystemically resilient 
if the agroecosystems maintain their productive potentialities. Indicators: 
agricultural yield trend; hunting and gathering off-take trend; presence of 
weeds indicating loss of fertility, etc.
Economic field, subsistence function: A village is economically resilient if 
its inhabitants are able to satisfy their basic needs and to avoid adverse in-
corporation to global economy. Indicators: food diversity, accessibility of 
health and education services, village’s terms of trade, etc.
Social field, cohesion function: A village is socially resilient if it is socially 
cohesive. Possible indicators: occurrence of discrimination against a per-
son/group of people; conflicts within the village; collective action; sense of 
belonging, etc.
Institutional field, regulation function: A village is institutionally resilient if 
its community is “governed”. Possible indicators: existence of a legitimate 
leader; number of incidents of rule breaking and the level of penalties ap-
plied; inequality in access to resources (land management in particular); 
degree to which villagers feel secure, etc.
Inset: The “functions” of a village community
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Resilience: A New Assessment 
Framework for Public 
Policies in the Sahel?
A far cry from these method-ological issues, resilience in the Sahel is currently a categorical 
imperative; it is not a matter for discus-
sion; it must simply be researched and 
supported. This provides us with a real 
opportunity to turn this notion into 
something useful: it could become an 
essential criterion for assessing nation-
al, regional, and international policies. 
It could be used to remind these policy-
makers of their responsibilities: do you 
really make a contribution to the resil-
ience to which you so earnestly aspire?
 
Implement Integration?
The aim of integration is insepa-rable from resilience. This aim is not without risks or prob-
lems, and is hard to operationalize 
(Grünewald 2014). Of course, major 
funding bodies attempt to implement it 
as part of their own procedures. USAID, 
for example, has developed an approach 
called the Joint Planning Cell (USAID 
2013). This cell is composed of agricul-
tural, climate change, food, health and 
food security experts, and its mission 
is to produce joint action plans to layer, 
sequence, and integrate humanitarian 
assistance. At a European level, ECHO 
and DEVCO increasingly conduct joint 
situation analyses, although each is 
keen to protect its prerogatives. In ad-
dition to this internal institutional dia-
log, longer horizons for funding bodies, 
and therefore for funding grants, which 
would appear to be decisive, are rarely 
achieved. This represents another par-
adox, even though resilience consists in 
encouraging target populations to im-
plement longer horizons. 
In the field, institutions are also 
attempting to modify their practices. 
This includes the FAO and its “caisses 
de resilience” approach, which has been 
tested in Mali and Burkina Faso (FAO 
2016b, 2017). It combines a technical 
component, based on the promotion of 
good agricultural practices in “farmer 
field schools”; a financial component, 
aimed at developing microfinance (sav-
ings, micro-credit, micro-insurance), 
and a social component including so-
cial nets and social inclusion tools. By 
combining these components, the aim 
is to trigger a virtuous dynamic, based 
on diversified and resilient livelihoods, 
longer horizons and social cohesion. 
However, it is mostly NGOs, which are 
generally in the front line in West Afri-
can field operations, on which the onus 
of implementing integrated approach-
es falls. They are often organized in a 
highly sectorial way, because funding 
bodies used to assert it as a condition of 
their effectiveness (cluster approaches), 
and they are now being asked, for the 
same reason, to do exactly the opposite. 
The same requirements for effectiveness 
have also too often led them to neglect 
national partners as not “professional” 
enough, and to limit in-depth assess-
ments, as too costly; they are now being 
asked to better integrate local actors and 
to develop less basic assessment frame-
works, based on the complexity of resil-
ience. Another problem is the assump-
tion that all goals could be achieved at 
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the same time, without resources being 
spread too thinly or goals coming into 
contradiction with each other. Final-
ly, asking them to link emergency and 
development in their activities requires 
them to rethink their internal orga-
nization, while remaining subject to 
the vagaries of funding, obtained on a 
case-by-case basis, and without pre-
dictability. Many aid workers, within 
NGOs, already doubt the possibility of 
implementing an integrated approach 
in practice.
 
Agricultural Development  
for Resilience?
The resilience approach is not simply about responding to food crises but also about trying to 
prevent them, based on development 
policies. But, which agricultural policies 
can promote resilience? Part of the an-
swer lies in the fact that not all technical 
approaches are equally effective in fos-
tering the resilience of family farmers. 
It is increasingly agreed that the agroin-
dustrial model disseminated during the 
“green revolutions”, based on the artifi-
cialization of agroecosystems, system-
atic chemicalization and the simplifica-
tion of cultural practices, is reaching its 
ecological, social, and even economic 
limits. The systemic approaches taken 
by agronomists reveal that resilience is, 
on the contrary, a result of complexity, 
diversity, flexibility, and autonomy (Ca-
bell and Oelofse 2012). Agroecologi-
cal practices, which are based on such 
6 Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa.
7 African Agricultural Technological Foundation.
8 GACSA: Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture.
complexity, local adaptation, and agro-
forestry, represent potential vectors for 
agricultural advances favorable to resil-
ience. This is what a very large number 
of studies now show (Altieri and Nich-
olls 2012).
The idea of resilience based on 
agroecology is certainly making in-
roads at the FAO and, more general-
ly, the United Nations, and in many 
NGOs. However, it does not play a 
dominant role in the funds mobilized. 
The approaches recommended by the 
“New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition”, which brings together a 
number of public and private fund-
ing bodies, particularly in West Afri-
ca, tend to perpetuate the dominant 
technical model, supported by the 
agricultural supply and genetic engi-
neering industries. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, AGRA6 and even more AATF7 
relay this model, supported by private 
foundations (Oxfam 2013). Their aim 
is to show, on the one hand, that the 
increasing dependence of peasants on 
input suppliers does not pose a threat 
to these small-scale farmers and, on 
the other hand, that only “new mod-
ernisation”, based on a technical pack 
including genetically modified seeds 
and widespread access to chemical 
inputs, will enable them to meet the 
demand for food in a climate change 
context. The climate-smart agriculture 
promoted by the FAO and the GACSA8 
points, more or less, in the same direc-
tion (FAO 2013).
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Food Sovereignty for Resilience?
What we are dealing with here, beyond the specifically tech-nical aspect, is the role given 
to family farmers in agricultural devel-
opment and food security in the Sahel. 
This reveals the ambiguity of the pro-
grams implemented on behalf of food 
security and family farming. On the one 
hand, we say that we expect a lot from 
these peasants to feed their contempo-
raries and provide jobs, etc. On the oth-
er hand, we tend to support practices 
contrary to the development of these 
peasantries. The suspicion that family 
farmers use outdated practices, already 
central to modernization policies sev-
eral decades ago, is never far away. In 
short, we support peasants, but only in 
the absence of a better alternative.
A case in point are the large-
scale agricultural investments that the 
World Bank and, to a lesser extent, the 
FAO continue to support, driven by a 
vision of development based on free 
investment and free trade. They are 
content to remind investors of their 
“responsibility” to limit the social and 
environmental externalities, or to con-
sider the modalities of the least unequal 
partnership possible between fami-
ly famers and large estates, based on 
contract farming (Lallau 2012). In the 
same way, despite numerous studies on 
this issue (De Schutter 2014), the main 
funding bodies strongly reject the idea 
of re-establishing border protection 
(without which, however, local agroin-
dustries and supply chains will be un-
able to thrive) and make the case, on 
9 Economic Partnership Agreement.
the contrary, for greater liberalization. 
The EPA9 between West Africa and the 
European Union is a good example of 
this: it places European producers and 
West African producers in competition 
within a single market, considering 
them as equals and equally capable of 
taking advantage of such a free trade 
agreement. European officials con-
firmed in 2015 that excess in milk pow-
der production caused by the end of 
milk quotas in Europe could easily find 
outlets in emerging markets, including 
in Africa. The European Union could 
be accused of lacking consistency, given 
the extent to which the EPA and AGIR 
initiative appear to be in total contra-
diction. What about the resilience of 
Sahelian agro-pastoralists? What about 
the growth of West Africa’s milk supply 
chain?
This also requires us to go be-
yond an often “nature-centred” con-
ception of resilience. Examining the 
resilience of Sahelian farmers unique-
ly from the point of view of climate 
change is far too limited. Of course, the 
limitations imposed by the climate are 
very real, and they are likely to increase 
in the future. However, shocks and 
stresses caused by global markets and 
land grabbing are equally important 
factors, and indeed more meaningful 
than climatic variations for under-sup-
ported and under-equipped Sahelian 
farmers. Such resilience should also be 
considered in terms of a clash between 
a Green Revolution model and alterna-
tive conceptions, based on agroecology, 
food sovereignty, and peasant farming 
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dynamics. The political dimension of 
Sahelian resilience really comes into its 
own here, and highlights the contradic-
tions, and therefore the responsibilities, 
of the institutions that advocate it.
 
Social Protection for Resilience?
Social protection has made a strong comeback in recent years in aid discourses and practices. Once 
again, there is nothing new about this 
finding: it is pointless to expect highly 
vulnerable people, for whom the small-
est hazard is potentially disastrous, to 
relay the “good practices” on which re-
silience is based. It is therefore neces-
sary to protect the livelihoods of Sahe-
lians from life’s hazards, and not simply 
the hazards of the market or rainfall, 
and to implement a diverse range of 
social protection methods accessible to 
local populations.
This primarily involves improv-
ing access to basic services, the reha-
bilitation of which began in the early 
2000s with social policies inspired by 
the MDG (Millennium Development 
Goals). More recently, in relation to 
the resilience approach, “preventive” or 
“productive” social net programs have 
grown in popularity in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, most often under the auspices of 
the World Bank (Leturque 2013). The 
stated goal is not only to save lives but 
also to sustainably transform the situ-
ation confronting people caught in the 
poverty trap, by maintaining safety nets 
outside of major crisis periods. This 
falls between conventional agricultural 
10 World Food Program.
policies based on production support 
and the live-saving actions of emergen-
cy response actors. This brings into fo-
cus another dimension of food security, 
the accessibility of food and its means 
of production: cash for work, one-off 
food aid supplies, support to capitalize 
agricultural holdings, guaranteed pur-
chase via local emergency aid supply 
systems (such as the P4P, Purchase For 
Progress, a program run by the WFP10), 
cash transfers to increase outlets for lo-
cal producers, etc. To return to the ter-
minology used above, the main targets 
of these initiatives are resistance house-
holds (between resilience and surviv-
al), with a view to enabling them, once 
again at least cost, to embark on resil-
ience trajectories.
In West Africa, social approach-
es to food insecurity are mostly target-
ed at poor farmers and breeders, that is, 
those who do not produce and/or do not 
earn enough to meet their food needs 
throughout the year. They are based on 
the idea that a sum of money, even very 
small, to supplement a person’s regular 
income (conditional or otherwise) can 
help households diversify their liveli-
hoods, invest, and go beyond short-
term resistance, and can also benefit 
the whole community through infra-
structural developments and related 
spending. Ethiopia is often mentioned 
as the example to follow, with its Pro-
ductive Safety Nets Programme, based 
on manpower-intensive public works 
programs. It provided a template for the 
CEDEAO, for example, whose “Zero 
Hunger” initiative, launched in 2012, 
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also includes this social dimension in 
terms of preventive safety nets (ECOW-
AS Commission 2012).
These are called inclusive agri-
cultural policies and they have both 
productive and social goals. They can 
give rise to potential discrepancy, no-
tably between attractive prices for pro-
ducers and acceptable prices for con-
sumers. It also requires us to make a 
difficult choice between potential ben-
eficiaries: should we help several older 
women or a young rural entrepreneur? 
Which will show the most resilience at 
a territorial level? It has also given rise 
to fears expressed by certain represen-
tatives of West African peasant organi-
zations that the social dimension will 
take precedence over the agricultural 
dimension. In other words, we will lim-
it ourselves to social redress or healing 
policies, without tackling, once again, 
the roots of food vulnerability.
Conclusion: Resilience 
Demands
It is now clear that, if we are to avoid empty words and emotional advo-cacy, we need to meet the many de-
mands made by resilience. The first de-
mand is conceptual and involves clearly 
defining resilience and associating it 
with other key notions in development 
debates, such as sustainability and ca-
pabilities; resilience, however neces-
sary, is not sufficient in itself to explain 
the realities of poverty and food inse-
curity in the Sahel. And it is relevant in 
Sahelian contexts if and only if we do 
not see resilience everywhere, if it is not 
confused with survival and resistance. 
The second demand is methodological, 
since resilience requires us to follow up 
situations over time, implement impact 
assessments, and take qualitative ap-
proaches. It must be studied at several 
scales, and there is here a strong inter-
est in linking capability approach and 
social–ecological systems approach, in 
any attempt of measurement. The third 
demand is more important still, since 
it is political and involves choosing a 
pro-resilience development model. In 
this way, resilience enables us to benefi-
cially re-launch the debate on the polit-
ical dimension of development aid, due 
to its prescriptive considerations, and 
the choice of models it inevitably re-
quires us to make. It also puts into per-
spective the least-cost argument often 
used to justify its implementation in aid 
responses. As a guiding principle for 
agricultural and social policies aimed at 
tackling the structural causes of vulner-
ability, and as a framework including all 
types of risks and shocks (not only the 
“natural” ones) resilience is inevitably 
a costly and, in the end, bothersome 
notion for States and funding bodies, 
since it reveals their own inadequacies 
and inconsistencies. 
Although it is too early to draw 
any conclusions about the use of resil-
ience in the Sahel, two key assessment 
criteria could be addressed in the years 
to come: its capacity for integration, 
which is often highlighted; and its ca-
pacity to legitimize and promote truly 
effective public action in favor of Sahe-
lian farmers and shepherds, local value 
chains, and urban consumers.
In Search of the Resilient Sahelian: Reflections on a Fashionable Notion
143
Bibliography
ACF-International. 2010. Food Security 
and Livelihoods Assessment Guideline. 
A Practical Guide for Fields Workers, 
Action Contre la Faim International, 
April.
Altieri, M. A., and C. L. Nicholls. 2012. 
“Agroecology Scaling Up for Food Sov-
ereignty and Resiliency.” Sustainable 
Agriculture Reviews 11: 1–29.
Béné, C. 2013. “Towards a Quantifiable 
Measure of Resilience.” IDS Working 
Paper, Volume 2013, Number 434. In-
stitute of Development Studies, Poverty 
and Inequality Research Cluster.
Béné, C., R. Godfrey Wood, A. News-
ham, and M. Davies. 2012. “Resilience: 
New Utopia or New Tyranny? Reflec-
tion about the Potentials and Limits of 
the Concept of Resilience in Relation to 
Vulnerability Reduction Programmes.” 
IDS Working Paper, Number 405, Sep-
tember, 61 p.
Cabell, J-F., and M. Oelofse. 2012. “An 
Indicator Framework for Assessing 
Agroecosystem Resilience.” Ecology and 
Society 17 (1): 18.
Constas, M., J. Cisse, E. Knippenberg, 
and K. Downie. 2016. “A Focused Re-
view of Methodologies to Measure 
Resilience: An Analysis of Conceptual 
Presentations, Indicators, and Estima-
tion Procedures.” The Technical Con-
sortium, CGIAR. Technical Report Se-
ries No 2.
Dercon, S. 2005. Vulnerability: A Micro 
Perspective. Department of Internation-
al Development, Oxford University, 
QEH Working Paper Series, 149, April.
De Schutter, O. 2014. “Final Report: The 
Transformative Potential of the Right to 
Food.” Report of the Special Rappor-
teur on the Right to Food, 24 January.
ECOWAS Commission. 2012. “To-
wards Local-Level Food Security in 
West Africa: ‘Zero Hunger in West Af-
rica’.” Position Paper, September.
European Union. 2012. The European 
Union Approach to Resilience: Lessons 
Learnt from Food Security Crisis. Euro-
pean Commission, 3 October. 
FAO. 2013. Climate-Smart Agriculture, 
Sourcebook. Rome: Food and Agricul-
ture Organization of the United Na-
tions.
FAO. 2016a. RIMA-II. Resilience In-
dex Measurement and Analysis. Rome: 
Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations.
FAO. 2016b. Les Caisses de résilience. 
Consolider la résilience des commu-
nautés en renforçant les capacités pro-
ductives, financières et sociales des 
ménages à travers une approche in-
tégrée. Rome: Organisation des Nations 
Unies pour l’Agriculture et l’Alimenta-
tion.
FAO. 2017. Caisses de résilience in Mali. 
Promoting women’s empowerment and 
improving nutrition for vulnerable 
World Food Policy
144
households through an integrated ap-
proach. Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations.
Gallopin, G. C. 2006. “Linkages Be-
tween Vulnerability, Resilience, and 
Adaptative Capacity.” Global Environ-
mental Change 16: 293–303.
Gondard-Delcroix, C., and S. Rousseau. 
2004. “Vulnérabilité et stratégies dura-
bles de gestion des risques  : une étude 
appliquée aux ménages ruraux de Mad-
agascar.” Développement Durable et 
Territoires, Dossier 3, février.
Grünewald, F. 2014. “La résilience et 
les ONG.” In Fragilités et résilience, Les 
nouvelles frontières de la mondialisation, 
Châtaigner J. M., dir., 221–228. Karthala. 
Hampshire, K. R., C. Panter-Brick, K. 
Kilpatrick, and R. Casiday. 2009. “Sav-
ing Lives, Preserving Livelihoods: Un-
derstanding Risk, Decision-Making 
and Child Health in a Food Crisis.” So-
cial Science & Medicine 68: 758–765.
Holling, C. S. 1973. “Resilience and Sta-
bility of Ecological Systems.” Annual 
Review of Ecological Systems 4: 1–23.
Jaspars, S., and S. O'Callaghan. 2010. 
“Livelihoods and Protection in Situa-
tions of Protracted Conflict.” Disasters 
34: 165–182.
Lallau, B. 2008. “Les agriculteurs afr-
icains entre vulnérabilité et résilience. 
Pour une approche par les capabilités de 
la gestion des risques.” Revue Française 
de Socio-Economie 1, 1er semestre.
Lallau, B. 2012. “Land grabbing ver-
sus investissements fonciers à grande 
échelle. Vers un ‘accaparement respons-
able’ ?.” L’homme et la Société 183-184: 
15–34.
Lallau, B., and I. Droy. 2014. “Rural 
Households in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Conceptual Considerations and Meth-
odological Issues on Resilience.” Resil-
ience 2014. Montpellier, France.
Leturque, H. 2013. “Social Safety Net 
Mechanisms in West Africa: Support-
ing the Emergence of National Preven-
tion Measures.” Thematic Note N°7. 
IRAM. 
Luthar, S. 2006. “Resilience in Devel-
opment: A Synthesis Across Five De-
cades.” In Developmental Psychopathol-
ogy: Risk, Disorder, and Adaptation, 
edited by D. Cicchetti and D. J. Cohen, 
740–795. New York: Wiley.
Mortimore, M. 1989. Adapting to 
Drought: Farmers, Famines and Desert-
ification in West Africa. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Oxfam. 2013. “The New Alliance: A 
New Direction Needed.” Briefing Note, 
September.
Pingali, P., L. Alinovi, and J. Sutton. 
2005. “Food Security in Complex 
Emergencies: Enhancing Food System 
Resilience.” Disasters 29: 5–24.
Reghezza-Zitt, M., S. Rufat, G. Dja-
ment-Tran, et al. 2012. “What Resil-
ience is not: Uses and Abuses.” Cyber-
In Search of the Resilient Sahelian: Reflections on a Fashionable Notion
145
geo: European Journal of Geography 
article 621, October.
Sen, A. 1981. Poverty and Famines: An 
Essay on Entitlements and Deprivation. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. 
Oxford: Oxford   University Press.
UNISDR. 2002. Living with Risk. A 
Global Review of Disaster Reduction Ini-
tiatives. Genève: United Nations.
USAID. 2013. “The Resilience Agenda: 
Measuring Resilience in USAID.” Tech-
nical Note, June.
Walker, B. H., L. H. Gunderson, A. P. 
Kinzig, C. Folke, S. R. Carpenter, and 
L. Schultz. 2006. “A Handful of Heuris-
tics and Some Propositions for Under-
standing Resilience in Social-Ecologi-
cal Systems.” Ecology and Society 11 (1).
Walker, B. H., C. S. Holling, S. R. Car-
penter, and A. P. Kinzig. 2004. “Resil-
ience, Adaptability and Transforma-
bility in Social-Ecological Systems.” 
Ecology and Society 9 (2  ).
Watts, M., and H. G. Bohle. 1993. “The 
Space of Vulnerability: The Causal 
Structure of Hunger and Famine.” Prog-
ress in Human Geography 17 (1), pp 43-
67.
World Bank. 2013. “Risk and Opportu-
nity, Managing Risk for Development.” 
World Development Report 2014. 
Washington, DC.



